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Norm is the one who is short-sighted, or perhaps more accurately, functionally blind, for overlooking the Moon, which is the only realistic near-term location for our next manned outpost in space.

Comment by Nelson Bridwell — May 4, 2011 @ 1:16 pm

Space tourism is going to be at the core of the new age of private commercial space operations. And private commercial companies like Bigelow Aerospace already have plans to set up hotels on the lunar surface.

With the recent evidence of significant water at the lunar poles, practically every nation on Earth that has any aspirations for space is focusing on the Moon and accessing those water resources.

Norm Augustine’s love for the ISS is what’s hurting NASA, IMO. I thought Norm said that NASA should be focusing its resources on beyond LEO missions? So how is spending $3 billion dollars a year of NASA’s limited resources on the ISS helping them to fund beyond LEO missions? There’s no way we should be spending $3 billion a year for the ISS program if its truly an international program supported by the US, Russia, Europe, Japan, and Canada. One billion a year from US tax payers for this international program should suffice, IMO! And if more funds are needed then maybe we should add more partners like India, South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, and China to help fund this program.

IMO, NASA should be helping to promote US manufactured space stations by purchasing a couple of large and cheap Bigelow space stations for its own use as way stations for beyond LEO missions launched into orbit by NASA’s future HLV. This would give the some of the largest Bigelow space stations such as the BA 2100 the NASA stamp of approval which should help to promote their sale to other nations and to private companies.

But every poll that I’ve seen over the past few years strongly supports going to the Moon to set up a lunar base over a sortie to Mars since it is viewed as a much more realistic goal that can be achieved more quickly and cheaply than going to Mars. There’s also no doubt in my mind that a Moon base will be one of the major keys towards eventually setting up permanent bases on the moons of Mars and on the surface of Mars.

The problem with NASA over the past 40 years is the failure of the President and Congress to allow NASA to make the next logical step in our space program after the end of the Apollo program. And that next logical step was to set up a permanent human presence on the surface of the Moon!

Comment by Marcel F. Williams — May 4, 2011 @ 2:32 pm

The basic problem with the administration’s “space policy” is that it is all safely located in the distant future. To even discuss events 30 years in the future as though they were anything but science fiction is folly, yet that is what the president is doing. Talking about Mars and the asteroids is sexier than talking about the moon. The reality is that the moon, Mars and some of the asteroids are all good targets and need to be developed concurrently with the primary focus on establishing permenant and eventually self-sustaining colonies. Manned space flight only makes sense for colonization. Science can be done by robots cheaper and easier. Missions whose sole purpose is flag planting and rock gathering are pointless. They are too expensive and too risky.

Comment by Doug Turnbull — May 4, 2011 @ 2:45 pm

I fear our space agency will soon become an entity that does a lot of planning but nothing more…

Comment by William McEwen — May 4, 2011 @ 4:02 pm

Dr. Spudis,

Since I was a participant in one of the comments sections you linked to (on Rand Simbergs’s site). I would point out there is one more nasty part to this debate (if you want to call it a debate). The repeated snide implications that Cernan’s positions might be due to mental impairment due to his “advancing age”.

On the Space Politics Web Site, when confronted with this Simberg replied: “Can you cite an actual person who has said we shouldn’t listen to Cernan because he’s old? What people have said, is that his advancing age might be an explanation for why he’s saying such blatantly clueless things.”

Somebody is clearly becoming unhinged here, but I do not think it is Cernan.

Comment by Joe — May 4, 2011 @ 5:38 pm

I think what’s going on here is that the new administration is indeed short sighted. By that I mean they are taking affordable and measured steps to get where we eventually want to be, which is beyond Earth orbit, and eventually down into gravity wells. These measured steps would have us gaining confidence in cis-lunar free space. Confidence in life support, nav, comm, propulsion systems, etc. with specific efforts to make those things as economical as possible before we add a landing vehicle and surface ops into the mix. You are being long sighted, in that you want to skip the affordable, measured steps and go STRAIGHT to the Moon. I say there is some sense in being “short sighted”, if that’s what this administration is being accused of being.

No one is arguing about whether development of the Moon is in the interest of human space flight. It is. The question is whether that is the right direction in the near term, or whether living and working there can be best approached via a flexible path strategy. Once we have a safe, inexpensive, and sustainable plan to go to the Moon, which we absolutely don’t have now, then let’s rev up the bulldozers, start growing flowers, and get into refining lunar propellant, oxygen, and hey, why not, helium-3.

Oh, by the way, we’re learning how to live and work in space right now. We do it on ISS, and that, you should know, has nothing at all to do with the Moon.

Comment by Heinrich Monroe — May 4, 2011 @ 5:53 pm

What exactly is the problem with commercial sector providing fixed-price launch services, for cargo and later humans ?
Because that’s what the “commercial” part of the policy is about.

It already seems to be driving down launch prices, with Falcon9 at $54 M, which should mean cheaper lunar probes ?

Comment by kert — May 4, 2011 @ 6:01 pm

By that I mean they are taking affordable and measured steps to get where we eventually want to be, which is beyond Earth orbit, and eventually down into gravity wells.

Yes, I understand that this is what is believed by the advocates of the new direction. I’m not buying it. I do not accept that the “flexible path” is an attempt to go everywhere and do everything. I believe it is an effort to dismantle an existing space infrastructure and nobody running the program really cares whether it is replaced by a new space faring system of not.

by the way, we’re learning how to live and work in space right now. We do it on ISS, and that, you should know, has nothing at all to do with the Moon.

You’re not learning how to use the existing resources of space to survive and thrive there. That is the obvious next step after ISS and one that is ignored in the new direction.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 4, 2011 @ 6:07 pm

What exactly is the problem with commercial sector providing fixed-price launch services, for cargo and later humans ?

Nothing. When such exist, I would be happy for NASA to use them.

Because that’s what the “commercial” part of the policy is about.

Their statement and your opinion. Reality may be different.

It already seems to be driving down launch prices, with Falcon9 at $54 M, which should mean cheaper lunar probes ?

A vehicle which has flown once. Get back to me with a price after about the next dozen flights.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 4, 2011 @ 6:09 pm

Paul and I think Cernan have revealed an inconvenient truth about so-called commercial space. A lot of so-called commercial space advocates cannot distinguish between actual markets and potential markets. A space entrepreneur can say, for example, that they plan to have a launcher than can boost such and such number of metric tons for such and such amount of money, and it is the same as if it had already been done. An actual investor who does not propose to lose their shirt would want more proof than someone’s word before pouring money into such a concept.

They also really get irate when one describes government funding for commercial space for what it is—a subsidy. This might be OK if private markets for commercial space actually existed in forms other than partially completed inflatable space stations on the ground in a factory. There are no efforts on the government level to encourage such markets, such as the zero gravity zero taxes concept. All commercial space is right now is a potential for servicing government clients with a slightly different accounting method.

Comment by Mark Whittington — May 4, 2011 @ 6:23 pm

A vehicle which has flown once.

It has flown twice, Paul. Which is two times more than any vehicle that NASA has developed in the last thirty years, and at a price at least an order of magnitude below what standard industry cost models would indicate it would, if done by NASA.

Comment by Rand Simberg — May 4, 2011 @ 6:26 pm

Somebody is clearly becoming unhinged here, but I do not think it is Cernan.

I will note that no one was discussing Captain Cernan’s age at Space Politics until you brought it up, and no one has said we should pay no attention to him because he is old, except in your imagination. You seem to be obsessed with the subject.

Comment by Rand Simberg — May 4, 2011 @ 6:34 pm

It has flown twice, Paul.

I stand corrected.

Which is two times more than any vehicle that NASA has developed in the last thirty years

By vehicle, I assume you mean launch vehicle. None were developed because none were needed until now.

and at a price at least an order of magnitude below what standard industry cost models would indicate it would, if done by NASA.

Ah yes, those wonderful cost models. The same ones that told us that lunar return is “unaffordable.” Anyway, good for them. Since they’re so smart, why do they need NASA money?

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 4, 2011 @ 6:45 pm

By vehicle, I assume you mean launch vehicle. None were developed because none were needed until now.

Apparently, someone disagreed, because there have been many failed attempts. Including Ares.

Since they’re so smart, why do they need NASA money?

They don’t need NASA money. But with the retirement of the Shuttle, NASA desperately needs their services, so they’re happy to accelerate their ability to provide them in return for money.

Comment by Rand Simberg — May 4, 2011 @ 6:51 pm

Comment by Rand Simberg — May 4, 2011 @ 6:34 pm

This is what you wrote on the Space Politics Webssite:

Rand Simberg wrote @ May 4th, 2011 at 2:10 pm
“What people have said, is that his advancing age might be an explanation for why he’s saying such blatantly clueless things. If he were younger, we would have to seek a different explanation, but his statements would be as clueless, regardless of his age.”

“advancing age”, “If he were younger, we would have to seek a different explanation”. Your words sir not mine.

Dr. Spudis, I apologize for bringing this dreck to your website and promise not to respond to Mr. Simberg on this subject in this forum any further.

Comment by Joe — May 4, 2011 @ 7:04 pm

I think people have to keep in mind, what Rand Simberg had said regarding NASA, congress, and politicians in general, that space isn’t important. If Space was important it would a major part of a campaign for President. It never has been, nor is it likely to be this time around. Of course it’s always mentioned, but it’s not a major part of a campaign.

Though this is also true of any governmental dept or agency- even the ones which get far more funding than NASA.

As far as the Shuttle program, that is basically over.
But dealing with all the government employees and private contractors involved with Shuttle program is what the “current debate” is all about.
The plan to make a NASA heavy lift has little to do with actually making a heavy lifter and is all about dealing with government employees and private contractors. And btw, if that is truly the only way or best way to deal with this- I don’t have much of problem with it. Handling NASA work force should be [and is politically] important.

ISS is certainly not over, and I would be happier if it’s intended life was extended beyond 2015.

Now when I say NASA heavy lift isn’t going to happen- some people aren’t going to agree with this. First of all, I would happy if NASA could built something of the capability of Saturn V [again]. As would I like it very much if NASA could build a ShuttleII.
BUT I think you look again at what Rand Simberg said, it provides the answer.

Now, what we need to do is make Space important. And if it the sole thing that presidential candidate runs on, we can then consider that job is done.

Space is important.
The public wouldn’t disagree. But the public isn’t well informed about it.
IF we make space important, the public will become well informed about it.
Some people will wrongly conclude that what I mean is that what Space *really needs* is more PR. And it is NOT what I mean.
First, I have to start with the obvious that space at this moment in time is important- it’s important because of what the private sector is doing in terms of the satellite market. And second reason it’s currently important is what military doing regarding satellites.
Few things are more critical to “modern life”.

I would say the reason why space isn’t regarded as important by politicans and the public is because the American’s space agency has failed them.
NASA FAILED the American public and the world in general, because they been operating from the point of view that space isn’t important. They have more important things to worry about.
This whole fight over the Hvy lift is example of what they regard as important. It’s nothing to do with what a hvy lift will do. I can think lots of things NASA could do with a Hvy lift- it doesn’t require much effort. But what NASA is going to do with the Hvy Lift- isn’t the issue.
And it *should* be the only issue of any importance.

Why would a ShuttleII or hvy lift be important, but to provide cheaper and safer way to lift stuff into space?

Now talk to any person interested in Space- NASA or anyone else. They will tell you that the fundamental problem with doing anything in space is it’s too expensive.
And this is dead wrong.

The fundamental problem with space is the shortage of markets in space.
And the fundamental problem with NASA, is it hasn’t been exploring space.
And the reason space lift is expensive, could broadly fit under the category that the government is restricting rocket launch from earth.
It does this in numerous ways- for reasons thought to be more important than opening the space frontier [which btw almost anything is regarded as more important- whether particular things are "correct" or not I am not going to address].
So briefly, the US govt has been and is restricting the launch market on Earth, and has done little to open new markets in space.
NASA could open new markets in space IF it explore the Moon. It can also explore asteroids.
Exploring Mars at the moment, isn’t as important as either space rocks or the Moon- in my opinion.

But if we could develop market in space, then exploring Mars is important- not necessary as a new market. It’s important because it’s someplace people might live in the future. Mining asteroids could become a significant market and Mars is closer to the main asteroid belt. Among other things. But I think the inner planets are also important, if we can first establish markets in space.

And the first market in space we should develop is a market for rocket fuel in space. This is a priority, but it doesn’t require much in terms of the amount money from the budget or NASA involvement.
In terms of budget, ISS, is a major part, handling the end of shuttle program is another. After that, we should spending a considerable amount of NASA budget on robotic lunar exploration.
I am not absolutely positive that there is water on the Moon. And more importantly, I don’t think we know enough to give much more say 50% chance that there minable water on the Moon. And robotic exploration can give more certainty in this regard.
Or you can say we about same point with fusion technology as we are in whether there is minable water on the Moon.
It can not become market until more is discovered.

Comment by gbaikie — May 4, 2011 @ 7:36 pm

If China, or Russia, or Japan are on the Moon in the 2020′s mining water and selling rocket fuel to NASA and to private US spaceflight companies, people are going to wonder how the US became dependent on foreign sources of fuel even in the new frontier. And then we’re going to be playing catch up, if we have the money and the political will, in a place where we should have had total technological and economic dominance!

