January 14, 2011
HEFT, Lies and Videotape
Cost and Schedule of Shuttle sidemount compared with HEFT alternatives. This is the only HLV option that meets all legal requirements and fits within the budget and schedule assumptions of HEFT. Data derived from SSP Study NSTS 60583, dated June 8, 2010
A real comedy of errors and misunderstandings collided this week between the new NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and the agency’s Human Exploration Framework Team (HEFT) Congressionally mandated 90-day report (their initial findings on how to implement agency direction). Though flush with the usual beautiful graphics and platitudes, the report’s bottom line is that under the existing budget and schedule, the agency cannot make the new heavy lift launch vehicle specified in the new authorization bill. In other words, you can’t get there from here. Can’t be done. Period.
Reading through the new report is an exercise in déjà vu for space policy geeks. It reads very much like the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) of 2005. No big surprise, when one realizes that many of the people who wrote that report are involved in the new one. But more than that, the sense of a previous life stems from the rocket design that has resulted from this effort. It looks remarkably similar to the rocket that resulted from the previous effort, the late and not-so-lamented Ares family of heavy lifters. As you may recall, a key conclusion of the oft-cited Augustine Committee report was that the existing program of record (Project Constellation, a.k.a. Ares rocket) was unaffordable without infusions of significant quantities of new money.
Did NASA get a big infusion of cash? No. So no one should be surprised that the same people, working under the same assumptions within the same agency and technology base as the Project Constellation people would reach the same conclusions. In fact, most were not surprised. But apparently, many in the United States Senate did expect a different answer. Or did they?
We now enter the political Hall of Mirrors in which what people say they want isn’t necessarily related to what they really want or don’t want. Let us see if we can chart a path through the maze of motives, desires and statements to fully understand exactly what’s going on. Please stay with me on this until the end; I will try to make things clear.
Seven years ago, we had the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), a statement of strategic direction in space. The VSE called for returning Shuttle to flight after the Columbia accident, completing construction of the ISS, the building of a new space transportation system, a return to the Moon (“with the goal of living and working there for increasing periods of time”) and finally, human missions to Mars and “other destinations.” After the VSE was announced, NASA “implemented” it by completing steps 1 and 2. Step 3 was started, outlining an architecture and design for a new human spacecraft and new launch vehicles (the ESAS). We never progressed beyond that, although many departments, universities and international partners dug in and began conducting studies of work and instruments needed to live on the Moon.
It is a fool’s errand to design architectures and new space vehicles if you do not know what your mission is. You can design and build a space system without an objective but as it must satisfy many different purposes, it tends to not satisfy any of them particularly well. From the beginning, NASA leadership didn’t acquaint itself with why they were tasked with lunar return, even though the VSE founding documents are quite clear on the purpose and activities associated with lunar return. Because of this strategic confusion, it was largely assumed by many that we would do on the Moon what we did 40 years ago – explore, collect samples, and leave as soon as possible (that last activity being particularly favored within the agency). To accommodate this activity, the Ares launch vehicles were designed to conduct a lunar mission with two launches – the Ares I, which would put the crew vehicle in low Earth orbit and the Ares V, which carried all the other pieces. Additionally, NASA never lost sight of its desire for Mars, so Ares V was sized at a payload capacity of 160 tons, overkill for a lunar mission but thought to be the right number for a human Mars mission, staged completely from the surface of the Earth (whether that’s true is another story).
As Ares rocket development costs rose, other pieces of the lunar return architecture were discarded. Eventually, we had a large rocket-building program but its purpose had become diffuse and nebulous (in 2009, the acting Administrator of NASA told Congress in testimony that he did not know what going to the Moon meant).
Curiously, the new NASA Authorization Act of 2010 was remarkably specific about the requirements of a new heavy lift vehicle the agency had been directed to build. It was to use Shuttle hardware to “the extent practicable” and initially carry 70-100 tons but designed such that it could be stretched to a lift capacity of 130 tons. Where did these numbers come from? It’s not clear, but here’s an interesting coincidence: 130 tons was the lift capacity of the old Saturn V (118,000 kg = 260,000 pounds = 130 tons). NASA has interpreted the new Congressional language as meaning metric tons (2200 lbs) but the simple language of the law says “tons” (1 ton = 2000 lbs). One might suspect that the calculus was that heavy lift in days of old (Saturn V) meant 130 tons, so that’s what “heavy lift” should be.
In the absence of any specific mission, the payload capacity of your launch vehicle is entirely academic. But this “requirement” has had some serious ramifications. Last summer, a study group at Johnson Space Center released a report (Preliminary Report Regarding NASA’s Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, Pursuant to Section 309 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267), SSP Study NSTS 60583, dated June 8, 2010) showing how a heavy lift vehicle could be built and flown under the then-current run out budget (any new budget for NASA is pure guesswork at this stage). It resurrects an old concept of replacing the Shuttle orbiter on the existing stack with a payload fairing and engine pod. This configuration, called Shuttle Side-Mount (updated from the old “Shuttle-C” concept) was not considered by the HEFT study team, but meets the specific language of the new authorization. The advantage of SSM is that, as it is a minimal modification of the existing stack, it uses all of NASA’s existing launch and processing infrastructure – launch pads, mobile crawlers, scaffolding in the VAB and fabrication facilities in Michoud and Utah. SSM initially carries about 80 metric tons (70 (63.3 metric) to 100 (90.7 metric) tons) and can be stretched to meet the 130 ton (118 metric tons) legal requirement with minimal modification (for example, adding 5-segment (instead of 4-segment) Solid Rocket Boosters, 4 Shuttle Main Engines, extended External Tank). So in fact, SSM meets all the technical, budgetary, safety and schedule requirements set out in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
So as Oliver Hardy would say, here’s another fine mess we’ve gotten ourselves into. NASA creates an unaffordable architecture (ESAS) to implement the VSE. The response by the new administration is to cancel the VSE and replace it with promises of more distant goals at some nebulous time in the far future. Congress directs the agency to build an HLV anyway, but the vehicle has no mission, so they pull out the specs of the last HLV America flew. NASA responds by saying they can’t do it on the money and schedule specified, even though they themselves have in hand a report that shows how it can be done. Moreover, the agency still claims it doesn’t know why anyone would want to go to the Moon, despite having been shown repeatedly that what we do there will create new space faring capability.
