July 10, 2010
NASA’s New Mission and the Cult of Management
O Fortuna! Irony intentional?
During a recent interview on Al Jazeera television, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden outlined NASA’s new priorities. His remarks became headlines as the previously ignored story about the redirection of the space agency toward international diplomatic outreach and global climate change research finally reached the many who still hold NASA in high regard. Beyond the inane and vacuous policy comments, one statement by Administrator Bolden went virtually unnoticed: “We’re not going to go anywhere beyond low Earth orbit as a single entity,” he revealed, “The United States can’t do it.” If it’s possible to shock Americans into paying attention to NASA and our national space program, those words might do it.
It’s one thing to assert that the Unites States desires more international collaboration as a matter of policy for reasons of fostering alliances, developing new cultural ties, or even to promote world peace. It’s an entirely different proposition to assert that the United States has lost the ability to reach for the stars, that America is incapable of exploring space alone. Have we become comfortable with the idea that it’s politically incorrect to have pride in our nation’s abilities – past, present and future?
The natural reaction of many Americans is to strongly protest such a notion by asserting that our technology is the greatest in the world and that we can design and build anything we choose to. However, one can not escape the reality that the statement quoted above was made by the head of the agency charged with sending U.S. astronauts into space, a task that Americans have watched NASA carry out for almost 50 years. A more troubling thought is that maybe he is right.
I’ve worked with NASA for 25 years on experiments, research, and advanced planning and missions. I’ve been involved with studies to put a base on the Moon since 1984 (the year of the first conference on lunar bases at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington DC). In all of these efforts, I believed that our future in space was at stake and that we were preparing for humanity’s return to the Moon, followed by journeys to the planets.
As the years wore on, it began to dawn on some of us that some within and outside the agency really didn’t want to go anywhere or do anything in space. Working for NASA means being involved in the process of working. How you structure a project, who gets assigned what work and how many meetings you conduct is the formula that elevates you faster than when (or even if) you deliver a product, a mission or a program. This culture becomes even more evident as one ascends the chain of command. The farther up the organizational ladder you go, the further removed from the productive segment of the agency you are, with product being replaced by an ever multiplying and bewildering variety of workshops, seminars and management training retreats. There exists in America today a thriving industry dedicated to convincing people who have no organizational or management skills that in fact, they are all excellent organizers and managers. Much of this sub-culture is accurately (and hilariously) portrayed in the comic strip Dilbert.
Management fads like Total Quality Management regularly come and go. NASA has dabbled in Faster-Cheaper-Better, Spiral Development, Earned Value Management, and many others. Each new initiative is unveiled as The Answer, the magic beans solution that will re-establish the NASA of our forefathers – smart, productive, innovative, and competent. Management thrives by producing more middle managers. People joke about highway projects where one guy digs a hole while five others lean on their shovels, watching him work. That old chestnut always gets a laugh because we’ve all seen it at some point. You see it a lot within NASA. As administrative cost consumes more and more of the budget pie, the slice that represents funding for the productive sector of the agency keeps shrinking.
Bolden’s comment is tragic, not in its misunderstanding but in its verity. America cannot go back to the Moon by itself not because we lack the wealth or the technical skills but because we have developed a culture of management bloat and process-orientation that proliferates bureaucracy. NASA is comfortably cushioned from the reality of their organizational maladies by the amazing legacy inherited from those who did great things in the past. They may believe they’re immune to the Cult of Management, but as evidenced by Bolden’s statements, the agency has changed. NASA has become a “feel-good” bureaucracy, stuck on the idea of doing one-off stunts in space for public approval and a guaranteed institutional lifetime, paid for by the public. This attitude both inside and outside of the agency has lead to the demise of our national spaceflight capabilities. Stagnant entities reflexively dwell on past glory; dynamic ones build upon them to create something both significant and permanent.