But if we don’t have the political will to invest in mining lunar water at that time, I guess we’ll just be content to rely on foreign sources of extraterrestrial fuel just as we’ve become content to import foreign sources of fuel here on Earth. And we’ll be a much poorer country for it with more jobs being created in other countries than right here in the USA!

Comment by Marcel F. Williams — May 4, 2011 @ 9:08 pm

As far as Capt. Cernan.

I would liked him to answer whether he thought there was minable water on the Moon.
What sort of conditions on moon would indicate whether there was minable water.

I would also ask if there was anything more important for NASA to do in the next decade or so, then answering this type of question. If so, what?

As for the questions asked:

“What are your thoughts as we near the end of the shuttle program in a couple of months?

Speaking of museums, what did you think about the decision to bypass Houston for a retired orbiter?

It’s been almost 40 years since you left the moon. At the time did you think it would be at least that long before humans went back?

Do you have any hope for commercial space efforts, like Space X?

Is there anything that excites you about the present or near future of the space program?

What do you think about a one-way mission to Mars? ”

I guess the best question is this one: “Is there anything that excites you about the present or near future of the space program? ”

And basically, he replied he has confidence in the congress.

So I guess he didn’t mention anything about the current space program that excites him.
Though I suppose congress involvement building rockets is what he meant. Which could be translated to mean he met with one or more congress persons and discussed things which he though was very encouraging.

I also wonder since NASA is spending a lot public funds involved with ISS what kinds things related to this program excites him most.

Comment by gbaikie — May 4, 2011 @ 9:37 pm

I guess the best question is this one: “Is there anything that excites you about the present or near future of the space program? ”
And basically, he replied he has confidence in the congress.
So I guess he didn’t mention anything about the current space program that excites him.

The context of this question was in regard to the future direction of the space program (it came at the end of that series), so yes, I believe that you can take it that he is not happy about the new path.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 5, 2011 @ 3:55 am

When a discussion become heated, it is a good idea to return to the basic facts of the case – a reset as it were.

1) Commercial Crew

In the latest round of this, CCDEV-2, NASA awarded contracts to four companies:

Company: SpaceX
Spacecraft: Dragon, 1 successful launch and recovery of the cargo version
Launchers: Falcon 9, 2 successful launches

Company: Boeing
Spacecraft: CST-100, in development
Launcher: Atlas 5

Company: Sierra Nevada
Spacecraft: Dream Chaser, in development – substantial hardware built.
Launcher: Atlas 5

Company: Blue Origin
Spacecraft: Biconic capsule, in development
Launcher: Atlas 5

3 out of 4 proposals use the Atlas 5. Atlas 5 has had 24 successful launches, 1 abort-to-orbit (equivalent) and no losses since it was put into production. It is part of the EELV program for the US Airforce, launching the surveillance sats that are the crown jewels of US national security.

Falcon 9 has had 2 successful launches to date and is entering series production.

CST-100 is based on the work that Boeing did in their bid for the Orion capsule project.

Sierra Nevada has been around for 50 years, Boeing is… well I don’t really have to say anything about that. SpaceX was found in 2002. Blue Origin was founded in 2000.

So, we have 2 launchers. Both exist and are in use. One is new, the other is a proven launcher used for the most valuable loads the US military has.

We have 4 potential spacecraft. One is new, currently in final testing as an un-manned cargo vehicle (SpaceX). One is based on a design for the Orion project, by one of the largest and oldest aerospace contractors in the world (Boeing). One is a space place, using a tested NASA design (HL-20), being built by a well established aerospace contractor (SNC). One is being built by a another new company (Blue Origin).

All the rockets exist. No paper. One is just entering service, the other is well established.

Of the space craft, 1 exists in cargo form (Dragon). 2 have had substantial hardware built (Dream Chaser & CST-100). The status of the last (Blue Origin) is uncertain, but metal has been cut.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 6:24 am

When a discussion become heated, it is a good idea to return to the basic facts of the case – a reset as it were.

All right, let’s discuss some facts.

1. I am not arguing against COTS, which was part of the original VSE plan from the beginning. We are discussing the proposal by the administration’s FY2012 budget to terminate Constellation, a project to build a government-designed and run space access system, and provide those funds instead to “commercial” space entities for the promise of the development of a future “commercial” space transportation system to and from LEO, with which NASA will contract for crew and cargo access to the ISS. This discussion focuses on the wisdom of terminating the Shuttle replacement and relying instead on systems that are not yet built, not yet demonstrated and not yet certain in terms of performance and reliability. It also relates to compelling national interests in maintaining a technical capability versus discarding one without due consideration of all the possible consequences.

2. NASA has always had access to Atlas and Delta launch vehicles and has always used them. No one is arguing otherwise. Falcon 9 is another story. As you note, it has had two successful launches, but the Dragon boilerplate was not an operational spacecraft (nor was it intended to be) and the Falcon 9 system is still “in development” (to use your own words). To argue otherwise, one would have to consider Ares I “operational” (and I do not) because they had a launch of a dummy payload too.

3. We have lots of “potential spacecraft” and always have had them. That is not the issue. The issue is do we destroy an existing infrastructure and technical capability for what is essentially an act of faith, that future “commercial” space operators will fill the void of the terminated capability. Different people have different opinions on that and such is the subject of this post.

Thank you for your reasoned input to the discussion.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 5, 2011 @ 8:11 am

1. I would submit that CCDEV is somewhat different, but related to COTS. I would also suggest that FY2012 plan *appeared* to be the following – replace Ares I with Commercial Crew and replace Ares V with something else, developed by NASA in the traditional manner.

2.1 Until the appearance of COTS/CCDEV, there was a very concerted front that EELV could never be used for manned flights, from some parties. This has now disappeared.

2.2 I would suggest that Falcon 9 is somewhere very close to operational, if not actually operational. It has carried out some initial test flights. The following flights are scheduled to carry actual payloads – such as the Dragon for the COTS 2/3 flight and commercial satellites. This is not operational for manned flight, but it is start in that direction. ARES I only flew a test, where most of the vehicle was not the planned ARES I vehicle (4 seg, dummy seg, dummy upper stage, control system).

2.3 The orbital Dragon had a great deal of capabilities – heat shield, pressure vessel, thrusters. Even windows. Is such a vehicle really a boiler-plate? If so, it is a rather advanced one (in the sense of nearly being the “real thing”). The “real thing” being the cargo vessel for ISS. Equivalent to the LEM on Apollo 10 – in terms of being nearly ready as a cargo ship to ISS?

3. The space craft options that might reasonably be considered to be available are Orion, Dragon, CST-100, Dream Chaser and Blue Origin. The first two actually exist in a semi-complete form. It is worth noting that there is increasing talk from NASA and the contractors about flying Orion on an EELV.

It seems to me that there are the following options (that have some plausibility – in political terms) :

A) COTS/Commercial Crew to ISS. Orion/SLS to BEO. Orion as backup to ISS on EELV.
B) COTS/Commercial Crew to ISS. Orion as backup to ISS on EELV. No BEO
C) Orion/SLS to ISS & BEO.

Option C) is rather problematic, since either you have a very small SLS (or an ARES I alike solution) or you use an HLV to launch to ISS. Getting the flight rate required and the probable cost makes the HLV-to-ISS seem a challenging idea.

In all these discussions it might be a good idea to specifically separate the LEO and BEO issues. Even if the same system is being used for both, the differing requirements will mean that the two uses will be quite distinct.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 9:09 am

Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 6:24 am

Since you seem to be knowledgeable about the CCDev2 activities, I have a question.

I was under the impression that a company called Paragon was working the ECLSS/Launch and Entry Suit portion of Commercial Crew (all vehicle configurations). Yet they did not receive an allotment. Are they subcontracted to Space-X, Boeing, etc.?

Comment by Joe — May 5, 2011 @ 9:21 am

While I agree with you that the Moon remains a viable exploration destination, I do not share your support for Capt. Cernan’s remarks, Dr. Spudis.

He mischaracterizes the COTS, CRS, and CCDev programs as giving away the space program without oversight. That is simply not true. The companies given awards under those contracts are required to meet certain technical and programmatic milestones before they get paid. NASA has to confirm that those milestones are met to its satisfaction.

We’re doing the same thing for commercial payloads flying to the Station. If they are self-funded, we only require they meet safety and interface requirements. If they use NASA funds, we require technical and programmatic milestones be met and certain data products provided to ensure the Agency has sufficient insight without unnecessarily constraining their technical design.

Contrary to what Mark Whittington keeps repeating, NASA buying down development risk to enable the creation of services that it intends to purchase is not a traditional subsidy. Otherwise, we might as well concede to Airbus that Boeing doing research work for NASA and fulfilling military contracts constitutes an unfair subsidy for its commercial business.

I also don’t understand why he puts his faith in a Congress that sat by and did nothing while Constellation went off the rails, even as the GAO was warning that NASA had failed to close the business case. I know colleagues at Marshall that are grumbling even now about being forced to work on a rocket – SLS – with no mission and no real payload. Congress has spent more time arguing over where to retire the Orbiters than working with the White House to set a NASA policy and budget that we can all live with. From where I sit, it looks like their only interest is keeping federal funds going to their home states.

If you want to talk about real markets, let’s talk about the fact that SpaceX has signed the single largest telecom launch deal ever. At PM Challenge earlier this year, I heard Andy Aldrin himself say that SpaceX is going to change the commercial launch marketplace if their approach works out. Iridium, Loral, and SES all trust the Falcon 9. Those are real customers with real money.

With regards to your Point 1, as of the most recent CR, NASA has authority to proceed with Constellation termination. That was also accepted by the 2010 Authorization Act. The FY2012 budget proposal does include significant funds for MPCV and the Space Launch System, so I don’t agree with your characterization that the administration proposes to take from Constellation to just give away to CCDev. That’s just not accurate. Neither Orion nor Ares were any more or less certain than MPCV or SLS, so I’m not sure what you think we’ve lost there.

As far as Point 2, the Aldridge Commission was pretty explicit that NASA should have been using existing boosters to get the next-generation program up and running, anyways. I think we’d be having a much different discussion today if NASA had followed that advice and put Orion on top of an EELV. One of my colleagues, who once worked for Spacehab, told me about the time Horowitz killed their proposal to fly on an Atlas V when he made it clear he would never allow it to be man-rated.

For Point 3, I think it is much less of a leap of faith to rely on commercial LEO service providers than it would have been to continue with Constellation under these budgets. If the status quo had prevailed, we’d have been saddled with an LEO-only Orion and Ares I with nowhere to go, once US participation in the ISS was terminated in 2015.

What’s the point in saving existing launch infrastructure if you can’t do anything useful with it and you don’t have enough money to build the useful parts? I can’t say that I’m necessarily happy with the “compromise” policy in the 2010 Authorization Act, but it’s better than the path we were on.

I agree that we currently lack a compelling mission for the human space program. In this fiscal environment, though, I think our only chance at figuring that out and moving forward is through public-private partnerships to get to LEO. I don’t think we can afford it any other way.

Comment by Justin Kugler — May 5, 2011 @ 9:23 am

I would also suggest that FY2012 plan *appeared* to be the following – replace Ares I with Commercial Crew and replace Ares V with something else, developed by NASA in the traditional manner.

The administration plan was to “study” an Ares V replacement, not build one. The new authorization directs NASA to build one using existing Shuttle-derived hardware.

The space craft options that might reasonably be considered to be available are Orion, Dragon, CST-100, Dream Chaser and Blue Origin.

Four spacecraft concepts ordered in terms of readiness to operationally fly, not a list of four operational spaceflight systems.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 5, 2011 @ 9:28 am

Joe, Paragon did not get a direct award for CCDev2 because this round was focused on flight vehicle development. Note that none of the booster developers received awards, either.

Comment by Justin Kugler — May 5, 2011 @ 9:29 am

24. We do not have any operational systems – apart from Shuttle (though it has been argued by a number of experienced people that Shuttle is an experimental system, not an operational one). Which is being discontinued because of the conclusions of the CAIB report.

We need an LEO system and a BEO system (IMHO).

The LEO system is vital. CST-100/Atlas 5 is virtually risk free technically. The risk is cost. Orion/EELV has a higher cost/cost risk, and there are issues with sizing the spacecraft. Dragon/Falcon 9 has higher technical risks, but offer potentially lower costs. Dragon is further along than Orion at this point. Dream Chaser/Atlas 5 has higher technical risks, but the company is well established, the launcher is proven and the spacecraft based on a very well studied and tested design. Blue Origin is the wild card.

Note that with the last two we have innovative R&D going on – a new space plane and in the case of Blue Origin, they are developing their own reusable TSTO to replace the Atlas 5 at a future date. Given that R&D in such areas has been frozen by past failures/cancellations within NASA, this is interesting.