You just gotta love this business.
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I have a companion piece online to supplement and support Paul’s deft analysis of this sorry state of affairs – “The HLV Cost Information NASA Decided Not To Give To Congress” at http://nasawatch.com/archives/2011/01/the-hlv-cost-in.html
Comment by Keith Cowing — January 14, 2011 @ 4:59 pm
[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Joe Williams, Trapit. Trapit said: HEFT, Lies and Videotape http://chtr.it/wzG5Wp #space [...]
Pingback by Tweets that mention HEFT, Lies and Videotape | The Once and Future Moon -- Topsy.com — January 14, 2011 @ 5:04 pm
by the time American deploied their HLV, chinese will have theirs as well. may not be as advanced as American’s, but it also can lift about 130tons to the LEO
Comment by Alex — January 14, 2011 @ 7:28 pm
Paul’s analysis of NASA’s idiotic behavior in this whole affair is right on the money. However, I think he is mistaken if he thinks NASA could actually build the Shuttle Side-Mount option at the proposed budget. The agency is trapped by its large fixed workforce, that it can’t fire because Congress doesn’t want to lose these jobs in their many Congressional districts. In the end, any project NASA tries to build is going to cost far more than it should.
Thus, I take a different perspective on this whole mess, See these two essays:
“The NASA bill is nothing more than pork” at
http://behindtheblack.com/behind-the-black/essays-and-commentaries/this-nasa-bill-is-nothing-more-than-pork
and
“Bad news for NASA, good news for private space” at http://behindtheblack.com/behind-the-black/essays-and-commentaries/bad-news-for-nasa-good-news-for-private-space
Comment by Robert Zimmerman — January 14, 2011 @ 8:04 pm
“the agency still claims it doesn’t know why anyone would want to go to the Moon”
I’m not sure you got this idea, the HEFT lists lunar surface missions as possible definitions.
Comment by Max — January 15, 2011 @ 2:01 am
Bob,
The agency is trapped by its large fixed workforce, that it can’t fire because Congress doesn’t want to lose these jobs in their many Congressional districts. In the end, any project NASA tries to build is going to cost far more than it should.
I know this is the conventional wisdom in space circles, but no agency is “trapped” by anything in the emerging fiscal environment. In fact, NASA had better come up some type of affordable approach or it will simply disappear.
And yes, I do think that the costs I quoted are reliable. We’ve known about the costs of Shuttle sidemount for over 30 years. The large “marching army” required to operate the Shuttle system is largely caused by Orbiter processing and refurbishing, not assembling and launching the stack.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 15, 2011 @ 4:10 am
Max,
“the agency still claims it doesn’t know why anyone would want to go to the Moon” I’m not sure you got this idea
Click on this link (linked in the article above):
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/hyperbola/2009/04/what-does-return-to-the-moon-m.html
and you will see where. That and my personal experience working with the agency for the last 25 years.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 15, 2011 @ 4:11 am
It is my understanding that the payload capability of the early Shuttle-C sidemount design was very limited because it required the use of a large, heavy shuttle orbiter structural frame.
I am not surprised that Bolden chose the reusable SSME RS-25D, which is expensive to manufacture and maintain, to fabricate a political excuse that a NASA HLV is unaffordable. I would love to compare the cost figures for the RS-25E and the Ares V RS-68.
The selected HLV will be in use for the next 50 years, so capability trumps cost. We need a real HLV if we want to actually go exploring, rather than spending decades playing around in LEO, bolting bits and pieces together into another ISS.
Bolden appears to be squarely in the pocket of billionare Elon Musk.
Comment by Nelson Bridwell — January 15, 2011 @ 4:50 am
Well said. I had not considered the metric/english mixup but it makes sense.
Comment by Brad — January 15, 2011 @ 5:04 am
Another factor to watch out for is Bolden’s tendancy to cook the books. For example, in a recent hearing Bolden told Congress that each Ares I flight would cost more than one billion dollars. At that same hearing Doug Cook confirmed that the marginal cost to manufacture and prepare each additional Ares I flight was $176 million.
Comment by Nelson Bridwell — January 15, 2011 @ 5:12 am
Paul,
Is there a link available to the Side Mount Study (SSP Study NSTS 60583, dated June 8, 2010) you reference.
I not only would be interesting reading, but useful in “discusstions” of the issue with others.
Thanks,
Joe
Comment by Joe — January 15, 2011 @ 9:45 am
Joe,
Is there a link available to the Side Mount Study (SSP Study NSTS 60583, dated June 8, 2010) you reference.
Unfortunately, it is not posted on the web. However, it is the final product of a study of Shuttle sidemount options that were presented to the Augustine Committee in 2009. John Shannon’s presentation to that group is available here:
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/361842main_15%20-%20Augustine%20Sidemount%20Final.pdf
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 15, 2011 @ 9:53 am
Paul,
Thanks. I saw a hard copy of the study (and am AIAA paper that seemed based on it), but when I recently went looking for links to “electronic” that could be shared in discussions could not find them (glad to here it is not my search skills that are the problem).
Thanks again,
Joe
Comment by Joe — January 15, 2011 @ 10:37 am
The Senate requires that the core HLV be able to lift at least 70 tons (63 metric tonnes) before the end of 2016. You don’t need new 5-segment SRBs in order to do that. So NASA could probably save at least $4 billion in development cost by just using the current SRBs.
Of course, the current administration doesn’t even envision using a heavy lift vehicle until the middle 2020s. And there won’t even be an Obama administration after January of 2017 (even if he’s reelected). So the question is, what will a future administration allow NASA to do with an HLV between 2017 and 2025?