Occasionally, I’m asked why I stay in the space business. I do so because I believe in the mission of space exploration and in the importance of moving humanity into the Solar System. Every now and then, an opportunity arises outside the boundaries of normal business to do something productive and create a lasting legacy – a time when the stars align and a leader refuses to follow the established rules or to unimaginatively subscribe to the conventional wisdom.
Currently, the “right stuff” manifests itself as a pattern of waiting for a propitious political opportunity and a few far-seeing people to seize the day and push through something that otherwise would be buried by “process.” In my opinion, the Vision for Space Exploration was such an opportunity – a path forward, achievable in stages, that would have created a legacy of space faring capability. The idea of actually doing something made the Vision a nonstarter to many within the agency – it challenged their worldview of process over product. They are content to merely manage an organization. The goal of leading America and the world into the Solar System has become a slogan in a strategic plan, an ever-fading banner over an office door.
Is any of this fixable? Perhaps. For now, the opportunity to strengthen the U.S. space program, an endeavor that has traditionally pushed technology development and stoked our economic engine, has been kicked aside. But by their very nature, new opportunities arise unbidden and unforeseen at irregular intervals. I wonder if we’ll do better next time.
Americans need to wonder.
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“Stagnant entities reflexively dwell on past glory; dynamic ones build upon them to create something both significant and permanent.”
We are totally on the same page here. Your assertions in some recent comments that the agency simply had to have a single particular goal and timeline and had to follow the Apollo model and that it just couldn’t change to Flexible Path implied that NASA had gone stagnant.
Clearly the NASA of today is not the NASA of von Braun. Change can occur in one of two ways: gradually or in quantum leaps. The change that formed NASA in the first place was a quantum leap. The change since the mid to late 60s (I surmise bureaucratization started sometime shortly before Apollo 11) has been gradual and largely for the worse. Can NASA handle another quantum leap?
“How you structure a project, who gets assigned what work and how many meetings you conduct is the formula that elevates you faster than when (or even if) you deliver a product, a mission or a program.”
This is a symptom of bureaucracy. It is also exactly backwards from the way things operate in any successful small business. How discouraging it must be for the truly bright lights to see the reward system operate this way at NASA.
“Management fads like Total Quality Management regularly come and go. NASA has dabbled in Faster-Cheaper-Better, Spiral Development, Earned Value Management, and many others.”
To make matters worse, large companies tend to adopt these management fads too, because “that’s how NASA does it”.
“In my opinion, the Vision for Space Exploration was such an opportunity – a path forward, achievable in stages, that would have created a legacy of space faring capability. ”
I agree. I think that with Flexible Path, the achievable stages become more and smaller steps, leading to much more space faring capability and a much more robust space industry. The VSE goals are still there – but instead of groups of four heading to the moon ten congressional elections away, there are smaller, shorter-term goals that apply leverage to the whole effort – and instead we maybe get groups of thousands going there to stay.
“For now, the opportunity to strengthen the U.S. space program, an endeavor that has traditionally pushed technology development and stoked our economic engine, has been kicked aside.”
I do not understand this view of the situation. What I see is quite the opposite: NASA finally going back to the edge of the envelope and the American economy stepping in behind to follow the path already well-marked by NASA, starting with crew delivery to LEO.
Comment by Ed Minchau — July 11, 2010 @ 1:09 am
Mr. Bolden should be ashamed of himself for continuing to perpetuate the myth that NASA’s relatively minuscule budget is unaffordable!
You could double NASA’s manned spaceflight budget, an approximately $8.4 billion a year increase, and NASA’s over all budget would still represent less than 1% of total Federal budget expenditures.
The scariest part of all this is the fact that the public believes it! A 2007 poll revealed that Americans in general thought that 24% of Federal budget expenditures were spent on NASA. 24%! That would be an $844 billion a year NASA budget!
There’s a titanic amount of government waste in appallingly inefficient programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the totally unnecessary adventure in Iraq that’s costing Americans hundreds of billions of dollars a year in waste.
NASA, on the other hand, actually creates wealth for the general economy.