23. Not sure – my understanding is that Paragon successfully completed their work under CCDEV-1.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 9:44 am

Justin,

You and I can just agree to disagree on most of this. My support of Cernan’s arguments is largely to share his mistrust and skepticism of the facile and unsupported claims of many in the New Space community who seem to think they understand spaceflight and the space business. Some do, but most do not. I do think that providing billions to New Space companies for system development is a government subsidy. I do not agree that we “don’t have the money for a traditional space program” and such a paradigm is not supported by the new direction, which proposes to spend more money on NASA than previously planned. Discarding the strategic direction of the VSE was and is the biggest mistake of the new direction; the conclusions of the Augustine committee that we could not afford lunar return was simply wrong, as I have documented here in many posts. Project Constellation may have been the wrong approach to implementing the VSE, but it was fixable and the committee never seriously looked at such an option, even though they were presented with several different possibilities.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 5, 2011 @ 9:48 am

We do not have any operational systems – apart from Shuttle (though it has been argued by a number of experienced people that Shuttle is an experimental system, not an operational one). Which is being discontinued because of the conclusions of the CAIB report.

If a system that has conducted 133 flights, all but two of them successfully, cannot be considered “operational”, then there is no such thing as an operational system. The Shuttle is not being discontinued because of anything in the CAIB; it is being terminated because we could not afford to keep it flying and simultaneously build a new spaceflight system (the former Constellation) at the same time under the existing budget envelope.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 5, 2011 @ 9:54 am

28. I’m not sure that I follow on the “billions for New Space” part. Even if COTS/CCDEV were terminated completely, the funds would not suffice to build the landers and other items required for VSE.

All the numbers I have seen suggest that at the current NASA budget, we have enough money to pay for COTS/CCDEV (to ISS) and maybe build a simple version of SLS (4 seg, inline, 3 SSME). Payloads for SLS would be extra.

What is your proposal? I am missing something, I think.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 9:59 am

29. The suggestion that Shuttle is still an experimental system has come from people within the Shuttle program, I believe. By this, they mean that a Shuttle flight is more characteristic of an X-15 flight than, say, an SR-71 flight. 1 in 90 and all that.

It was my understanding that the reason that the Shuttle was terminated was the nature and risk of the system. This lead to the requirement to replace it. The financial reason for terminating it before Constellation came on line was, as you say, that doing both at the same time was a budget buster.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 10:04 am

The President did initially propose an increase in NASA’s budget, Dr. Spudis, but that is not the case anymore. The FY2011 CR passed by Congress and signed by the President actually funds NASA at slightly less than FY2010. The FY2012 proposal essentially holds the line on spending. You appear to be basing most of your argument on the original FY2011 proposal that was not implemented.

We don’t have the money for an Apollo-style architecture, which is what the Constellation Program was. Augustine concluded that we couldn’t afford lunar return under that paradigm, not that we couldn’t afford return at all. There were lunar return options in their report.

With flat budgets, at best, for the foreseeable future, NASA has to change the way it does business if we’re going to have a serious exploration program. Neil deGrasse Tyson showed in the lecture he gave at the University of Houston last month that NASA’s effective buying power has stayed about the same for the past 30 years.

If that’s not an indictment of the status quo, I don’t know what is.

Comment by Justin Kugler — May 5, 2011 @ 10:07 am

I’m not sure that I follow on the “billions for New Space” part.

I am referring to the original administration’s FY11 budget request, which proposed to spend $500 M in FY11, ramping up to between $1.2 B and $1.4 B for the next four years, on what they called “Commercial crew and cargo.”

It was my understanding that the reason that the Shuttle was terminated was the nature and risk of the system.

Some on the CAIB thought that, but after the Shuttle return-to-flight redesigns, everyone involved in the program agreed that Shuttle was safer than it had ever been. Cost became a more determining factor.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 5, 2011 @ 10:13 am

We don’t have the money for an Apollo-style architecture, which is what the Constellation Program was. Augustine concluded that we couldn’t afford lunar return under that paradigm, not that we couldn’t afford return at all. There were lunar return options in their report.

I have said exactly this same thing on this blog for the last two years. That’s why I proposed a robotic resources-based architecture that does fit under a “constant budget.” The Augustine committee’s problem was that the mission of their “lunar return” wasn’t any better than what NASA had come up with — a series of one-off, touch-and-go Apollo-like sorties. Given that paradigm, they concluded that lander development was the tall pole in the budgetary tent and came up with the “flexible path” option to do missions to objects with small gravity wells. The problem is that these missions are still one-off, PR stunts that leave no infrastructure in place in space. So what is the “new paradigm” that is being pursued?

With flat budgets, at best, for the foreseeable future, NASA has to change the way it does business if we’re going to have a serious exploration program

I agree. That’s why Tony Lavoie and I wrote our paper (downloadable HERE).

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 5, 2011 @ 10:21 am

From what I saw of NASA’s interpretation of Flexible Path at last year’s exploration conference in Galveston, the new approach was to use commercial launch services for LEO so that NASA could focus on building the elements of an in-space transportation architecture. While ESMD would have focused on the Flagship Demonstrations and enabling technologies, OCT would have a parallel path for introducing disruptive technologies as the system progressed.

I’ve heard some talk of building up temporarily-crewed outposts at places like the Lagrangian Points and the Martian moons, to pre-position for longer-duration missions as better technologies become available. However, I do agree that it still lacks a compelling strategic vision. I don’t see that any of the proposals coming out of the White House or Congress, either.

I have read your paper with Lavoie and I’ve commented that I think it’s a good place to start the discussion about how to build a space program that actually gets things done that are relevant to our society’s interests.

Comment by Justin Kugler — May 5, 2011 @ 10:37 am

33. I was referring to the implication in the “billions for New Space” which has popped up in a number of places, that any easy alternative is to fund a traditional cost plus NASA system for the same money. There isn’t enough money for that. Also, it is rather hard to consider Boeing and SNC as New Space. After all, space companies don’t get much older than that

What I personally like about the commercial initiatives is that they are tightly tied to results, and that we have multiple competitors at this point. Out of the 4 CCDEV-2 proposals the chances that we won’t get an affordable, usable LEO system are quite low in my opinion. We may get a cheap semi-HLV as a side effect (FH).

Unless we pull out of ISS completely at this point, what is alternative? SLS to ISS is not financially viable. Orion/EELV will probably cost more than the entire CCDEV program.

Even after the safety improvements, the fundamental design of the Shuttle is still risky. None of the parts of Constellation promised to be especially cheap – though Ares I was claimed to be somewhat cheaper early in the program. Safety combined with enhanced capability was the sales pitch for Constellation.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 10:50 am

“Comment by Justin Kugler — May 5, 2011 @ 9:29 am
Joe, Paragon did not get a direct award for CCDev2 because this round was focused on flight vehicle development. Note that none of the booster developers received awards, either.”
“Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 9:44 am
Not sure – my understanding is that Paragon successfully completed their work under CCDEV-1.”

I am going by a press release from Paragon that I was shown, celebrating the successful completion of their CCDev1 work. What they produced was what is usually called a Table Top Demonstrator for an ECLSS System (not making light of that, it is the logical first step), but even their press release said the work would have to continue in CCDev2.

If we are all in agreement that an ECLSS is required for a crewed vehicle, the question remains, since Paragon (or anybody else for that matter) did not get a delineated CCDev2 allocation; How and where is that work to be done?

Comment by Joe — May 5, 2011 @ 11:03 am

It would have to be done as a supplier/subcontractor to one of the four CCDev2 winners, Joe. We’re just going to have to wait and see.

Comment by Justin Kugler — May 5, 2011 @ 11:26 am

A question for all here….

The politically, financially, and technically doable plan is something like -

1) CCDEV & COTS
2) SLS (4 Seg, 3 SSME)

The problem is that 2) is the 70 ton rocket – but it might keep the Legislative types happy.

What can we afford to put on top of 2???

Scraping ISS and 1) doesn’t give us enough money for 2) + the Moon (or anywhere else)…..

Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 12:13 pm

What can we afford to put on top of 2???

Our lunar architecture creates both a resource-processing outpost on the Moon and a reusable Earth-Moon (cislunar) space transportation system in about 16 years, all for about $87B (real year dollars). This cost (which fits under the cost assumptions of the Augustine committee) includes development and flight of a 70 metric ton HLV; see Table 3 of Spudis and Lavoie (2010).

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 5, 2011 @ 12:54 pm

Sadly, CCdev and using NewSpace, has gone from a proposal, to a religious cult; a cult very eager to burn blasphemers, and utterly intolerant of reasoned debate or questions.

It’s certainly true folks like Boeing or L/M in the mix blow a whole in the blanket statement that “they are to inexperienced” and reveal folks just against any lessoning of bloated NASA oversight. (Oversight and management directly resulting in both shuttle losses.) But most folks pushing this versus Orion/HLV are seeing it as NewSpace (or alt.space) vrs old space. As Cernan reasonably mentioned a lot of the NewSpace claims (most extreme and troubling are those from some of the executives) don’t make any sense, or contradict reality.

It’s certainly reasonable to expect without all the overhead of normal contracting you can expect dramatic, perhaps 10 fold cost reductions to develop craft. That wouldn’t surprise anyone in the industry, and why industry has long advocated such contracting changes. But new space players routinely brag about 100 fold cost reductions. In Musk’s May 4th update state
>.. The total company expenditures since being founded in 2002 through the 2010 fiscal year were less than $800
> million, which includes all the development costs for the Falcon 1, Falcon 9 and Dragon. Included in this $800 million are the
> costs of building launch sites at Vandenberg, Cape Canaveral and Kwajalein, as well as the corporate manufacturing facility
> that can support up to 12 Falcon 9 and Dragon missions per year.

I.E. hes fielded the equivalent of 1 or two of the Ares rockets, and Orion, and did all the other facilities etc purchases for 1/100th Constellations budget for Ares-1/V and Orion. $800 million is less than the cost it takes experienced biz jet makers like Cessna to get a 6 passenger bizjet designed, certified, and in production. So its certainly not unreasonable to wonder how a start up, can turn out a quality fleet of boosters and manned (or manable) reusable capsules for this? Even more reasonable to get worried by responses to such questions that range from hand waving about new visions and methodologies, to wide eyed reverent proclamations of brilliance.

Combining such suspiciously economical results, with Musk’s proclamations that SpaceX will be launching people to Mars in 10-20 years, and make a fortune selling billionaires one way tickets to Mars so they can frontier; you can really see more of the Pied Piper in Musk and the movement, then shrewd engineering and management sense.

Also note this increasingly confident and vehement defense of the new faith, comes as the companies involved have moved year after year from talking about huge undeveloped commercial markets, to talking about how NASA and the gov need to support them.

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 5, 2011 @ 1:23 pm

41. Industry cost models have been repeatedly broken in the past, for aerospace. SR-71, U2 and F117a came in at prices that were an order of magnitude less than the cost models suggested. The Skunk works at that time had a similar model to SpaceX – hire a small number of very good people and hard core in sourcing and cost control. Note what happens when the Skunk works turned away from that model.

Another way of looking at it – how much did the launch tower for Ares I cost? Isn’t that number crazy when you think about it?

Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 3:01 pm

41. Further – the prices offered for Liberty (aka Ares I part 2) and the proposal to keep on running the Shuttle are interesting. Overnight massive cost reductions are suddenly possible…..

Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 3:40 pm

As long as the emerging private spaceflight companies are tied to the perpetuation of the $3 billion a year ISS program, NASA won’t be saving any money for beyond LEO missions. $6 billion alone could probably pay for the development of a single stage reusable LOX/LH2 lunar landing vehicle.

Comment by Marcel F. Williams — May 5, 2011 @ 3:42 pm

For the next 20 years commercial will be a small-scale success in LEO, with perhaps 3 tourist flights per year.

As far as BEO, there will not be ANY sources of revenue to support comerce beyond LEO for the next 50 years (with the possible exception of one or two billionare tourist lunar flybys).

So BEO will be entirely the domain of NASA and a few other governments. If commercial firms want to play a part, they will need to taylor their products and services to meet the needs of NASA. For instance, if Boeing (which spent $17B developing the 787) were to field a lower-cost 130+ mT HLV then NASA should take it seriously.

It is not the mission of NASA to create artificial demand for a handful of private businesses.

Comment by Nelson Bridwell — May 5, 2011 @ 4:48 pm

“New Space advocates tell us that vast new markets await the advent of new commercial launch services and that they’ll be launching multiple payloads frequently, at a fraction of current launch costs.”

It seems New Space has borrowed a page out of NASA’s 1970s playbook. These were exactly the same promises that NASA made about the Shuttle and none of them ever came true. “Cheaper than Apollo, operates like an airplane, 100s of flight per year”.

New Space is nothing more than a bunch of slick hucksters in the 21st century selling their ‘miracle elixir’ that will cure all that ails space travel.

And their flaming of anybody that disagrees with them is right out of the Democrat’s play book. Hail to the chief, and redistribute the money to us.

Comment by JohnG — May 5, 2011 @ 5:40 pm

Paul, it looks like your robotic base architecture proposal ( which i fully support, if it matters) would be entirely implementable with existing American launch vehicles, Atlas V, Delta IV, and now Falcon 9, and/or Falcon Heavy when/if it comes online.