Marcel F. Williams
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — January 15, 2011 @ 1:43 pm
Marcel,
The Senate requires that the core HLV be able to lift at least 70 tons (63 metric tonnes) before the end of 2016. You don’t need new 5-segment SRBs in order to do that.
Yes, I know — I mentioned above that 5-segment SRBs, an additional SSME and a new ET are growth options to make a 130 ton HLV. The plain vanilla SSM (no mods to the existing stack) carries between 70 and 80 metric tons.
The 130 ton number has an uncertain pedigree; at a minimum, it is very poorly justified. I know of no good technical reason for that number as opposed to any other within 100 ± 20 metric tons.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 15, 2011 @ 4:11 pm
I’ve suspected for a while now that the 130 tons (117 metric tons) is an admission that Nixon and the Congress made a huge mistake when they decommissioned the Saturn V back in the early 1970s.
The Space Shuttle program would have been viewed as a golden age of space travel if it could have worked along side a functioning Saturn V for space station deployment and beyond LEO missions. And you, Dr. Spudis, would probably be writing this blog from a permanent facility on the lunar surface!
Two things strongly hurt the technological and economic progress of the US back in the 20th century, IMO:
1. The melt down at Three Mile Island (a technological back-up safety success that was spun into a political and economic disaster for the nuclear industry by those who fear technology) and
2. Nixon’s decommissioning of the Saturn V which has trapped America at LEO for nearly 40 years.
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — January 15, 2011 @ 6:05 pm
Marcel,
The problem with Saturn V is that it was too costly to serve as a workhorse launch vehicle. The S-II second stage was (almost literally) hand made (see Angle of Attack: Harrison Storms and the Race to the Moon). There was simply no mission justification that had political traction at the time to continue Saturn V production.
Saturn V was a great vehicle, but its specifications and properties should not define the requirements for a new HLV. There is nothing sacred about 130 tons, unless you already have some spacecraft that requires such capacity. And we don’t.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 15, 2011 @ 6:20 pm
Paul,
I have issue with this statement: “Moreover, the agency still claims it doesn’t know why anyone would want to go to the Moon, despite having been shown repeatedly that what we do there will create new space faring capability.”
This is not true at all of the “agency”, and I believe you know that. The President, his administration, Charlie Bolden and Lori Garver do not want to go to the moon. I can assure you that everybody else in the agency working on the Orion Project WANTS to go to the moon. None of us ever wanted to go to ISS, that was added later. We would all like to go to other places like asteroids and Lagrange points too, and eventually to Mars, but the vast majority wants to go to the Moon. First and as soon as possible.
Otherwise, great article.
Comment by spaceboy — January 15, 2011 @ 8:01 pm
At that time, the titanic expense of the Vietnam War was eating up everything. Nixon entered the presidency actually hostile to the Apollo program not really wanting the last two Apollo Moon missions nor did he really want Skylab. Nixon actually told Eugene Cernan that he would probably be the last man ever to travel to the Moon in the 20th century– which angered Cernan.
There was always a wing of the Democratic Party that viewed the Moon program and manned space travel in general as a waste of public funds and Nixon’s hostility towards the legacy of John Kennedy and the space program took advantage of that.
The highest NASA expenditures were during the Apollo development phase during the middle 1960s. The peak years were 1965 and 1966 when NASA expenditures represented 4.31 and 4.41% of the Federal budget. In today’s dollars, NASA spent about $33 billion in 1965 and $32 billion in 1966. However, once the Moon landing program was fully operational, NASA expenditures had fallen to 2.31% of Federal expenditures in 1969 and eventually down to 1.48% in 1972.
In today’s dollars, the NASA budget in 1969 was approximately $21.4 billion, 1970: $18.8 billion; 1971: 15.7 billion; and 1972: $15.1 billion. The Saturn V was also used to launch Skylab in 1973 when NASA expenditures in today’s dollars was about $14.3 billion.
So according to these numbers, we had a Moon program and a space station program that was costing us relatively less than what we’re spending today.
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — January 16, 2011 @ 12:07 am
spaceboy,
I have issue with this statement: “Moreover, the agency still claims it doesn’t know why anyone would want to go to the Moon, despite having been shown repeatedly that what we do there will create new space faring capability.” This is not true at all of the “agency”, and I believe you know that.
Well, I know that the guy in charge of developing the rationale and strategic plan for lunar surface activities at ESMD during Horowitz’s tenure told me in person that he didn’t know why we were going to the Moon. I had two agency AA’s tell me they thought lunar return was simply a rehearsal of the Mars trip. I’ve had many in both the science and exploration side of NASA tell me directly that they didn’t care if there were usable resources on the Moon or not and what did any of that have to do with the Mars mission anyway (which is what they thought the Vision was all about)? Finally, I had a NASA Administrator tell me directly and in person that he was not going to put lunar resource utilization in his “critical path,” even though those activities are specifically identified and made part of the lunar surface mission in the Vision.
There were a few agency people I worked with who understood the Vision and did their best to break through the logjams created by upper management and their own colleagues. I respect their knowledge and dedication and honor those efforts. But the fact remains that many within agency leadership, middle management and rank-and-file did not understand their goal, direction, and responsibility to implement the VSE as it was intended.
That’s what I know.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 16, 2011 @ 5:02 am
Marcel,
In today’s dollars, the NASA budget in 1969 was approximately $21.4 billion, 1970: $18.8 billion; 1971: 15.7 billion; and 1972: $15.1 billion. The Saturn V was also used to launch Skylab in 1973 when NASA expenditures in today’s dollars was about $14.3 billion.
So according to these numbers, we had a Moon program and a space station program that was costing us relatively less than what we’re spending today.