To say that I’m extremely disappointed with Mr. Bolden– is an understatement!
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/badastronomy/2007/11/21/nasas-budget-as-far-as-americans-think/
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1000/1
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — July 11, 2010 @ 4:36 am
Ed,
I think that with Flexible Path, the achievable stages become more and smaller steps, leading to much more space faring capability and a much more robust space industry. The VSE goals are still there –
You and I simply disagree on this. I think that the Obama anti-Vision is fundamentally a non-serious proposal. It is all smoke-and-mirrors, designed to fracture the space community against itself (accomplished), pretend that we’re going somewhere (a NEO mission in 15 years is not a space program, but a license for Powerpoint engineering ad nauseum), and spend the (increased) budget on widget-making and gadgets that may or may not be relevant to future spaceflight — all of this laying the groundwork for the termination of the human space program at some future date.
My point in this post is that by virtue of the prevalence of the Cult of Management at NASA, the agency is perfectly configured to spend and waste money, not to fly missions or develop technology (we get useful technology development by flying missions, not by research).
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 11, 2010 @ 5:37 am
You say ” NASA has become a “feel-good” bureaucracy, stuck on the idea of doing one-off stunts in space for public approval and a guaranteed institutional lifetime, paid for by the public”
I dispute this, not that NASA is not an institution o one-off stunts, but that it has always been such. A read of the Apollo missions design history, where an initial idea (on paper only, not a serious proposal I believe) was to build a station in orbit, and go from there to the moon, reveals as much the one-off stunt thinking
The Saturn-V, humanity’s most powerful machine, was a profilgate waste of resources, throwing away most of itself to simply return one tiny capsule with 3 men, and leave nothing of productive use in a place we can use them. In and of itself, I believe Apollo was a great program. But it was a once-off, and did not lead to the things that we should have had – factories in orbit, hotels in orbit, and all the things that *finally* private industry is talking.
I reluctantly concede, much as I never thought to do so, that the current path is perhaps the correct one. Leave the space commercialisation to the private sector, where the passion still thrives
Comment by Mark Stacey — July 11, 2010 @ 5:47 am
Mark,
But it [Apollo] was a once-off,
I agree and have said as much in this blog on several occasions.
and did not lead to the things that we should have had – factories in orbit, hotels in orbit, and all the things that *finally* private industry is talking. I reluctantly concede, much as I never thought to do so, that the current path is perhaps the correct one.
Fine, except what you’ve just described is NOT the “current path” — instead of private investors putting up capital to develop a commercial spaceflight system, we’re going to continue to spend NASA’s $20 billion/year plus. The difference between the old path and new one is that with the new path, we won’t get anything for the money.
Leave the space commercialisation to the private sector, where the passion still thrives
Perhaps. But you’ve just argued for not pursuing the “current path,” which is to make NASA the agent for commercialization.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 11, 2010 @ 8:24 am
Having worked for my share of “#1 Defense Contractors”, I can tell you that program management is a challenge for any large program, NASA, DOD, whatever. The difference has typically been that DOD programs produce many of the eventual product, where NASA produces few, so the costs per unit end up looking extremely high for the eventual outcome (as opposed to only really high for DOD). This is the nature of large programs, and it’s not unique to NASA.
The old saying “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime” applies to NASA as it does for everything else in life, and why people don’t want NASA to spread their knowledge to U.S. companies is shortsighted. Transferring the duties to U.S. companies of getting cargo and crew to LEO will allow NASA to focus on their goals outside of LEO, and that’s really where NASA’s talents and abilities shine.
The lesson of Constellation was that NASA has a hard time managing $100B programs that don’t pay off for 20 years, so don’t create all-in-programs that big again. Instead, break down the effort into smaller, easier to complete chunks that provide value when completed, and serve as building blocks for the next set of goals. The goals are easier to manage, the payoff is quicker, the capabilities create stepping stones that are valuable on their own, and large programs don’t get a chance to overwhelm the entire agency. This is what the new NASA plan does, and part of the reason I fully back it.