The only missing piece, for Mission 12 and onwards is dry launching and LEO refuelling of some of the components, which is routinely done on ISS today.

Everything before, and that would be for a long time, you have baselined on Atlas. Just for redundancy so that no one launcher becomes the bottleneck or critical path making the payloads compatible with both EELVs and Falcon 9 would be prudent.

So, in a sentence, why exactly would you want NASA to go at another attempt of building a launch vehicle, bearing in mind that they have failed at every single one since STS ?

Also, if recent history is of any indication ( see MSL and JWST ) , one would need EVERY PENNY AVAILABLE for development of the actual payloads, for which the currently planned SLS budget would cover nicely, don’t you think ?

Comment by kert — May 5, 2011 @ 5:53 pm

In short, i think what i am trying to say, if you really wanted a lunar return near term then you are going to need a budget for payloads, lots of payloads, and you really do not want yet another likely failed attempt at fielding a launch vehicle.

Comment by kert — May 5, 2011 @ 5:56 pm

Here is my one and only comment on this article:

Dr. Spudis stated it perfectly; “Some honestly oppose this new direction because they see it as fundamentally flawed – a shell-game attempt to divert attention away from the ongoing, systematic dismantling of our national space faring capability.”

I am one of those people. All my points are well known on the before mentioned sites. There is no substitute for HLV’s with hydrogen upper stages and Hydrogen earth departure vehicles. Space flight is inherently expensive, there is no cheap. Private space wants to exchange one standing army for another AND show a profit for their investors (Cernan is right, with NASA supporting commercial, it is not commercial). LEO is no longer space exploration- it has been explored and is now endless circles at high altitude. The water on the moon is the key to deep space human missions. Nuclear power is to the space age as steam was to the industrial age.

And….Falcon 9 “heavy” is not heavy and 27 engines is not a good idea. An anemic hypergolic pusher escape system is not a good idea. Using a human rated capsule to haul cargo is not a good idea. The whole hobby rocket retire on mars kerolox cult has never been a good idea. Fuel depots and transfer is definitely not a good idea and storables effectively turn any deep space piloted vehicle into battlestar galactica. Trying to piece together spaceships with inferior lift vehicles will take so many launches it is absurd.

Finally, Sidemount is the obi-wan Kenobi of human space flight. It is our only hope. Sidemount cargo is the way to the moon and the moon is the way to the rest of the solar system.

Thank you Dr. Spudis for stating the situation so beautifully in your article.

Comment by GaryChurch — May 5, 2011 @ 5:57 pm

“right out of the Democrat’s play book”

Sorry, one more comment; it is right out of both parties play book JohnG. (we agree on the issue but are obviously on different sides of the aisle)

Comment by GaryChurch — May 5, 2011 @ 6:01 pm

” We are discussing the proposal by the administration’s FY2012 budget to terminate Constellation, a project to build a government-designed and run space access system, and provide those funds instead to “commercial” space entities for the promise of the development of a future “commercial” space transportation system to and from LEO, with which NASA will contract for crew and cargo access to the ISS.”

Well, the idea that you can terminate a program to get additional funds for some other thing; indicates a lack of understanding of the costs of any program- namely the workforce involved in program.
So real question is what are you doing with the NASA workforce.

Is anyone suggesting that the administration isn’t managing the NASA workforce in a responsible manner?

Btw, I am not making a claim that they are doing a good or poor job in this regard.

“This discussion focuses on the wisdom of terminating the Shuttle replacement and relying instead on systems that are not yet built, not yet demonstrated and not yet certain in terms of performance and reliability.”

OK.
What is this cost of the shuttle replacement- from now until the point that it’s flying?
And how much did cost so far?
And more importantly what is it’s cost per year after it’s flying. If doesn’t launch anything in one year- how much is that in costs, if launches 2 per year how much is that cost?

And since we switching from one program to another- how much “effort” [how much costs] is being spent in order make this process as painless as possible- and as low costs as possible?

“It also relates to compelling national interests in maintaining a technical capability versus discarding one without due consideration of all the possible consequences.”

That’s a tough issue to resolve.
I would say the best way to solve this problem is:
First put a lot effort in re-training- and training in entire workforce.
Rather than do something silly, I have the ones with the technical expertise directing this effort. And in general give the workforce options/opportunities rather than “orders”.
Another aspect would the preservation of data/knowledge- strengthen existing libraries and outreach to general public. Have lot’s workshops, seminar do lots of projects- involving lot’s graduates [bring in people outside NASA].

Comment by gbaikie — May 5, 2011 @ 6:58 pm

How about a perspective from a mere enthusiast aware of his limitations?

I admit I’m no expert, but I’m very much a proponent( not cultist! )of nexspace. Why? Well, perhaps those on here skeptical of the paradigm could set me straight on a few things that, to me, to be just plain manifest truth.

1.) The NASA development model( including Constellation ) is fatally flawed.

What else should I conclude? It’s been three decades since Shuttle first launched.

That’s a significant timeframe.

Since the Reagan admin. knocked heads to pass a requirement that NASA rely on commercial vendors for – yes, UNmanned – delivery to orbit, there’s been the Atlas and Delta lines( including the DeltaIV and IV Heavy, powered by the first newly designed and built liquid fueled engine since the Shuttle ). There’s Orbital Science’s line of launchers, and more recently, SpaceX, at the very least.

That’s a significant sample size.

Even with the ‘traditional’ contractors, compare development cost, launch prices( whatever they are today ), time of development and metal to arbit. Compare to NASA oversight + cost-plus since the Shuttle.

From the peanut gallery, why should I trust another Contellation/SLS/whatever-the-acronym-of-the-day-is to do the job?

2.)Commercial space – including NEW commercial space – can no longer be knocked on ‘experience’( if it ever should have ).

Last I read, United Lauch Alliance was 54 and 0 for successful launches.

That’s a VERY significant sample size.

Orbital Science’s launch record is also excellent, recent back-to-back failures of a launcher with precisely TWO prior launches notwithstanding.

SpaceX – well, as I said, no expert, but wouldn’t three failures of decreasing signifigance, includeding multiple demonstrations of their system’s post-ignition abort and rapid turaround capabilities, followed by back-to-back successes of the Falcon1, followed by back-to-back successes for F9, – that’s 2 and 0, and 5 and 0/ 5 of 8 for Spacex – said launches emcompassing successful test of pressurized Dragon, successful deployment of two generations( going on three ) of Merlin engine, Kestrel engine, and Draco thrusters – would not all of this represent SIGNIFICANT launch and r&d experience???

From the peanut gallery, why should I have MORE faith in a cost-plus + NASA oversight program than in these companies to deliver as promised?

3.) Put up or shut up? Comm. space is WALKING their talk – right NOW.

X-core, for the first several years, on a budgetal rounding error for Spacex, never mind NASA. SpaceX, were their actual expenses ten times what Musk insistantly affirms. Armadillo, at the very low end. For starters. Say X-cor is freeloading off gov. developed technology, I dares ya.

From the peanut gallery: comparing the actual accomplishments in bent metal, time and budget – accomplished fact, TODAY, of multiple new comm. companies to NASA’s post-shuttle record, why should I trust NASA more than the ‘Newspace’ community to deliver quality for less of my taxpayer buck?

And on top of all of that, shouldn’t NASA foster the opening of space, and leverage the results, rather than go it on it’s own? doesn’t that make more sense?

From my – uninformed – position, it’s not a matter of zealotry or ideology. It’s just manifest, accomplished fact. Any comments?

Thanks

Comment by Joel — May 5, 2011 @ 7:22 pm

> Comment by Malmesbury — May 5, 2011 @ 3:01 pm

> Industry cost models have been repeatedly broken in
> the past, for aerospace. SR-71, U2 and F117a came in at
> prices that were an order of magnitude less than the cost
> models suggested. The Skunk works at that time had a
> similar model to SpaceX – hire a small number of very
> good people and hard core in sourcing and cost control. ==

But that’s the point. Musk is saying he can do 10 times better then the skunk works could at its prime, with a green team. Hes says hes developed Falcon or Dragon for less then Rutan’s charging for SpaceShip 2. A fraction of what anybodies done.

Musk and company aren’t that good or experienced as their testing problems illustrated. So where are all these miraculous cost savings coming from? What corners did they cut?

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 5, 2011 @ 7:35 pm

> Comment by JohnG — May 5, 2011 @ 5:40 pm

> New Space is nothing more than a bunch of slick hucksters
> in the 21st century selling their ‘miracle elixir’ that will
> cure all that ails space travel.

Yeah, but I think they are drinking to much of their ‘miracle elixir’. Expect a really bad hangover.

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 5, 2011 @ 7:37 pm

“I.E. hes fielded the equivalent of 1 or two of the Ares rockets, and Orion, and did all the other facilities etc purchases for 1/100th Constellations budget for Ares-1/V and Orion. $800 million is less than the cost it takes experienced biz jet makers like Cessna to get a 6 passenger bizjet designed, certified, and in production. So its certainly not unreasonable to wonder how a start up, can turn out a quality fleet of boosters and manned (or manable) reusable capsules for this? Even more reasonable to get worried by responses to such questions that range from hand waving about new visions and methodologies, to wide eyed reverent proclamations of brilliance.”

Nevermind a Cessna, it can cost billions to redesign and build a new car.
But a Cessna or Volt is something in which you going to build a lot of them and sell at low unit cost.
Cost is directly related to number people required to make it. People and time are the main costs not the materials.

So according to Musk’s numbers he has done an amazing job, I think these numbers indicate amazing management skills, but do not indicate he has done something which is impossible.
Of course Musk needed people who who had the necessary skills- but if you assume that these people already exist, then it is a matter management skills to get these people doing the job.

So in other words, these numbers he gives does not indicate
he is lying or “overselling” his achievement.
Maybe someone can give some evidence, that indicates he is significantly overselling.

“Combining such suspiciously economical results, with Musk’s proclamations that SpaceX will be launching people to Mars in 10-20 years, and make a fortune selling billionaires one way tickets to Mars so they can frontier; you can really see more of the Pied Piper in Musk and the movement, then shrewd engineering and management sense.”

Musk has already done, what most people who knew better, thought was not possible.
I wouldn’t bet against Musk, in the same sense as I wouldn’t bet against America.
I know that Musk didn’t know how to build a rocket, before he started building rockets [that's impossible for one person to know]. So just because Musk doesn’t know how to get to Mars, doesn’t mean much to me.
The real question is, can Musk get the people who can know how to get to Mars.
At this point he has no need of them- he needs to focus on building rockets for next couple years.
So what you actually saying is that Musk can’t work with smart enough people that will allow a human crew to land on Mars within 10-20 years.
If manages to actually do it in 21 years, instead 20, is this in any way serious problem/deception/Pied Piper tune?

Comment by gbaikie — May 5, 2011 @ 8:14 pm

Wasn’t a private company, the ULA (the United Launch Alliance), supposed to dramatically reduce cost for the US military space program?

I’m a strong believer in private commercial space programs. And I strongly believe that NASA should provide funds and expertise to get these companies off the ground. But that doesn’t mean that you try to replace NASA with these amateur rocket companies like Space X or even with the professional ones like the USA and ULA. In other words, “Don’t try to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs!”

We need strong private commercial space programs in the US but we also need a strong Federal space program in the US. And both should be mutually beneficial to each other.

Comment by Marcel F. Williams — May 5, 2011 @ 11:46 pm

46. So far tight budgets and strict milestones have generated results for NASA at a fraction of the costs that traditional procurement would have done. Surely, continuing gradually and carefully down a successful path is a good plan?

Comment by Malmesbury — May 6, 2011 @ 3:12 am

kert,

In short, i think what i am trying to say, if you really wanted a lunar return near term then you are going to need a budget for payloads, lots of payloads, and you really do not want yet another likely failed attempt at fielding a launch vehicle.

If you read our paper, you will see that we included costs for development and operation of a 70 mT HLV in our total program costs. So I reject the idea that building an HLV uses up all the money. Note well that we do not need an HLV to implement our architecture, but if one exists, we intend to use it.

I do not claim that NASA is the perfect agency and never have. I do claim that we now have an existing space faring technical base and infrastructure, created under the “old” model. That base is being dismantled. It is not clear that anything will replace it — promises and rhetoric are not substitutes for action and plan forward.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 4:29 am

53. SpaceX state they have developed the Falcon 1 & 9 plus Dragon for $800 million.

100x that gives you 80 Billion. Are you really saying that developing one light and one medium launcher plus a capsule should cost that? That’s the total cost for going to the moon over 16 years according to our host, here.

8 Billion would surely be more realistic for a quite expensive program…

OSC are developing developing Taurus II and the Cygnus spacecraft for somewhere less than $500 million. Given their history, I think we can say they are old space – 30 years in the business, 500+ launch vehicles, 150+ satellites. Or are they not telling the truth?

Comment by Malmesbury — May 6, 2011 @ 5:15 am

58. What about paying for the SLS on a fixed price per milestone basis, by the way? Given that it should be a really simple job, if we go for the sensible option (3 SSME, 4 seg)…. no exotic development required.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 6, 2011 @ 5:17 am

59. Some numbers to think about.

Say that the cost of employing your engineers is $200,000 – that’s salary and all overheads. Crazy generous on average, I believe.