Your argument is only valid for the operating costs of flying the last few Apollo missions. All of those missions after peak Apollo used legacy hardware that had been paid for and built under previous budgets. The Saturn V production line had been shut down by the time Apollo 14 flew in January, 1971. So my argument that Saturn V was “unaffordable” stands — it cost more than America was willing to spend.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 16, 2011 @ 5:30 am
To readers of this blog,
Last night, several legitimate comment posts evaporated — they got directed to the spam file and accidentally deleted before review and are not recoverable. If anyone posted a comment last night, please re-post it for review and approval.
Sorry and thanks.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 16, 2011 @ 5:58 am
The absurdity of Congress mandating construction of a heavy lift vehicle (HLV) is that they’ve provided no funding for any payload. What they’re doing is creating a heavy lift vehicle to nowhere (HLV-N) that will waste billions of dollars for R&D plus additional billions each year to maintain the launch infrastructure (personnel, facilities and equipment) necessary to operate a vehicle with no payload. Of what possible good is having a vehicle with nothing to carry? It takes years to develop large payloads, so “if you build it, they will come” is a fallacy.
Comment by Larry J — January 16, 2011 @ 12:00 pm
Larry,
The absurdity of Congress mandating construction of a heavy lift vehicle (HLV) is that they’ve provided no funding for any payload.
How is that any more absurd than an agency that has no mission? Or rather, because they failed to implement the mission that they had been given, they ended up with direction to build a means with no end.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 16, 2011 @ 2:00 pm
NASA delivered a report on the Space Launch System (the launcher) that Congress really wanted, which to no surprise happens to be more expensive than they desired.
Though the NASA Authorization Act states that NASA was to build a 70 ton launcher that could be evolved to 130 tons, the draft appropriations legislation (which was not enacted) said “the initial lift capability for the heavy lift launch vehicle system shall be not less than 130 tons” and that “the upper stage and other core elements shall be simultaneously developed.” Since NASA does not yet have the complete authorization from Congress, it went with the apparent intent of what Congress wanted.
Two things:
1. NASA proposed what Congress wanted, but what Congress doesn’t like is being told NASA needs more money than what Congress can provide. Congress wants money flowing, no matter what.
2. The true need for the SLS is unknown, as is the needed capacity. Congress doesn’t even have a funded program to produce a payload for the SLS by 2016 or any other date. The SLS will likely be built, and then wait around for a purposeful mission.
Regarding the authors statement that “The response by the new administration is to cancel the VSE…”, I would remind everyone that the VSE had four goals:
• Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond;
• Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations;
• Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and
• Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.
The removal of the Moon from the “Do Next” list does not equate to the cancellation of the VSE, as the Moon was only one of the many things to do and places to go. In fact, the current NASA Authorization Act restores work on many parts of the VSE that the Constellation program was consuming to stay alive – luckily it was killed before it ruined all of NASA.
Lastly, regarding the chart at the top of the article, some simple math will illuminate a quicker and less costly solution to our space exploration needs.
Assume the Side Mount 70-100mt launcher would actually cost what the chart assumes ($7.6B/$28.6B), and it would put 100mt into LEO on 18 missions (~4M lb total). Here’s what it would cost to put the same mass into LEO using existing or near-term launchers:
- Delta IV Heavy can put 50,000 lb into LEO, and we’ll assume $300M/launch (what ULA quoted for a human-rated version, so it’s high), and it would cost $24B, or $4.6B less than Side Mount.
- Falcon 9 Heavy can put 70,000 lb into LEO, and it is advertised for $95M/launch, and it would cost $5.4B, or $23.2B less than Side Mount. WOW!!!
- For kicks and giggles, let’s look at what Elon Musk has proposed for their Falcon XX launcher, which would be government funded. He stated he could develop the XX for $2.5B, and that it would cost $300M/launch and place 300,000 lb in LEO. Instead of $2.5B, let’s say it takes $7.6B, just like Side Mount, but because Falcon XX flies for $300M/launch, and puts 300,000 in LEO, it would only cost $11.8B, or $16.8B less than Side Mount, and a more capable launcher than Side Mount mass & size-wise.
For me, I don’t want to see the congressionally designed SLS ever get built. Instead, Congress should define the mission, let NASA define the mission elements, and let American commercial launch providers determine the best way to get the product to the destination. A government-run launch system will only cost more, and has a strong chance of never becoming operational (i.e. a waste of time and taxpayer money).
Comment by Coastal Ron — January 16, 2011 @ 4:06 pm
NASA’s redecessor NACA (National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics) never tried to operate an airline or even build their own airplanes except for test articles. Their mission was to promote aeronautics technology and they did it quite well. Among their many contributions were the NACA Cowling for radial engines, extensive research on aerodynamics and airfoils including laminar flow airfoils (such as the one used on the P-51 Mustang), and the area rule for transonic aircraft.
If NASA’s sole mission were to promote space technology development (something they’ve done quite well over the decades), they’d be a much smaller organization. From what I read, part of Obama’s controversial proposal last year was for NASA to develop technologies that could be useful to go anywhere instead of just to the moon.
What is the justification for spending over $10 billion to build a booster that has no payload, therefore no possible mission? Not only will it be a waste of scarce resources to build it, you’ll have to continue wasting money on it every year to maintain the infrastructure to have it ready for flight.
Comment by Larry J — January 16, 2011 @ 4:11 pm
Coastal Ron,
In regard to my re-post invitation in post #22, I said “legitimate comments….” :^D
I have read your endless harangues now for many months. My initial impression was that you don’t have the faintest idea what you’re talking about. Nothing you have written since then has inclined me to change that opinion.
It would be a pointless and thankless task to address your entire interminable post, but let me pick two points as illustrative:
1. The removal of the Moon from the “Do Next” list does not equate to the cancellation of the VSE, as the Moon was only one of the many things to do and places to go.
Wrong — the removal of the Moon from the “next to do” list guts the entire intention of the VSE, which was to learn how to live and work on another world and to create new space faring capability by learning how to use the resources of space, starting with the material and energy resources of the Moon. By-passing the Moon prevents such research.