Regarding the comment by Administrator Bolden that “We’re not going to go anywhere beyond low Earth orbit as a single entity”, I see that as a reflection of what has happened with Constellation, and the huge costs involved in attempting human exploration beyond LEO. It’s not that we don’t have the capability to do it, it’s that we don’t have the national will to spend that much money on it without a better payoff than “because we need to”. The ISS, which has barely survived congressional funding challenges, is a good example of that.
Consider just the Ares I program, which was estimated to cost $40B. If Griffin had chosen to use the Delta IV Heavy instead, we would have saved at least $$35B, and would be planning the first launch of Orion this year on a Delta IV Heavy. That $35B would have paid for extending the ISS, and even the development of a smaller Shuttle replacement like Dream Chaser. Instead, decisions at the top (Griffin) lead to a program that was too big to manage for NASA, and too limited in it’s end product to have universal support.
NASA can afford to do BEO missions, but it cannot afford to do them by themselves. As soon as a task becomes repeatable enough (like sending crew to LEO), NASA needs to hand those tasks off to commercial companies (or willing partner countries). This reduces the management scope for NASA (and reduce their bureaucracy), introduces competition to lower prices, and allows NASA to stay focused on the things they do best. Commercial companies also bring marketing resources to bear, and they have a better ability than NASA to encourage new applications for products and services in space. It’s a win-win for everyone.
Comment by Coastal Ron — July 11, 2010 @ 1:34 pm
Coastal Ron,
This is what the new NASA plan does,
I don’t agree. The new plan purports to break down the task into steps as you describe, but the actual effect is to spread money around randomly, increase entropy and produce nothing.
NASA can afford to do BEO missions, but it cannot afford to do them by themselves.
That is entirely dependent upon what you think the mission is and how you chose to implement it. You still conflate Constellation Program of Record with the VSE. The former might not be affordable, but the latter always was and still is. But with the new anti-Vision, all that has been cast away for a promise of some accomplishment in the indefinite future.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 11, 2010 @ 1:45 pm
Paul D. Spudis said:
You still conflate Constellation Program of Record with the VSE. The former might not be affordable, but the latter always was and still is.
The Vision for Space Exploration is just that, a vision, and Constellation was Griffin’s way to start achieving part of the VSE. Constellation, however, was not going to achieve enough for the money required – it was the wrong approach to achieving the VSE.
I agree with the overall goals of the VSE, but the vision talks about goals, and not the specifics of how to achieve them, nor the schedule of when they are to be done. NASA has a limited budget, and after this next congress gets done figuring out how to handle the growing deficit, it may be smaller still. Whatever we do has to build stepping stones that others can use to follow, otherwise we’re wasting money re-accomplishing things we’re already done. For instance, the ISS is a stepping stone, but Apollo was not. We need legacy, not memories.
You see the proposed budget as the “anti-Vision”, but I think that’s FUD.
How is funding robotic precursor missions to the Moon, Mars and its moons, Lagrange points, and nearby asteroids, not supporting the VSE?
How is funding short turnaround programs (5 years or less) such as in-orbit propellant transfer and storage, inflatable modules, automated/autonomous rendezvous and docking, closed-loop life support systems, and other next-generation capabilities, not supporting the VSE?
How is keeping the ISS so we can continue to learn how to live and work in space, not supporting the VSE?
How is human-rating existing launch vehicles and developing new spacecraft that can ride on multiple launch vehicles, not supporting VSE?
How is modernizing the Kennedy Space Center to increase it’s operational efficiency and reduce launch costs for all users, not supporting VSE?
If anything, what Obama/Bolden propose is to build the foundation for achieving the VSE, but not the details of how it will be ultimately achieved. This is smart, because the technology and knowledge we need to accomplish the VSE changes over time, and locking ourselves into a one technology ecosystem is not the cost-effective way to do anything in space. We need multiple capabilities for all of our transportation needs, and we need a commercial system in place that allows competition to gradually lower costs and expand the space marketplace.