80 Billion is 400,000 man-years at that price. The vast majority of the cost of aerospace projects is the staff costs.

At a more realistic 100,000 per employee, you are looking at 800,000 man-years

Say 50,000 employees and the rest as material purchases.

Would it really take 50,000 to build two rockets and a capsule?

Comment by Malmesbury — May 6, 2011 @ 5:42 am

“I do not claim that NASA is the perfect agency and never have. I do claim that we now have an existing space faring technical base and infrastructure, created under the “old” model. That base is being dismantled. It is not clear that anything will replace it — promises and rhetoric are not substitutes for action and plan forward.”

I think there a fair amount evidence that NASA is one best run agency in US govt.

I don’t expect that NASA will receive much of budget hit in coming years- even though we **could be** heading into worse economic trouble than we have already recently had as nation.
[Though if we have some major war- say worse than Iraq- I would have more doubts about this.]

So, if NASA basically stays around same level as it has had historically. And if you generally agree, then is your worry mostly about lack of strong NASA leadership?

Comment by gbaikie — May 6, 2011 @ 5:47 am

And if you generally agree, then is your worry mostly about lack of strong NASA leadership?

My worry is mostly about the lack of a clear statement of purpose and a strategic goal on the part of national leadership; the agency is included, but lacking direction from the top, they can’t do much (they can barely do much with it). The Vision for Space Exploration was the best strategic direction NASA ever got, yet from the beginning, they tried to torque it into something else. They never understood why we were going to the Moon, so naturally, they reverted to the Apollo model — which may have worked if we were in the Apollo political and budgetary environment. But of course, we are not.

The issues that the space community seem most preoccupied with (Heavy lift or not, Commercial or government) are all secondary to a more basic and fundamental issue: where are we going and what are we trying to do? With the VSE, we had a clear strategic direction. Without it, we do not.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 6:04 am

63. I would definitely say that current 130-ton-SLS-and-no-payloads plan is not explicable or justifiable from any point except politics.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 6, 2011 @ 6:16 am

Malmesbury,

Given that it should be a really simple job, if we go for the sensible option (3 SSME, 4 seg)…. no exotic development required

I agree and have discussed Shuttle-derived HLV before here:

http://blogs.airspacemag.com/moon/2011/01/heft-lies-and-videotape/

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 6:16 am

I would definitely say that current 130-ton-SLS-and-no-payloads plan is not explicable or justifiable from any point except politics.

Politics are always in play in any government program and space is no exception. However, in regard to the new agency authorization, I think that another reason for the specific language in relation to HLV is a desire on the part of some in Congress to maintain (to at least some degree) the existing capability and infrastructure so that a future administration can pick up the pieces of a shattered space program and rebuild it.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 6:31 am

“The Vision for Space Exploration was the best strategic direction NASA ever got, yet from the beginning, they tried to torque it into something else.”

Yes, but that can be expected.
You do of course realize that NASA “leadership” has been ignoring the Moon for decades.

That Obama will say rather strange things when off script, and the people who are writing his script are most likely very clueless about science or space.

And in terms of politics, it doesn’t do Obama any good to “appear” to following yet another of Bush’s policies. But that doesn’t mean he isn’t actually following Bush’s policy.

If he isn’t following Bush’s policy, what is Obama space policy? [other than mostly ignore the whole topic- which btw is sort of normal presidential behavior- mostly].

What can be said, is there doesn’t appear to be any great push from NASA to go to Mars. Which in my opinion, NASA had a long history doing such. And was a waste of NASA time- not mention the massive amount of delusion that this required.
Maybe there is “feedback” about the lack of NASA kidding itself about going to Mars, and this causing much talk about a lack of direction.

Direction at this point, I would expect, has to do with ending the shuttle program. And doing ISS.

One shouldn’t expect NASA to be focusing on Manned Lunar program at this point in time.
Though they should be beginning to focus on the lunar robotic aspect at this time.
The Manned aspect of lunar program could start after 2012, and still have lots of time before 2020.
Now, I like them to do a manned lunar program faster than what Bush scheduled, but that isn’t part of NASA’s stated plan [though it was option if congress would fund it sooner].
I think if Obama can avoid the bad news of shuttle lay offs just prior to his re-election, he is going to be very happy [and won't fire the people in charge at NASA].

Comment by gbaikie — May 6, 2011 @ 7:34 am

66. If that is what they want, why 130 ton? A design that means a massive redesign of the external tank – basically a new tank. 5 SSME – the 5th SSME is extremely expensive for the marginal gain. 5 Seg – unflown new design. J2X – an expensive engine that weighs literally a metric ton more than the original J2 and which has performance problems to boot. Oh, and a requirement to rebuild the crawlerways/crawlers and everything else because the weight exceeds what the infrastructure can handle…..

130 ton is a requirement to build Ares V. After having said that they (the Legislative branch) won’t fund the very large cost to develop and use it.

Note that Bolden & Co. are proposing 70 tons 3 seg / 3 SSME as their “Phase I” vehicle.

At this rate, we’d have more certainty in taking Musk up on the HLV offer!

Comment by Malmesbury — May 6, 2011 @ 8:01 am

If that is what they want, why 130 ton? …. 130 ton is a requirement to build Ares V.

Actually no — it’s a requirement to build Saturn V (which was 130 ton lift capability). Ares V was a 160 ton + behemoth.

I speculate on that specific requirement in the post I directed you to before. Note that the language of the authorization requires an initial capability of 70 tons (nb: NOT 70 metric tons); such can be easily accommodated with a simple Shuttle side-mount design, which would use all the existing parts, tooling and Cape infrastructure. The authorization only says that the vehicle must be expandable to 130 tons at some unspecified date. That’s their “out.”

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 8:07 am

And in terms of politics, it doesn’t do Obama any good to “appear” to following yet another of Bush’s policies

Actually it was national space policy, having been endorsed by two different Congresses under control of two different parties. Part of the reason we are in such policy chaos is because without much serious thought or deliberation, Obama discarded a strong national consensus space policy direction for no direction: platitudes about Mars missions in 30 years shows a fundamental unseriousness to the supposed new policy. The new NASA Authorization — which specifically mentions cislunar space and the lunar surface — could not have passed without strong support from Congressional Democrats and Republicans. So at root, space policy is not the President’s call alone. By creating a policy leadership vacuum, the President has invited Congress to step in. The leadership vacuum within the agency has invited Congress to specify design details.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 8:15 am

69. To get to 130 ton would require all of the er….. features of Ares V, as far as I can tell.

The problem with side mount is the inability to expand much beyond 70 tons and the foam issue. You can argue that it is a non-issue with any crew capsule mounted towards the top of the tank, with the heat shield hidden by mounting it on the top of the cargo pod…. but I can’t see anyone signing off on that design. Purely from the (semi) political angle.

In-line is not much more complex, plus you gain efficiency from all the loads and thrusts going through CoG. Use a thrust structure that can vary the number of SSMEs actually used

Comment by Malmesbury — May 6, 2011 @ 8:35 am

59. == Malmesbury — May 6, 2011
> 100x that gives you 80 Billion. Are you really saying that developing
> one light and one medium launcher plus a capsule should cost that? ==

For a gov program that’s about right now. $20b for Orion’s budget is high compared to $17b (in adjusted dollars) for the shuttle orbiters, but Apollos Capsule and SM ran $19B. 2 boosters for $30B each – its what you get.

Doing it commercially saves you a lot. But not a 100 fold!! As I said, you can’t even get a airplane (even a small 6 passenger propeller one) onto the market for $200M. You can’t get an old model with new avionics out the door for that.

> 60. What about paying for the SLS on a fixed price per milestone basis, by the way?

Good idea. The contractors have proposed it – no response from NASA or Congress.

Better idea, just do a all up contract to field a finished lunar base and transportation infrastructure. Awards at milestones and yearly fees for minimum term for operations support (operating the transport systems, maintaining the base, etc). NASA as user/buyer – not a developer.

> 59. that the cost of employing your engineers is $200,000 – that’s salary and
> all overheads. Crazy generous on average, I believe.

Actually that’s about right. In the 80’s I was told with salary, benefits, overhead (office space equip etc) a engineer was about $150,000, so by now it would have to be well over $200K.

>64 I would definitely say that current 130-ton-SLS-and-no-payloads plan is not
> explicable or justifiable from any point except politics.

Agreed. I think its just thought of as life support until they can get their hands around the details, and so they don’t lose the capability.
Also they have been assured by NASA that you need a capsule and HLV to go BEO, so they focused on delivering those as likely needed for whatever they work out.

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 6, 2011 @ 8:36 am

The problem with side mount is the inability to expand much beyond 70 tons and the foam issue.

Neither is an issue. You can build a 130 ton SM with 4 SSMEs and 5-segment SRBs. Foam is not an issue with a BPC over the spacecraft during launch; the reason foam doomed Columbia was the brittle RCC leading edges of the Shuttle wings.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 8:41 am

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 8:41 am
“You can build a 130 ton SM with 4 SSMEs and 5-segment SRBs.”

Have not seen a specific study that supports that conclusion (the 130 Ton mass would exceed the weight of a fueled orbiter), is this information in the SSP Study NSTS 60583, dated June 8, 2010 you have previously referenced? Have never been able to get a copy, sure would like to see it.

In any case the numbers I have seen for the 3 SSME/4-segment Side Mount are a 72 Metric Ton Payload (with a 10% performance reserve). Use 5-segment SRBs and the number goes to 86 Metric Tons (still with a 10% performance reserve). The Higher number would be nice to have, but either would support the kind of lunar program we have been talking about, including an earlier Human Lunar Return.

“Foam is not an issue with a BPC over the spacecraft during launch; the reason foam doomed Columbia was the brittle RCC leading edges of the Shuttle wings.”

Exactly.

Comment by Joe — May 6, 2011 @ 9:26 am

Joe,

I should have added that the 130 mT version of the side-mount uses a “stretched” ET as well. And yes, this information comes from the JSC Shuttle side-mount study.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 9:37 am

“And in terms of politics, it doesn’t do Obama any good to “appear” to following yet another of Bush’s policies

Actually it was national space policy, having been endorsed by two different Congresses under control of two different parties. ”

Ok. That is much more forceful way to say it.

And we can assume that the people at NASA will follow the law. That isn’t a question. That there isn’t a shortage of lawyers at NASA- and they will be eager to make any law clear.

“Part of the reason we are in such policy chaos is because without much serious thought or deliberation, Obama discarded a strong national consensus space policy direction for no direction: platitudes about Mars missions in 30 years shows a fundamental unseriousness to the supposed new policy.”

I am more interested in any executive orders Obama may have made, rather than listen to what he says in some speech. Obama has a habit of saying one thing and doing another.

“The new NASA Authorization — which specifically mentions cislunar space and the lunar surface — could not have passed without strong support from Congressional Democrats and Republicans. So at root, space policy is not the President’s call alone.”

Yes. But other than some idiotic speech. Where is the evidence he is opposing this law?
The US Constitution does give the President executive authority, and as president, he could choose to oppose it. But unless he has given written executive orders, the all the people at NASA would be fools not to follow the law.

“By creating a policy leadership vacuum, the President has invited Congress to step in. The leadership vacuum within the agency has invited Congress to specify design details.”

Perhaps this is true to some extent. But Congress tends to do this sort of thing regardless of strong leadership or not.

Comment by gbaikie — May 6, 2011 @ 9:49 am

Yes. But other than some idiotic speech. Where is the evidence he is opposing this law?

The agency that he is responsible for stopped all work on lunar outpost studies, lander design and requirements definition, mission strategy planning and supporting technology efforts. All this was done after his announcement of the “new direction,” while the old NASA authorizations were still in place and had the force of law.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 10:27 am

“The agency that he is responsible for stopped all work on lunar outpost studies, lander design and requirements definition, mission strategy planning and supporting technology efforts. All this was done after his announcement of the “new direction,” while the old NASA authorizations were still in place and had the force of law.”

Ok, sounds like good evidence to me.
I assume that was a direct result of an executive order.

Comment by gbaikie — May 6, 2011 @ 10:51 am

Too many people see this as an either or situation. You can read the couple of postings on my blog for more depth to my comment but basically the current policy is both right and wrong. It was right to turn LEO over to commercial enterprises. But it was wrong to remove a destination.

Now we need to get out of the space station business and turn the ISS over to our partners or splash it and use Bigelow.

I wish I could say the the money saved would stay in NASA’s budget but in the Age of Austerity … NASA will probably lose it or, at a minimum, get small or no increases in funding.

At pace that NASA is going about building a HLV (maybe super heavy lift is a more correct term nowadays), it might be better to put it out for bid as well.

Comment by LoboSolo — May 6, 2011 @ 11:17 am

VSE was a good direction, but unfortunately the NASA leadership that was tasked with implementing it twisted it into a bottle rocket program, and cancelled the most important parts of it promptly : VSE called for a robust robotic precursor program, i recall at least one probe a year, and we only got LRO out of it.