2. Delta IV Heavy can put 50,000 lb into LEO, and we’ll assume $300M/launch (what ULA quoted for a human-rated version, so it’s high), and it would cost $24B, or $4.6B less than Side Mount.
Wrong again. The cost of a Delta-IV Heavy is $475 million. Each. I know this because I’ve recently been involved in a mission study and this is the price we were quoted. Needless to say, it drove us rapidly to the Atlas 551 instead ($180 million each).
These two points document (to my satisfaction anyway) that you haven’t a clue.
But regardless of your ignorance, in common with many in the space blogosphere, you clearly have a lot to say anyway. I suggest that you go create your own blog and post there to your heart’s content. I do not intend to waste the time of my readers and the bandwidth of Air&Space magazine with any more of your prose.
Have a nice day.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 16, 2011 @ 6:03 pm
Larry,
From what I read, part of Obama’s controversial proposal last year was for NASA to develop technologies that could be useful to go anywhere instead of just to the moon.
You shouldn’t believe everything you read. Spending money on “technology development” without some guiding mission objective is to fund a widget factory or hobby shop. NASA’s track record on that front is quite poor.
What is the justification for spending over $10 billion to build a booster that has no payload, therefore no possible mission?
I’m not going to defend the Congressional action because I am not in complete agreement with it. However, I can understand it. Let me suggest one possible justification: Congress thought that the Shuttle fabrication and launch capability was important for a variety of reasons of national economic and technical significance. Abrupt cancellation of the Constellation program left NASA with no capabilities along those lines. Requiring them to build an HLV — something that the “new direction” claims to want eventually anyway — was a way to preserve this capability before it was irretrievably destroyed.
Not saying I think about it this way — only that it is not unreasonable to think about it this way. Reasonable people may differ.
One other point — who says that there’s “no payload” for a HLV? For one thing, a 70 mT HLV could deliver a year’s supplies to the ISS in one fell swoop.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 16, 2011 @ 6:12 pm
Mr. Spudis,
A well thought out article, thank you. Obama’s plan for NASA, beyond LEO, stretches the definition of the word “plan.” Does anyone really believe NASA is going to visit an asteroid sometime after 2020? He might as well said there is no plan and saved us the time. So much for leadership.
During his party’s Presidential campaign in 2008, candidate Obama stated he wanted to shift money from NASA to pay for more teachers. That about sums up his interest in NASA and America’s role in space exploration and development.
Comment by Jim R. — January 16, 2011 @ 9:32 pm
The Saturn V program was cancelled even before Neil Armstrong set foot on the Moon. It wasn’t that Apollo was “unsustainable” but more that Johnson had a war to fight and the Great Society to fund. Nixon wasn’t hostile but he wasn’t very supportive either. The polls were against continuing Apollo and he went with the polls.
NASA failed to convince the people and congress that pushing the envelope of technology was a valid and vital goal and well worth the money. It is still failing.
In a sense, we’re still in the same spot. Even tho, in the grand scheme of things, NASA’s portion of the federal budget is insignificant … it’s still difficult to tell grandma that her Medicare payment from her Social Security check is going to increase while we’re spending billions on sending people to Space.
Really … nowadays, it’s almost better when NASA doesn’t crow about what’s its doing. Out of sight, out of mind.
As for an HLV … In the military I was taught to apply the principle of backwards planning. Start where you want to be and when you want to be there and work backwards.
What do we need to get started … in terms of habitats … to return to the moon?
How much lift do we need to get it there? Do we need the 118 MT of the Saturn V? Or will the the Sidemount suffice?
If you use a fuel depot, how high will the orbit be? What’s the delta v to get to the fuel depot versus not using one? What’s the cost and complexity of maintaining a fuel depot if the fuel is launched from Earth? Is it worth it? (As opposed to launching a fuel pod with each mission.)
These are questions that I don’t know the answers to but I think are necessary before we move forward. If I were in Congress, these are the questions that I’d ask Bolden.
And finally, I’ve come to the conclusion that it’s time to turn the ISS over to someone else or deorbit it. It’s sucking money that could be used to develop systems to go elsewhere.
Comment by LoboSolo — January 17, 2011 @ 7:32 am
Lobo,
apply the principle of backwards planning. Start where you want to be and when you want to be there and work backwards.
Exactly. That’s why I have been saying on this blog for the last two years that it’s the mission that’s important, not the means. We once had a mission. Now we don’t. So we waste our time arguing about the arrangement of the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 17, 2011 @ 9:04 am
One other point — who says that there’s “no payload” for a HLV? For one thing, a 70 mT HLV could deliver a year’s supplies to the ISS in one fell swoop.
Except to do that, you have to develop a vehicle that can not only hold the payload but also maneuver in orbit to rendezvous and dock with the ISS. That means you need to develop a very large version of the Progress, Dragon, or ESA’s ATV. Where is the money to build such a system? Simply putting the stuff in orbit is pointless unless you have the ability to get it to the ISS. Check how much ESA spent on developing the ATV and how long it took.
There’s a fundamental difference between the Russian and American approaches to launching space station modules. Americans launched our modules on the Space Shuttle which had all of the support systems (TT&C, propulsion, etc.) to get the module to the ISS. The Russians launched their modules on Proton rockets, and each of their modules had to have all of the systems necessary to rendezvous and dock with the destination space station. We used the very expensive Shuttle to launch relatively simple modules and they used inexpensive rockets to launch more complicated modules.
Simply building a heavy lift vehicle without a funded payload is utter foolishness. Getting a lot of stuff into orbit in one very expensive launch (and risking losing all of it in a single launch failure) is inefficient and wasteful. There is no defined need for heavy lift at this time or for the foreseeable future. There are alternative architectures that don’t require the development of expensive heavy lift vehicles but instead leverage existing boosters like the EELVs, Falcon 9, and their growth versions.