With the proposed plan, we actually end up with a bunch of useable systems and technologies at the end of Obama’s term, instead of an unfinished, outdated, over-budget grand space plan. Which is what Constellation was.
I think the VSE is a laudable goal, but it’s not an endpoint, nor does it need to be done all in one chunk. The new NASA proposal works on laying a firm foundation to start the journey towards achieving the goal, and it will provide usable stepping stones for those follow.
Comment by Coastal Ron — July 11, 2010 @ 3:08 pm
Ron,
I think the VSE is a laudable goal, but it’s not an endpoint, nor does it need to be done all in one chunk.
No one ever claimed it was an “end point” — lunar return was the beginning of the creation of a new space faring system, one built through the use of off-planet resources, that can routinely access cislunar space and the planets beyond. The anti-Vision discards all of this without any thoughtful alternative.
The new NASA proposal works on laying a firm foundation to start the journey towards achieving the goal, and it will provide usable stepping stones for those follow.
I know that you believe this. I don’t. We disagree.
And with that, I believe that our discussion here is concluded.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 11, 2010 @ 4:10 pm
You and I simply disagree on this.
Well, we could both be wrong, too. Maybe things don’t work out as well as I think they could, maybe they don’t end up as much of a CF as you think they could.
I guess I view space development as analogous to programming computers in some ways. For instance, I see things like commercial passenger service to low earth orbit, LEO propellant depots, CELSS, inflatable habitats, and so on as subroutines – breaking down a problem into component steps, solving them, and then re-using those components in other contexts.
Let’s look down the road 20,30,40 years. What should routine access to the moon look like? To me, that means:
- fly to the nearest spaceport
- transfer in the terminal to your launch vehicle, perhaps one of several commercial launches that day
- launch to LEO
- transfer to a LEO station, wait
- transfer to a vehicle that only makes the LEO-L1-LEO trip, refueling at each end of the trip
- travel to L1, transfer into station there, wait
- transfer into a vehicle that only makes the L1-Luna-L1 trip, refueling at each end
- land at de Gerlache station.
Can this be done with Flexible Path? Maybe. Could it be done with Constellation? Heck no. Do you have a better plan? Maybe, and I’d like to see your thoughts on how it should be done.
I’ve been posting my ideas on how it should be done for years, including some recent lengthy posts. From something I wrote three years ago:
Comment by Ed Minchau — July 11, 2010 @ 5:33 pm
The focus on management fads and process rather than product isn’t unique to NASA. It’s not a new problem at NASA, either. If anything, I think NASA’s new approach helps address this problem.
NASA’s new approach allows it to use commercial services rather than its most bureaucratic sections, such as NASA’s government rocket divisions. It gives a lot of other opportunities for using more streamlined services from commercial space and academia. Meanwhile, it strengthens NASA’s more productive segments, such as its robotic missions, by funding more robotic precursor missions, Earth observation missions, and general space technology developments and demonstrations.
Meanwhile, NASA’s new plan gives plenty of opportunity for reform within its HSF areas by continuing the ISS, doing heavy lift engine development and related work, continuing Orion in a CRV role, and running various exploration technology demonstration missions. We will get to see which ones work and which ones don’t work … and unlike megaprojects like Ares I/V, these projects will be small enough to shut down if they aren’t working.
Comment by red — July 11, 2010 @ 6:29 pm
On an unrelated note, I’d be interested to see what ideas Paul might have for improving NASA’s plans within the current overall framework. In other words, let’s assume that NASA is flat-out going to fully support Earth observations and green Aeronautics based on Obama’s general political inclinations. Also, the ISS will be kept, used, and improved. Thus, those budgets, and the baseline Science and Aeronautics budgets, are off-limits.