No landers ( RLEP-2 ? ), no ISRU demonstrators, no ground truth on polar water. For an outside observer, it seemed that all this was done to make room for the launcher development budget.

If VSE implementation had proceeded along the path set out by Steidle and the industry CER study proposals, i.e. spiral CEV development on EELV, no new launcher development, this raiding of the robotic program would have been unlikely.

Not sure why giving NASA the mandate to try and build yet another launcher would end any different ?

The $11B blown on Constellation, would have bought a heck of a lot of lunar landers on existing launchers. Same for the planned SLS budget ..

Comment by kert — May 6, 2011 @ 11:25 am

If VSE implementation had proceeded along the path set out by Steidle and the industry CER study proposals, i.e. spiral CEV development on EELV, no new launcher development, this raiding of the robotic program would have been unlikely.

Yes, we would have had a robotic program, but no flights. Part of the mythology of NewSpace was that Steidle was doing great as AA for Exploration until Mike Griffin came along. In fact, under Steidle’s leadership, NASA spent 18 months navel-gazing and conducting road-mapping retreats, but built and flew nothing. “Sprial development” was just another engineering management fetish, like TQM.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 12:08 pm

72. To repeat myself -

OSC, a traditional, long standing space company, has costed developing their Taurus II rocket and cargo capsule at less than $500 million dollars. Not quite as capable as Dragon/F9, but close enough to make a comparison reasonable.

While they are being cost concious they have gone for the traditional outsourcing approach – hell, their upper stage motor is by ATK who are not known for the extreme cheapness of their products.

To upgrade Cygnus to a full manned capsule and build another, lighter launcher – how could they even spend another 7 Billion on that?

The idea that a medium and a light launcher plus a capsule should cost 80 Billion doesn’t fit any available data I can find. Even 8 Billion is far more than anyone has recently suggested.

Musk is beating the going costs by an order of magnitude at most.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 6, 2011 @ 12:27 pm

I think its pretty clear that America will get a heavy lift vehicle built in this country before the end of the decade since both Democrats and Republicans in Congress really want such a vehicle. And I think its a good decision for America to get back the heavy lift capability it use to have back in the late 1960′s and early 1970′s.

Now what we need is support for a simple single stage, and possibly reusable, LOX/LH2 Extraterrestrial Landing Vehicle (ETLV) to go with the heavy lift vehicle. Such a vehicle could be used to land humans and unmanned payloads on the lunar surface and on the surfaces of large asteroids and on the moons of Mars. Since it would be a single stage vehicle, it should in theory cost half the price ($6 billion?) to develop as the more complex two stage Altair lunar lander (estimated at about $12 billion) which was going to use a LOX/LH2 descent stage and an hypergolically fueled ascent stage.

I think if we call it an ‘extraterrestrial landing vehicle’ instead of a lunar landing vehicle, we could get a lot of support from both Congress and from the current administration since it could be viewed as part of the flexible path scenario.

The best time to press for funding such a vehicle would be during the 2012 election cycle, IMO, when both parties will by vying for the extremely important swing state of Florida. So under this scenario, full funding for the ETLV could start as early as 2013 or 2014 and could be ready before the end of the decade!

Comment by Marcel F. Williams — May 6, 2011 @ 1:02 pm

> 81 Comment by Paul D. Spudis
>
> == “Sprial development” was just another engineering
> management fetish, like TQM.

Spiral dev and TQM are not a “fetish” Paul, these are major successful way to dramatically improve developing and using systems. Its worked great in commercial and military programs from computers to (in Steidle’s case) the F-16.

One disturbing fact is NASA is utterly incompetent in them! When I was in the space station freedom program, to our shock the integration labs were dismantled for our task, because the NASA manager of the contract came back from studying TQMS and decided it ment if the engineering change request paperwork, and the reported changes, had matching descriptions – there was no reason to do testing, even integration testing.

That contract didn’t go well.

>… NASA spent 18 months navel-gazing and conducting road-mapping retreats ===

Yeah that seemed more a O’Keefe thing. He really didn’t trust the agency, and wanted to do major house cleaning. The house cleaning was probably a excellent idea – but he forgot he had to demonstrate results during the process. Congress started to baulk at any proposed cuts or changes. O’Keefe figured that made it futile to try to fix NASA – so he moved on.

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 6, 2011 @ 3:32 pm

> Comment by Malmesbury
>
> OSC, a traditional, long standing space company, has
> costed developing their Taurus II rocket and cargo capsule
> at less than $500 million dollars. Not quite as capable as
> Dragon/F9, but close enough to make a comparison reasonable.

;/
The F9 is a 20 ton lift craft, and it was pretty much a design from scratch craft other then parts compatible with F-1.

Taurus-II is 7 tons cargo craft, and was a upgrade from the Pegasus like the Taurus-I was. I.E. upper two stages were straight off the Pegasus. I beleave the T-II was the T-I with bigger motors installed.

> The idea that a medium and a light launcher plus a
> capsule should cost 80 Billion doesn’t fit any available
> data I can find. ==

20-30 tons (Ares-I) is considered heavy lifter, the 130-?200? tons nebulous Ares-V is a super heavy lift – I.E. Saturn-V plus launcher. And as I said the Apollo and Orion Capsules weer $20 billion.

Check the Constellation budget if you doubt that.

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 6, 2011 @ 3:47 pm

Spiral dev and TQM are not a “fetish” Paul, these are major successful way to dramatically improve developing and using systems.

BS. NASA uses management fads as a substitute for accomplishment. If you choose to believe otherwise, fine with me.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 3:55 pm

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 6, 2011 @ 12:08 pm
“Yes, we would have had a robotic program, but no flights. Part of the mythology of NewSpace was that Steidle was doing great as AA for Exploration until Mike Griffin came along. In fact, under Steidle’s leadership, NASA spent 18 months navel-gazing and conducting road-mapping retreats, but built and flew nothing. “Sprial development” was just another engineering management fetish, like TQM.”

Man, reading that felt good. I have said something essentially the same (but less bluntly) on other web sites and been verbally assaulted for my trouble.

Actually I think. “Sprial development” is a useful tool in software development, the real problem was that Steidle tried to apply it to the hardware parts of the program as well (apparently he was a software guy by expertise and the old adage – “when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail” – applied)

The same thing was done on Future Combat Systems with similar results.

Comment by Joe — May 6, 2011 @ 5:21 pm

“I think its pretty clear that America will get a heavy lift vehicle built in this country before the end of the decade since both Democrats and Republicans in Congress really want such a vehicle.”

Wernher von Braun built the Saturn V, who is building this heavy lift?

Comment by gbaikie — May 6, 2011 @ 5:46 pm

Comment by gbaikie — May 6, 2011 @ 5:46 pm
“Wernher von Braun built the Saturn V, who is building this heavy lift?”

If the vehicle is SDHLV (especially the Side Mount) the people whi have been using this well understood hardware for decades.

Comment by Joe — May 6, 2011 @ 5:57 pm

“Space Adventures already has one customer signed on for the circumlunar joyride and is in contract negotiations with a second, which means the first flight could occur as soon as the end of 2015, said the company’s chairman Eric Anderson”

http://www.space.com/11584-space-tourism-private-moon-flights-details.html

I think that would put egg on NASA’s face.

Comment by LoboSolo — May 6, 2011 @ 9:15 pm

>> Spiral dev and TQM are not a “fetish” Paul, these are major
>> successful way to dramatically improve developing and using
>> systems.

> BS. NASA uses management fads as a substitute for accomplishment.
> If you choose to believe otherwise, fine with me.

Didn’t say NASA could cut it, said it gets great results when used by capable organizations. NASA can’t do accounting eiather – doesn’t make it BS.

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 6, 2011 @ 10:22 pm

> Actually I think. “Sprial development” is a useful tool in software development, ==

Actualy it works well in aerospace to — or cars for that mater.

> The same thing was done on Future Combat Systems with similar results.

I work at GD on that, they weer so into process it was crazy. One guy was just dippy for modes and states charts. Course one manager there described the place as hundreds of independent fiefdoms, only willing to work together to attack any allience.

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 6, 2011 @ 10:27 pm

@gbaikie

Boeing has been pushing the most for an HLV, so I think they will get the NASA contract for the core vehicle.

But it would be nice if the ULA (Boeing/Lockheed) got the contract for the Service Module for the multi-purpose crew vehicle using ACES 41 technology which could be used for fuel depots that don’t require helium or hydrazine instead of going backwards and using a hypergolically fueled SM. Such fuel depot technology could be applicable for a lunar water and LH2/LOX production program.

Comment by Marcel F. Williams — May 6, 2011 @ 11:42 pm

“If the vehicle is SDHLV (especially the Side Mount) the people whi have been using this well understood hardware for decades.”

Hmm, I think the answer in that regard is John Shannon.

“According to NASA’s John Shannon the HLV can be developed within 4 1/2 years until the first manned flight occurs. The development program should cost about US$ 6.6 billion, which is only about 20% of the costs currently estimated for the Ares I and Ares V vehicle development.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuttle-Derived_Heavy_Lift_Launch_Vehicle

It seems to me that 4 1/2 years and 6.6 billion dollars. Means a fair amount of work.

But if not John Shannon, who?

Comment by gbaikie — May 6, 2011 @ 11:53 pm

85. Falcon 9 is 9-10 tons (metric) – depends in the orbit you want. The upgrade to Merlin 1D may put that to 16 tons. 20 tons has never been a F9 capability as far as I know. The lower performance of Taurus II is largely related to their choice of a solid for the second stage, though it is a somewhat smaller rocket overall.

Taking you point – say that going to F9 capability doubled the cost of the project. Since the cost of Cygnus is included, that probably means we are saying that we has 3x the budget to develop the larger rocket. This takes us to 1 Billion.

20 Billion was for the original Rolls Royce BEO version of Orion. How much is Boeing costing CST-100 development at? They can’t eat an investment that size, and NASA won’t give them that much to do it. Also, how much for ATV?

The rise in costs of the Ares I development from high to ridiculous killed the project. Having things like 1 Billion a year to keep your 1st manufacturer alive (no actual 1st stages for that price) does things like that.

Also, check out how many people work on rocket programs in other countries. ESA doesnt employ 50,000 people to develop new Ariane rockets…

Comment by Malmesbury — May 7, 2011 @ 5:35 am

Dr. Spudis,

The Shuttle stack at the moment is over 30 years old and not cost effective. Constructing a shuttle-derived launcher at this moment, means locking US into this suboptimal architecture for another 30 years. Unless there is a need to develop a HLV to fulfill a mission ASAP (which there isn’t), this route has no benefits — except for job creation in certain states. A Shuttle-derived HLV was a good idea 20 years ago.

Having read your “Affordable Architecture” paper, I must note that your plan — which has a lot of merits — can be executed without building a HLV. First, you launch most of equipment on Atlas V. Second, even for missions, where you plan using a HLV, you actually do not need a HLV — you need a method for delivering a larger payload to lunar surface; in principle, this can be achieved through other methods [1]. Further, your plan calls for HLV only for the manned portion of the mission. Given the present technological capabilities, an entirely unmanned lunar propellant factory is feasible.

So, there are at lest three other methods of achieving your goal without using a HLV: (1) split the payload into smaller chunks launched on Atlas V; (2) use an Earth-supplied propellant depot architecture; (3) go for the entirely unmanned operation, at least until lunar propellant production reaches level enabling sending humans to lunar surface via the depot architecture.

[1] This architecture claims a cost reduction over HLV using a Falcon 9 Heavy and propellant depots: http://www.nasawatch.com/images/F9Prop.Depot.pdf

Comment by Kris — May 7, 2011 @ 6:03 am

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 6, 2011 @ 10:27 pm
“Actualy it works well in aerospace to — or cars for that mater.”
“I work at GD on that, they weer so into process it was crazy. One guy was just dippy for modes and states charts. Course one manager there described the place as hundreds of independent fiefdoms, only willing to work together to attack any allience.”

I do not want to turn this into a book, but I also had the ‘honor’ of working on Future Combat Systems (FCS) for several years. What you describe (especially the “dippy” for process part) is what I have come to expect any time someone says Spiral Development are TQM. That is not only at NASA, but the military (FCS) as well. You mention cars as an example where they work well. General Motors maybe?

Comment by Joe — May 7, 2011 @ 8:53 am

Comment by Marcel F. Williams — May 6, 2011 @ 11:42 pm
“Boeing has been pushing the most for an HLV, so I think they will get the NASA contract for the core vehicle.”

I think USA (Boeing/Lockheed) which has been operating the Shuttle would be the most likely.

“But it would be nice if the ULA (Boeing/Lockheed) got the contract for the Service Module for the multi-purpose crew vehicle using ACES 41 technology which could be used for fuel depots that don’t require helium or hydrazine instead of going backwards and using a hypergolically fueled SM. Such fuel depot technology could be applicable for a lunar water and LH2/LOX production program.”

Wouldn’t be wonderful, especially if NASA and the DoD split the cost of developing the ACES stage. I am not sure if this would be impeded by the law requiring maximum use of the existing contracts (J2X Engine) however.