Comment by Larry J — January 17, 2011 @ 12:55 pm
@ Dr. Spudis”Your argument is only valid for the operating costs of flying the last few Apollo missions. All of those missions after peak Apollo used legacy hardware that had been paid for and built under previous budgets. The Saturn V production line had been shut down by the time Apollo 14 flew in January, 1971. So my argument that Saturn V was “unaffordable” stands — it cost more than America was willing to spend.”
I think where you and I disagree is whether most American’s including Nixon and Congress in the early 1970s were really concerned about the cost of the Saturn V or whether they simply thought that– any money– spent sending humans to the Moon was a waste of public funds. I tend to favor the latter explanation.
But here’s the perspective from one of China’s leading lunar scientist (Ouyang Ziyuan (Ouyang), a senior consultant at China’s lunar exploration program):
“If China doesn’t explore the moon, we will have no say in international lunar exploration and can’t safeguard our proper rights and interests.
The contribution of the Apollo project of the US is amazing. According to one calculation, the input-output ratio is 1:14. It drove the development of high-tech worldwide and made the US a leader in the high-tech field for almost 20 years.”
http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commentary/2010-10/581744.html
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — January 17, 2011 @ 6:26 pm
@LoboSolo
Why would you want to terminate a $3billion a year symbol of a space program (the ISS) in favor of using that money for a real space program:-)
I realize that I’ve said this a trillion times before on many other forums but there is no way that we’re getting $2 to $6 billion (if you include shuttle cost) a year of tremendous science out the ISS program. No way!
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — January 17, 2011 @ 6:47 pm
I just read that the the Russians are ready to launch out of Kourou so now there is no reason to keep the ISS in its skewed and useless orbit.
We should move it to an equatorial orbit so that it can be used as the departure point for manned lunar missions or splash it in the ocean.
But if we can use it as a base of operations, how does that change the launch scenarios? Would it be better to put the money into a nuclear OTV that could shuttle people and supplies from the ISS to the Moon and use MLVs to launch up to the ISS?
Comment by LoboSolo — January 18, 2011 @ 9:55 pm
Using nuclear anything in Earth orbit is just asking for a lot of political trouble, IMO. Chemical rockets work just fine within cis-lunar space.
We need to cap our funding for the ISS at $1 billion a year, IMO, and use some of the $2 billion a year in savings to purchase a couple of cheap Bigelow Space stations and place them in an orbit more suitable for launches from American soil. The largest Bigelow space station will weigh between 70 to 100 tonnes and will have twice the interior volume of the ISS. So it would be nice to have a new HLV ready to launch them into orbit.
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — January 19, 2011 @ 12:05 pm
My fear is they will build something on the cheap and it will be crappy and dangerous.
R. Jones
http://www.robertwilliamjones.blogspot.com
Comment by Robert Jones — January 19, 2011 @ 1:12 pm
Robert,
A fair enough concern, although I will observe that those three properties are not necessarily correlated. I think that the Congress’s fear is that they won’t do anything, a much more likely outcome.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 19, 2011 @ 2:21 pm
David S. F. Portree just wrote an excellent article on his ‘Beyond Apollo’ blog about President Nixon’s decisions on the future on NASA. Take a look:
NASA’s report to the Space Task Group (1969):
http://beyondapollo.blogspot.com/2011/01/nasas-report-to-space-task-group-1969.html
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — January 20, 2011 @ 12:34 pm
I just read that the the Russians are ready to launch out of Kourou so now there is no reason to keep the ISS in its skewed and useless orbit.
We should move it to an equatorial orbit so that it can be used as the departure point for manned lunar missions or splash it in the ocean.
The Russians will soon start launching Soyuz rockets from Kourou but not Soyuz spacecraft. They’d need to build a lot of additional infrastructure to process and launch the Soyuz spacecraft from there, something they have no announced intention of doing.
Lowering the inclination of the ISS is a very energy (propellant) intensive undertaking. It requires far more propellant to change a spacecraft’s inclination than it does to change apogee or perigee. Given the ISS’s mass, it would likely take a couple hundred tons of propellant to lower the inclination to 28.5 degrees. That would require many launches of even the HLV-N and billions of dollars. For far less cost, you could put a Bigelow module in the desired orbit.
If you tried to lower the ISS’s inclination, you’d very quickly run into the situation where you could no longer reach it using Soyuz or Progress vehicles launched from Baikonur.
Comment by Larry J — January 20, 2011 @ 2:30 pm
Wow–this is really weird: two minutes before I started reading this blog post, I posted the following little comment on Wayne Hale’s latest blog post re: space architectures:
Perhaps part of the problem with respect to the difficulty of choosing a launch architecture is the lack of a clear mission to begin with. E.g., with Constellation, on the one hand, the VSE clearly stated that we should go to the Moon, get some rocket propellant, and use that to help get to Mars. In the event, however, that vision was lost, and what was attempted instead was a more “Mars Direct” architecture, hence the super big launch vehicle, and hence the name “Ares”. I think maybe we should pick not merely a destination, but also have a clear idea about what to do as the top priority once we get there, and then work backwards from that. An architecture is only “optimal” relative to its main use. An architecture not designed for anything in particular probably won’t be optimal for anything….
Wayne’s take is that we need to do something: just settle on a launch architecture–it doesn’t matter what it is–and just do it!. While I agree that something is better than nothing, I agree with you Paul 100% that an architecture centered around properly focused mission would be best of all.
Regarding the 130 tons, my bet is that some Congressional staffers have been reading up on Mars architectures: e.g., the Mars Semi-Direct architecture specifically calls for a 130 metric ton HLV–and this also squares with NASA interpreting tons in the metric sense (cf. “A Practical Architecture for Exploration-Focused Manned Mars Missions Using Chemical Propulsion, Solar Power Generation and In-Situ Resource Utilisation”, 2006, p. 187).
Comment by Warren Platts — January 22, 2011 @ 3:01 am
While cosmic radiation may be the 800 lb gorilla in the room as far as interplanetary travel is concerned, the accompanying heavy nuclei are probably the 800 kg aliens in the closet:-0 It is estimated that during a 6 month journey through interplanetary space, every cell nucleus in our body would receive multiple hits from proton radiation. It would take about 2 meters of water surrounding your space craft to protect astronauts from galactic radiation. Heavy nuclei, however, requires at least 5 meters of radiation protection. One out of every three cells in our bodies, including our brains, would receive at least one heavy ion hit in just 6 months without proper shielding against heavy nuclei.
This is why we’re not going to Mars or to an asteroid using chemical rockets or even fast nuclear powered ships (80 days round trip is still way too long to be exposed to heavy nuclei). The only way we’re going to Mars without suffering significant brain damage is with an appropriately heavy shielded space ship requiring hundreds and possibly over a thousand tonnes of shielding mass depending on the size of the habitat modules. And carrying this amount of weight is going to require that we use an Aldrin Cycler or titanic light sails in order to bridge interplanetary distances.
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — January 22, 2011 @ 1:28 pm
lol: here’s what Wayne has to say:
You have a different version of the VSE/Constellation story than I have ever heard.
But I agree with your last sentence.
Comment by Warren Platts — January 23, 2011 @ 2:26 am
Warren,
I assume that you are referring to the exchange between you and Wayne in this thread (near end):
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/20/space-architecture/#comments
Truly amazing — and I must say, all too typical. Very few people within NASA ever “got” the VSE. They only heard one word out of several hundred: Mars. So naturally, the Moon became a shake-out cruise on our way to Mars and hence, the idea of using the resources of the Moon to create a permanent transportation system was lost. This mindset naturally culminated in Obama’s cancellation of lunar return on the grounds that “we’ve been there.” So now we have a space program that goes nowhere.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 23, 2011 @ 4:23 am
Paul,
A little late, but for whatever it is worth here is a link to one of the AIAA papers I mentioned above:
http://spacepropulsion.us/Documents/2010AIAA-JPC-Rothschild.pdf
Comment by Joe — January 28, 2011 @ 12:17 pm
Paul, I hope your memory (or access to resources) is better than mine. Do you know the launch pad abort and early ascent numbers for crew survival with the Shuttle SideMount? My memory is that the SSM was great for cargo but had the same (if not worse) issues as the Shuttle for crew survivability. Hence, the focus on the Orion + LAS combination on top of the stack.
Comment by Mal Peterson — January 28, 2011 @ 5:57 pm
[...] on their plans for developing the heavy lift launch vehicle that Congress told NASA to build. http://blogs.airspacemag.com/moon/2011/01/heft-lies-and-videotape/ This entry was posted in NASA. Bookmark the permalink. LikeBe the first to like this [...]
Pingback by NASA’s Report to Congress on Developing the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle | Silicon Valley Space Club — January 28, 2011 @ 11:56 pm
Mal,
My understanding is that the Loss of Vehicle (LOV) estimate is driven by the number of engines and number of SRBs on the vehicle. The Loss of Crew (LOC) estimate is based on the LOV and the probability of a successful abort. Abort success for side mount is about the same as for the in-line configuration; if the IL vehicle has more engines it wouldn’t be as safe as SM. I am told that the LOC estimate for side mount is about 1/1000.
The whole issue of launch safety is fraught with uncertainty and misinformation. I note in passing two canards about safety that have been tossed against the side mount concept. First, the idea that falling foam is a hazard is based on the Columbia experience. But an Orion-style vehicle is covered by a boost protective cover that would shield it against foam sheds during launch; the brittle RCC leading edge of Columbia’s wing was not protected. Second, since Challenger, the assumption is that side mount puts the crew in danger in the event of a catastrophic explosion of the stack. But the crew of Challenger probably survived the vehicle break-up; recovered flight recorders show that the crew had activated their emergency systems. They were killed when the cabin hit the Atlantic Ocean at several hundred miles per hour — if they had had a pod-parachute system for the crew cabin of the Shuttle, they might have survived.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 29, 2011 @ 4:11 am
Hi Paul,
I want to ask you a question that I have run by you before, but looking for further comment. Let me briefly lead up to it. Not until Administrator Bolden cancelled the entire Constellation program one year ago was I finally convinced that project Apollo was never intended as a genesis for future human exploration and expansion into the solar system; many – yourself included – reached this conclusion a life-time ago. It would have seemed incredible to me – still does – that such an amazing commitment and outward reach would be started and expeditiously achieved without, from the onset, continuity included as a fundamental tenet. In addition somehow, in the early days, I convinced myself that the Space Shuttle and International Space Station – although remaining relatively close to home – represented efforts aimed at getting us humans deeper into space. Now, looking back over the past 38 years (post Apollo 17) it clearly looks like a landscape of debris.
For a few years now I have followed your writings on the rational and methods for developing a space fairing civilization. And I have said it before; I think you make a ton (metric) of sense. My concern – and this is my question (again) – is how do you make a case that would convince a government to fund true human space exploration (beyond LEO)? Given the failed attempts and poor rational of the past forty years, what can make next time different? I know your plan is essentially ‘go as you pay’, and that it can adapt to good and bad economic times, but given the state of the world economy why would any nation commit any money to an effort that needs funding only if you are interested in sending humans into deep space: lunar resources having little direct value to anyone on the ground. I don’t think that answers such as the long term survival the human species carry enough weight.
How do you convince nations and individual people that moving out into space is worth the investment?
All the best,
Phil
Comment by Philip Backman — January 30, 2011 @ 2:49 pm
If NASA had simply built a small space plane and placed it on top of a two stage liquid rocket booster, neither of the shuttle type accidents would have happened. And if they wanted to launch 20 or 25 tonnes into orbit, they could have simply used the same booster on an unmanned flight.