Comment by Joe — May 7, 2011 @ 9:01 am

Comment by gbaikie — May 6, 2011 @ 11:53 pm
“Hmm, I think the answer in that regard is John Shannon.”

Sorry, misunderstood what you were asking. Since Shannon has been Shuttle Program Manager and by all accounts done a good job, he would be a logical choice

“But if not John Shannon, who?”

Good question, which is of course what people always say when they do not know the answer.

Comment by Joe — May 7, 2011 @ 9:07 am

Kris,

Yes, I am aware that there are multiple paths that do not require a new heavy lift vehicle, at least initially, and we noted that in the paper. The age of the Shuttle stack is irrelevant; in age terms, Atlas is an older family of launch vehicles than a Shuttle-derived. In any event, no one is proposing to continue Shuttle — the debate is about what replaces it. Congress specified Shuttle-derived HLV to leverage existing resources and create a new launch system as expeditiously as possible.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 7, 2011 @ 11:34 am

100. But if the Congressional-Executive Branch-NASA-Space-Industrial-Complex do SLS in the same old way, it will suffer the same fate at Ares V.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 7, 2011 @ 1:04 pm

85. Also, Apollo was developed at the same time as inventing the fundamental technology, on a do-it-yesterday basis. Think Manhattan Project vs the South African nuke program.

Constellation was the result of continuously applying a cost plus model to previous cost plus work. D.K. Brown put a nice appendix in his book “Nelson To Vanguard” on how the contractors to the UK Navy used such models to run the cost of pre-WWII battleships to insane heights. At one point they were making 100% profits on guaranteed, no risk work.

By the way, Taurus II is almost entirely new – first stage is brand new. The second stage is one of those rework-an-existing-system-and-turns-into-a-virtually-new-thing deals.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 7, 2011 @ 1:32 pm

> by Malmesbury — May 7, 2011 @ 5:35 am
>
> 20 Billion was for the original Rolls Royce BEO version
> of Orion. How much is Boeing costing CST-100 development at?==

Don’t know, but I know L/M stated they could cut the cost for the full up Orion to $7B if they weer allowed to do a more commercial dev.

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 7, 2011 @ 2:44 pm

> == Comment by Joe — May 7, 2011 @ 8:53 am
>==
> What you describe (especially the “dippy” for process part)
> is what I have come to expect any time someone says Spiral
> Development are TQM. ==

Sadly a lot of managers just like plying with the tools without knowing how to use them.

>== You mention cars as an example where they work well. General Motors maybe?

More the Japanese. The whole Deming Methodologies for high quality (quality circles, TQMS, spiral, etc) was ignored for a long time in the US and Europe who were as dismissive as folks here. Japanese adopted it religiously, and its generally credited with them rapidly becoming the quality and cost leaders in electronics and manufacture.

To many American companies still are run with idots who figure they don’t need “methodologies” requirement analysis, traceability, QC, etc. That real engineers can just wing it.

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 7, 2011 @ 2:52 pm

@Joe

Developing ACES technology for NASA and the ULA would be a win win situation for for both the government and a private space flight company. And if the EDS stage for the heavy lift vehicle could also be based on ACES technology, then enormous fuel depots could be potentially placed at LEO and the Lagrange points by our HLV launch systems.

I also think the ACES 41and even the EDS stage could potentially be modified into simple lunar tankers for transporting water, oxygen, or hydrogen from the lunar surface to L1 or to LEO. Its shouldn’t be too difficult to land such tankers nearly — empty– on the lunar surface in a vertical position since they shouldn’t weigh more than 5 to 10 tonnes before they are refueled and loaded with liquid payloads for take off.

Comment by Marcel F. Williams — May 7, 2011 @ 5:06 pm

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 7, 2011 @ 2:52 pm
“More the Japanese. The whole Deming Methodologies for high quality (quality circles, TQMS, spiral, etc) was ignored for a long time in the US and Europe who were as dismissive as folks here. Japanese adopted it religiously, and its generally credited with them rapidly becoming the quality and cost leaders in electronics and manufacture. “

This breaks the discussion down into two parts as (at least as far as I know) Denning had nothing to do with Spiral Development. I will therefore stick to my previous assertion that Spiral Development may work for software, but is much less useful (even counterproductive) when dealing with hardware.

For TQM, the reasons that Denning’s ideas worked as well as they did in Japanese Culture and did not in American Culture (even when they were in vogue) is a very interesting subject, but is worthy of a website of its own. I am not dismissing your point here (really), but it would lead to a very long complex debate that I think is off topic for this whole website (much less this thread).

Comment by Joe — May 8, 2011 @ 1:38 pm

103. Found a reference that Ariane 5 cost $6.28 billion (U.S.)

http://www.designnews.com/article/1830-Ariane_5_Europe_s_heavy_lifter.php

Astronautix says 8 Billion. Usual case of what you include/exclude probably.

And that was a project where the costs were considered to have got out of control….

Comment by Malmesbury — May 9, 2011 @ 6:11 am

Article is also dated March 24, 1996 so adjustment would also need to be made for inflation.

Comment by Joe — May 9, 2011 @ 8:50 am

108. True. Still along way from the numbers that were being suggested as required to build a launcher in this class.

An interesting example of how SpaceX seems to be cutting costs – have a look at the KSC site. They have photos of the latest F9 first stage arriving. A single large load on a big rig. Hard to imagine anything more low key. Compare that to SRB segments – 300,000lb weight for each segment. 250,000lb of that is propellant – meaning that each has to be handled like explosives….

Comment by Malmesbury — May 9, 2011 @ 11:29 am

> 107. Found a reference that Ariane 5 cost $6.28 billion

That would be a touch under $9B now. About right for a commercial project in this size — and about30 times what Musk says he’s able to do it for.

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 9, 2011 @ 10:18 pm

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 9, 2011 @ 10:18 pm
“Found a reference that Ariane 5 cost $6.28 billion
That would be a touch under $9B now. About right for a commercial project in this size — and about30 times what Musk says he’s able to do it for.”

Thirty times! I read a news article where the Chinese basically said they could not hope to match Space-X cost quotes. This was taken in many quarters as the Chinese ‘throwing in the towel’; at the time I thought an alternate explanation was the Chinese (politely) saying they did not believe the Space-X cost quotes. I believe that even more now.

Comment by Joe — May 10, 2011 @ 10:31 am

110. Ariane 5 went over budget in a big way – at one point there were rumbles about killing it.

If you’ve seen European aerospace joint ventures up close, you’d find the idea that doing it 30x cheaper is perfectly reasonable. Makes the US “a job in every state” thing look tame. The SRBs were mandated by the French, for example to reduce costs for their SLBM production. Does that sound familiar?

Still a long way from 80 big ones….

Compare that to Tarus II – give that a decent upper stage and you’d be nudging 9 tons pretty easily. Less than $500 million for development with a cargo capsule thrown in.

Which would you rather be the proud owner of?

Comment by Malmesbury — May 10, 2011 @ 10:42 am

Comment by Malmesbury — May 10, 2011 @ 10:42 am

“Which would you rather be the proud owner of?”

Would depend on which one actually worked.

I understand the European Bashing (at least it is a relief from NASA Bashing), but are you saying the Chinese are similarly playing domestic political games. Last time I checked they did not actually have to stand for reelection.

Comment by Joe — May 10, 2011 @ 12:43 pm

111. Ariane 5 had cost problems of the pork-for-everyone kind, as I mentioned. Interesting to see an upper bound for the cost of this kind of thing. Shows how insane Ares I was getting.

IIRC the SR-71 was 26 times cheaper than the cost models said….

As I mentioned above a better comparison is OSC – they are doing a cargo capsule and launcher for less than $500 million.

There was a tour of SpaceX shown on the BBC today – see the BBC website, by the way. if you look at how they are doing things, their costs make sense. Compare a big rig and a couple of guys delivering a 1st stage to KSC (F9) with the cast required for the shuttle SRBs….

Comment by Malmesbury — May 10, 2011 @ 12:58 pm

> 111 Comment by Joe

> Thirty times! ==

Maybe over 40 times if you take one $200M quote for Falcon dev costs.

>== I read a news article where the Chinese basically
> said they could not hope to match Space-X cost quotes.
> This was taken in many quarters as the Chinese
> ‘throwing in the towel’; at the time I thought an
> alternate explanation was the Chinese (politely)
> saying they did not believe the Space-X cost quotes. ==

Bingo!

When a new comer comes into a established market, building with the same tech, a product with a similar (or arguably worse) design, but geting 30+ fold price advantages over state funded providers long rumored to be pricing under cost… And they come back with quips about “we know what it costs adn have no idea why everyone else charges so much”..

Yeah this tells me to sell your stock fast!

Comment by Kelly Starks — May 10, 2011 @ 4:02 pm

115. As I pointed out above, if there is a cost conspiracy in New Space, then Sierra Nevada Corporation, Orbital Science Corporation and that upstart Boeing outfit are in on it. Musk is claiming to be a few times cheaper than them, not 40x. Or does Atlas 5 cost 2 billion per launch?

How do you explain the proved existence of F9 & Dragon? Nasa have inspected the design and operations in detail – they have people with desks in his offices, and wondering round the factory floor…..

Either SpaceX built them for the amount of money claimed or it was alot more. He does have 9 Billion in his sock drawer and never did have. So where would it come from? Given his public pronouncements on costs, he would saying his plan is to ruin hid investors, if there was some hidden billions. And they would go along with that – why?

Comment by Malmesbury — May 11, 2011 @ 3:48 am

113. Not Euro bashing – joint US/UK citizen – just tired of the use of space programs as spoils for politicians and their cronies. Remember the UK satellite program – killed and replaced by a European project that didn’t work….

In the field I work in (IT) I’ve regularly proper, run and completed projects for a fraction of what the big consulting outfits charge. A few talented guys, and no need to feed 6+ levels of management. Our success rate (on time and budget) is north of 80% It would be higher, but the usual problem, customer internal politics gets in the way.

China is actually worse than EU/US in this regard – more rice bowls to fill. But the greed level is rocketing there and so is wages. They can’t cut costs because employment is part of their state mandated function. In the past cheap labour bridged the gap, but they are running low on skilled workers – hence wage inflation.

Comment by Malmesbury — May 11, 2011 @ 4:13 am

“Some of us may have our heads in the sand, but that’s better than where the heads of some others are.”

If I get your drift, the “other” place you refer to is what we called the “fourth point of contact” in the 101st and the 82nd. Sad but true that many in NASA and the industry appear to have had their heads up their “fourth point of contact” over most of the last 4 decades. If NASA had been competently managed from the early ’70s to the early ’90s we would have had bases on the Moon and Mars by now, and you might be writing this blog from the Moon, except it would be about actual lunar exploration and development instead of just advocating it.

“Statements (marketing?) suggesting that SpaceX will send a human mission to “Mars in 10-20 years” does not engender confidence in the Chief Designer’s understanding of the realities of space travel.”

Elon Musk, however, is not one of the people who have had their heads up their “fourth point of contact” in my opinion. SpaceX reportedly developed the Falcon-9 and Dragon capsule for about $300 million each. NASA would have taken at least 10 times as much to do the same job, and probably more like 20, or even 30 times as much. The Dragon that flew last December was not the manned version, but it was a functioning spacecraft and not a dummy. It maneuvered in space, communicated with the ground station, de-orbited and made a controled re-entry, and was recovered intact. It did just about everything that would be required to deliver a cargo to ISS except dock. Elon Musk appears to know a few things about the realities of space flight that NASA doesn’t.

About all they need to add is a life-support system, but we’ve known how to build short-term life-support systems for 50 years. Long-term life-support systems that recycle water and oxygen is one of the major design challenges for a manned Mars flight, but a lot of work has been, and is being done on that. Producing LOX/Methane propellants on Mars for Earth return, and the engines to burn it, is another major design challenge. The J-2X will reportedly be able to burn LOX/Methane “as is”, and P&W is working on an RL-10 derivative that will burn methane.

“spending billions and 25 years to “go back to the Moon doesn’t inspire anybody.” He did note that a brief stop at the Moon might be allowable, if it were really necessary on our way to Mars….He clearly views lunar return (as many in NASA’s leadership also choose to characterize it) as a re-boot of Apollo, with the same objectives and (more or less) the same architecture, a gap-filler on the way to Mars.”

Going back to the Moon will require billions, but taking 25 years to do it certainly doesn’t inspire ME. Nothing that takes 25 years inspires me. We went to the Moon in only 8 years with 1960s technology, and we can certainly do it again, especially after another 50 years of technology development.

I agree with Zubrin that we don’t have to have a lunar base before we go to Mars, but we do need to do a fairly extensive flight test program before we commit to a 2 1/2 year Mars flight, and landing the initial elements of a lunar base, including a pilot propellant plant would be a good way to make use of those test flights.

The launch windows to Mars are about 2.2 years apart, and we can’t lay off the engineering support and launch crews after the Mars flights are on their way and then hire them back just before the next launch window opens. They have to be kept on the payroll whether they are flying anything or not. Supporting the infrastructure is a major part of the cost of a manned lunar or Mars program, so if we design the transportation and surface systems so that the same hardware is used for lunar and Mars flights, we can do both.

Comment by Dick Morris — May 19, 2011 @ 7:03 pm

“Cernan’s point is that it’s easy to design paper rockets and…also questions what markets will support commercial space”

A certain amount of scepticism at this point is not unreasonable, given that the crew vehicles being developed for COTS/CCDEV have yet to put any crew into orbit. I am, however, reasonably optimistic that they will succeed in the near future in doing so. The Falcon-9 is not really a “paper rocket”, and anyone who thinks it’s easy to design a launch vehicle has very likely never done so. It’s an extremely complex, iterative process with a multitude of feedback loops. See “Space Logistics Engineering” page 232(?) for a simplified block diagram of the process.

“Some “New Space” advocates accuse people who disagree with the new direction of being too stupid and stubborn to understand its benefits or too parochial and selfish (or a combination thereof) to realize that government sponsored spaceflight is simply political pork.”

We don’t need to regard COTS/CCDEV as a competitor to manned lunar and Mars exploration, in the sense that we can only do one or the other. I strongly support commercial crew and cargo transport to ISS, and LEO in general, since I consider it to be on the critical path for long-term, large-scale space development. I also support “government sponsored spaceflight” for ISS and exploration beyond LEO. But I understand, and sympathize with, those who bemoan the way the NASA has tended to turn manned spaceflight into political pork. NASA has long sought to spread spaceflight funding into as many congressional districts as possible (especially districts which contain NASA’s major research centers).

“New Space companies claim that they are commercial enterprises developing new space vehicles. If they are truly commercial, what markets do they serve?”….”New Space advocates tell us that vast new markets await the advent of new commercial launch services and that they’ll be launching multiple payloads frequently, at a fraction of current launch costs…and that the ticket to lower launch costs lies in putting those federal dollars into New Space hands.”

The tourism market could be considered “vast”, at least compared to existing space transportation markets. Polls have shown that millions of people would like to take a trip to LEO, once we bring down launch costs sufficiently. Daily flights from multiple launch sites are not out of the question, though that will indeed require launch costs to be brought down to a small fraction of current costs. (That’s still a small fraction of commercial airline traffic, however, which probably amounts to about a million passengers per day.)

Can we get costs down far enough? I haven’t seen any published plans by commercial space companies that would be capable of coming anywhere near what we need, but we have to start somewhere. “Low” launch costs requires that we develop a fully-reusable launch vehicle with a relatively simple design (VTOL) that uses proven technologies (requires 2-stages at this point) with generous safety margins to ensure reliability. We have had the technology to do that for several decades. We could have done that in place of the current Shuttle design.

Comment by Dick Morris — May 19, 2011 @ 8:06 pm

Going back to the Moon will require billions, but taking 25 years to do it certainly doesn’t inspire ME. Nothing that takes 25 years inspires me. We went to the Moon in only 8 years with 1960s technology, and we can certainly do it again, especially after another 50 years of technology development.

How long we take to do something is of secondary importance; what you are trying to do is the primary consideration. It doesn’t matter if it takes 25 years to do something, IF you can construct an incremental program that makes constant progress, meeting recognizable milestones along the way.

Deadlines are the Apollo mentality and this isn’t Apollo.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 20, 2011 @ 5:12 am

Make that page 322.

Comment by Dick Morris — May 20, 2011 @ 7:15 pm

We certainly need to make sure, first of all, that what we are trying to do makes sense. If it does, then the length of time it takes to do it does matter IMHO, but that may be based largely on the fact that my experience has been entirely in the military and commercial sectors of the aerospace industry. If we take 25 years to do something that can be done in 10, then there is the opportunity cost that needs to be considered. If we plan to make money off of something, taking an additional 15 years to do it costs us 15 years of profits. We may also find that somebody else has beaten us to the market, and will own the lion’s share of it for a very long time to come. Good locations for polar bases on the Moon are somewhat limited, and they are not going to be available forever.

There is also the cost factor to consider. Stretching programs out, such as by developing system elements in series that are intended to work together, can greatly increase the total cost of a program. The engineering staffs that develop the initial elements need to be kept on the payroll, until the entire system is in operation, whether anything is being produced or not. Stretching it out also exposes the program to the risk of cancellation for a much longer period of time.

It is true that producing propellants on the Moon from indigenous resources will involve a series of steps, and intermediate products can be accumulated for a period of time before the next step is in operation, but that will still increase the length of time before the first end product becomes available. An incremental approach may take many years to fill the “pipeline”, whereas developing all the elements in parallel, and deploying everything in one or two large packages may take only weeks or months from the first landing.

Deadlines can actually serve a useful purpose, if they are realistic, and deploying an initial lunar outpost, and pilot propellant plant, in 10 years is realistic. Congress has directed NASA to develop an SDHLV, and crew vehicle, by 2016, and it wouldn’t make much sense to have them just sitting around doing nothing, or nothing useful, for a decade or more. Surely, given a choice, you’d rather have the system in operation by 2021 than 2030+.

Comment by Dick Morris — May 20, 2011 @ 8:12 pm

“-for the 3 SSME/4-segment Side Mount are a 72 Metric Ton Payload (with a 10% performance reserve). Use 5-segment SRBs and the number goes to 86 Metric Tons (still with a 10% performance reserve).”

“How long we take to do something is of secondary importance; what you are trying to do is the primary consideration. It doesn’t matter if it takes 25 years to do something”

Consider launching 8 to 10 Sidemount cargo vehicles, which we could have been doing after Challenger if we were not sinking billions into Star Wars, with incremental development to include wet workshop earth departure stages, for 25 years. We would have a space station in lunar orbit with an interior volume of several hundred skylabs. Of course solar events make such a station impractical, but my point is we can still put up around 700 tons a year with sidemount for the NEXT quarter century if we had just a tiny percentage of the DOD budget. Sending a couple dozen tons a year to the moon is not going to accomplish much compared to this. If the lower figure is all we get, of course I want that, but it drives me crazy thinking about what a couple politicians making a backroom deal could mean for the human race.

Comment by GaryChurch — May 21, 2011 @ 2:54 pm

Comment by Dick Morris — May 19, 2011 @ 7:03 pm
“The J-2X will reportedly be able to burn LOX/Methane “as is”, and P&W is working on an RL-10 derivative that will burn methane.”

Interesting assertions. Dual mode propulsion would be quite a neat (and useful) trick. Do you have a link to technical papers (or even news stories) documenting these activities? Please note I am not being sarcastic if such details exist I would love to see them.

Comment by Dick Morris — May 20, 2011 @ 8:12 pm
“There is also the cost factor to consider. Stretching programs out, such as by developing system elements in series that are intended to work together, can greatly increase the total cost of a program. The engineering staffs that develop the initial elements need to be kept on the payroll, until the entire system is in operation, whether anything is being produced or not. Stretching it out also exposes the program to the risk of cancellation for a much longer period of time.”

Agreed on this one. I can give a useful example from ISS. The water transfer system. There was a desire to have the capability to pump water from the supply vehicle to the ISS Stowage Tanks (because manually transferring the water would be a big hit to crew time). Due to budget constraints, however, this could not be done in parallel; so the system was ‘scarred’ to accept the extended capability later. When the series development of the capability began it was discovered that it would require a number of extra Remote Power Control Modules (RPCMs). The RPCM production lines had been closed down by that point and would have had to be restarted at substantial expense in order to add the capability. I changed assignments at that point and am not sure what the outcomes of that particular develop things in series ‘cluster’ was.

Comment by Joe — May 23, 2011 @ 12:01 pm

Here are a couple of links for the J-2X using methane fuel:

http://snindex.spacenews.com/imaginova.spacenews/news/read?GUID=15164875

http://www.astronautix.com/engines/j2x.htm

The “as-is” quote is from an Aviation Week article, “Down To The Wire”, in the Nov. 15, 2010 issue, page 49 (I couldn’t find a link for it):

“PWR, prime contractor on the J-2X, already has concluded that the engine could run “as-is” with methane as a fuel instead of hydrogen…”

The RL-10 derivative is the CECE: Common Extensible Cryogenic Engine.

http://pw.utc.com/vgn-ext-templating/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=76660eae0846a210VgnVCM1000004f62529fRCRD;

http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20090028814_2009028507.pdf

Comment by Dick Morris — May 25, 2011 @ 6:49 pm

Comment by Dick Morris — May 25, 2011 @ 6:49 pm
First of all, let me say thank you for taking the time and effort to provide the links and other information.

The Av Week quote about “as is” does not seem to be backed up by the other data, for instance the Space News article says: “Not only will it burn liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, but NASA’s J-2X has the capability of being a technology demonstrator, namely as a test-bed for a liquid oxygen-methane engine.”. A test bed would imply that mods would be made to the J-2X for it to burn methane (which makes sense – because of the different density etc.).

Similarly the other links refer to methane as an option for a variant of the engine

Never the less Av Week is generally very precise in their reporting, so I would take their word for the report absent evidence to the contrary.

A question for Dr. Spudis:
I asked you once before if there were usefully significant amounts of Carbon (and Nitrogen) in the lunar deposits recently revealed. You replied yes. However, I did not specify useful for what (at the time I was thinking about life support).

Making the following hypothetical assumptions:
1. That a single engine design (or a close variant) could use either Hydrogen or Methane.
2. That for some Cis-Lunar space activities use of Methane as a fuel was advantageous.

Would there be sufficient Carbon in the Lunar deposits to make such Methane fuel production possible.

I am flying way out of my areas of expertise here, so feel free to tell me it is a dumb and I will not take offense.

Comment by Joe — May 26, 2011 @ 1:20 pm

Joe,

We’re not completely sure of the exact concentrations of volatile species in the polar regions, but methane was detected at the few per cent level, consistent with its cometary abundance. We also know that molecular carbon is present in the regolith (implanted by solar wind) at about 100-200 ppm abundance. So there is carbon and it can be harvested.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 26, 2011 @ 2:06 pm

Dr. Spudis,

Thanks for the reply.

As per the link below:

http://www.onorbit.com/node/3410

“Lunar Magma Has 100 Times More Water Than Previously Suggested”

Questions again ( ):

Is this accurate?
Is it significant?
Is this separate from the Polar Ice Deposits?

Comment by Joe — May 26, 2011 @ 4:01 pm

Joe,

Yes, I have a pre-print of this paper and I believe the work to be sound. I’m not sure how, if at all, this result relates to polar water, except to increase the number of possible sources from which the cold traps could receive water. Most of the polar water we see is trapped within the upper couple of meters of the surface and this zone dates from the last 2 billion years or so. Indigenous water from the interior would have been released during lunar volcanic eruptions, most of which had ended by then.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 26, 2011 @ 4:08 pm

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 26, 2011 @ 4:08 pm

As a kid (now Engineer) who was raised to believe that the Moon was ‘bone dry’ and thus useless as a practical source of resources, is it just me or does the Moon seen to keep getting ‘wetter and wetter’?

Comment by Joe — May 26, 2011 @ 4:45 pm

does the Moon seen to keep getting ‘wetter and wetter’?

It does. I too learned in school that the Moon is bone-dry and always has been. The new mission results are re-writing the textbooks.

And we’re not finished yet. Stay tuned.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — May 26, 2011 @ 6:20 pm

JohnG wrote: “It seems New Space has borrowed a page out of NASA’s 1970s playbook. These were exactly the same promises that NASA made about the Shuttle and none of them ever came true. “Cheaper than Apollo, operates like an airplane, 100s of flight per year”.”

NASA did indeed make a lot of promises in the early days of the Shuttle program, and none of them ever came true: The Shuttle turned out to be more expensive, and less reliable, than the ELVs it was supposed to replace. But that doesn’t mean there was anything wrong with the motivation behind the program, or that the goals could not have been achieved had NASA selected a practical design for the Shuttle and used design criteria appropriate to a reusable vehicle.

Had NASA selected a practical, fully-reusable design for the Shuttle at the outset, and designed it for reliability instead of absolute maximum performance, they could have gotten costs about 2 orders-of-magnitude below the Shuttle’s actual launch costs, and flight rates in the hundreds per year would have been a realistic possibility.

Comment by Dick Morris — May 31, 2011 @ 9:44 pm

Paul, Do you think it possible to produce air, water, and food on the lunar surface fast enough so that astronauts would not have to return to Earth at any specified time? If recycling of O2 and water were done, then the lunar ice input could be modest. The same might be true for nitrogen from unused plant debris and human waste.

Hardened solar panels should work for years. If the astronauts spent most of their time underground and kept up a vigorous exercise program, they wouldn’t have to return for health reasons. Without a need to return to Earth, a growing population on the Moon could begin to feel like an actual colony.

Comment by JohnHunt — June 2, 2011 @ 2:20 pm

Yes, I think it will ultimately be possible. All of the elements needed to support human life are available on the Moon, including nitrogen and phosphorus for agriculture. I do not think the lunar inhabitants will be self-sufficient immediately and in fact, I advocate establishing a human-tended facility prior to creating permanent human presence. But ultimately, that is the direction we should go. Given the right circumstances, a lunar base could become self-sufficient within a decade or so of its founding.

Comment by Paul D. Spudis — June 2, 2011 @ 3:06 pm