As far as shuttle derived concepts are concerned, an inline crew launch booster without the SRBs would be the safest, IMO:
Expediting the Development and Lowering the Cost of NASA’s New Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle
http://newpapyrusmagazine.blogspot.com/2011/01/expediting-and-lowering-development.html
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — January 30, 2011 @ 5:11 pm
Phil,
how do you make a case that would convince a government to fund true human space exploration (beyond LEO)?
I would tell them that going to the Moon is not about science or even expanding human civilization off planet — it is about creating a transportation infrastructure that enables routine access to all points in cislunar space, where all of our scientific, economic, and national security space assets reside.
The last 50 years of the space program have shown us several key things: 1) satellites provide enormous societal benefit in a wide variety of areas; 2) we are mass- and power-limited in our template for spaceflight because we must launch everything we need from the surface of the Earth, a deep gravity well. Thus, we can launch no space asset bigger than the capability of the biggest launcher; 3) On the other hand, the International Space Station shows us that human- and machine-assembled satellites can be made as big and as capable as needed; 4) But we cannot get to all the places in space (i.e., beyond LEO) such orbital assets might be needed with people and machines to do such assembly and maintenance; 5) if we could establish a system that enabled routine access to and from the lunar surface based around the manufacture and use of lunar propellant, such a system could also: a) access all other points in cislunar space, including GEO and other orbital positions; and b) enable human interplanetary flight, i.e., to Mars and beyond; 6) Therefore, we go to the Moon to establish a permanent human presence there that will create this reusable, extensible, maintainable space transportation system, a “transcontinental railroad” for cislunar space if you will; 7) Undertaking such a space program creates wealth by developing and enabling new technology, opening new and previously unforeseen markets, and (by having America do it), assuring that a paradigm of free market, democratic pluralism prevails in the new frontier of space, not totalitarianism nor corporatism.
That’s my position in a nutshell. For an expanded exposition, see this paper:
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=1376
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — January 30, 2011 @ 6:14 pm
I agree with you Dr. Spudis. The economic domination of cis-lunar space is going to be one of the major keys to the growth of the US economy during the rest of this century.
We should have had a base on the Moon back in the 1970′s or 1980′s. Now were very close to totally squandering our huge technological lead. This is probably going to be America’s last chance to maintain our leadership in space and to economically dominate cis-lunar space.
But if we allow China, Japan, Russia, and India to dominate and control the precious water resources on the lunar poles while we just sit back and give them the thumbs up, our children and grandchildren are going to suffer the harsh long term economic consequences of that decision!
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — January 30, 2011 @ 7:11 pm
Paul: FYI, the concept of a detachable crew module for the orbiter was evaluated and rejected. there were several reasons that I recall, but I probably don’t have the full story. Placing explosive bolts in the mating joint between mid-body and crew module and forward fuselage to enable separation of the crew module was a huge issue. It would result in more failure modes; i.e., the increase in risks overwhelmed the value of the solution. Plus, I believe there were increased mass, and structural FOS concerns.
As for the rationale for human exploration, I have argued on several occasions that the preservation/enhancement of national security remains the fundamental rationale behind decisions to allocate scarce US government (= taxpayer) funds by both the Administration and Congress for the Shuttle, Shuttle/Mir, ISS, Apollo and Apollo/Soyuz. Although the introduction of significant international collaboration with with India, China, Russia, et al. raises “loss of control” issues for many in the U.S., I believe it solves many “insufficient funds” problems. And to the extent our decisionmakers can overcome those fears and decide a human exploration program furthers our international security to a significant degree, then decisionmakers will be more inclined to support it. Of course, there are many facets to the international security of our nation, including education and economic benefits (including support of our industrial base capabilities and technology transfer concerns). So, it’s not a simple guns and ammo equation.
Comment by Mal Peterson — February 1, 2011 @ 4:47 pm
the concept of a detachable crew module for the orbiter was evaluated and rejected
I’m sure that there were good reasons for this on the already built Shuttle. My point was that the initial explosion of the Shuttle stack did not kill the crew. Thus, arguments against Shuttle-derived side mount on grounds of crew safety are specious.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — February 1, 2011 @ 6:10 pm
[...] creating a heavy lift launch vehicle. This Shuttle side-mount launch vehicle is something that fits the requirements placed on NASA for a new heavy lift vehicle. Its reliability has been consistently improved over [...]
Pingback by Discarding Shuttle: The Hidden Cost | The Once and Future Moon — March 2, 2011 @ 4:52 am
I didn’t read through all the comments. But the ones I did read didn’t mention the Truax “Sea Dragon” launch vehicle that was, as far as I can tell, just abandoned. Does anyone know if it has been reviewed recently? Just curious.
Comment by Riley Bishop — July 15, 2011 @ 5:02 pm
Riley,
The purpose of this web site is for me to comment on things lunar (including space transportation issues). It is not to discuss launch vehicle concepts. Sea Dragon never materialized — it was a paper fantasy and a 50 year old one at that. As such, this board is not the place for such a discussion.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 17, 2011 @ 8:07 am
[...] needs aren’t clear since NASA hasn’t settled on a specific exploration architecture.” Or, as lunar scientist Paul Spudis put itin a blog post, “In the absence of any specific mission, the payload capacity of your launch [...]
Pingback by NASA’s New Rocket: Will Congress’s Pet Project Fly? » imcity.ir — September 15, 2011 @ 1:38 pm
[...] needs aren’t clear since NASA hasn’t settled on a specific exploration architecture.” Or, as lunar scientist Paul Spudis put it in a blog post, “In the absence of any specific mission, the payload capacity of your launch [...]
Pingback by NASA’s New Rocket: Will Congress’s Pet Project Fly? | Space News Center — September 15, 2011 @ 7:50 pm
[...] clear since NASA hasn’t settled on a specific exploration architecture.” Or, as lunar scientist Paul Spudis put it in a blog post, “In the absence of any specific mission, the payload capacity of your launch [...]
Pingback by NASA’s New Rocket: Will Congress’s Pet Project Fly? | Observations, Scientific American Blog Network — September 18, 2011 @ 7:43 am