In addition, assume we’re going to have a Flexible Path sort of plan that can include the Moon (but not first). We get $7.8B for exploration technology development and demonstrations, $3B for HLVs, $6B for commercial crew and cargo, $3B for robotic precursors, and so on through 2015. Partial use of Constellation hardware might free us from wasting some of the $2.5B on Constellation transition, and use of Shuttle-derived hardware might give us access to some of the $2B of KSC modernization funds.
In that context, how could things be improved? Are there specific robotic precursor missions we should fly, specific technologies we should develop on Earth or demonstrate in space, specific new missions we could give to the commercial crew, commercial cargo, AR&D space tug, or Orion-based CRV that aren’t in NASA’s current plans but that could be within the general approach that it seems we will be taking?
For example, one of the flagship technology demos is for SEP, and another is for aerocapture. Paul has spoken against aimless dabbling in technology development. In these cases, a certain amount of focus may be given because the demos will (possibly) fly to Mars and carry science instruments there. The SEP mission also has a certain amount of built-in focus because it’s demonstrating military technology (from DARPA). Is this, in addition to NASA’s hopes for SEP cargo transport for exploration, enough focus? If not, what would work, and if so, how can we do something similar for other NASA technology work?
Comment by red — July 11, 2010 @ 6:50 pm
Paul,
My problem with the VSE is the “E” part. I think that we need to press the pause button on Exploration and start doing some Development for a while.
When most people think about the term “exploration”, it means going to new places where we’ve never been before for no other purpose than to discover or just to be able to say that we’ve done it (i.e. Glory). The concept of exploration is exciting to many people. It gives us a new knowledge of planetary bodies. It gives a nation great pride in accomplishing a difficult thing. It inspires our kids to go into math, science, and engineering careers.
But does exploration provide access to natural resources? Not unless it is specifically designed to do so. Does it make the next steps easier? Generally not. In fact, does exploration make development more difficult? Yes, because it diverts resources into non-productive ventures and away from sustainable steps. Does exploration make a plan vulnerable? Yes, because, fundamentally, exploration is probably not actually essential. It is mostly for pride or curiosity. But if there are budget overruns then the plan can be scrapped or switched to some other plan.
The exploration emphasis of the VSE was its Achilles’ Heel. Obama could say that we shouldn’t return to the Moon because, frankly we’ve been there before? True, we were there before but in an exploration mode not a development mode. That’s the difference. But Constellation had huge landers because an Ares V could accommodate it. And Ares V was so large because it needed to also go to Mars. And we needed to go to Mars because…because we’ve never been there before. But since an HLV is considered to cost too much then we just scrap that and go to an asteroid because “we’ve never been there before”. And we can always push off the date of going to an asteroid because…going now or going a bit later…what does it matter?
Constellation’s lunar base wasn’t really about real development but just gaining the skills necessary for the next step which was the exploration of Mars. So there was real talk about abandoning the Moon base while we spent money going to Mars. Neither Bush nor Obama really cared about the Moon because the Lunar exploration offered fewer exploration opportunities than Mars or an asteroid.
But from a development perspective the Moon becomes essential. It has remarkable natural resources. It is relatively nearby. Development can be done relatively cheaply because we don’t need to safely transport and sustain people there in order to develop a base or mine. Work can be done there telerobotically. What’s more (unlike the vice versa) development can dramatically support exploration through the provision of in-space resources.
BUT America’s lust for Glory will not be denies. Apparently, we MUST be in the lead. We MUST have a manned program however much it costs and however much accidents might set back the program.
So, my solution is to grant the cheapest form of novel manned space exploration program. I see this as being a trip to an asteroid using EDSs which are launched without the need for a HLV. Then, the money saved by doing such a mission on the cheap should be directed to incentivize commercial companies to expand America’s economic sphere through cis-lunar space including the lunar surface. We’re talking fuel depots, space tugs, lunar landers, lunar water extraction, conversion to ascending fuel, and transport of lunar resources back to LEO. Lunar rock collectibles, large GEO communications satellites, supplying orbital hotels, even SPSs — all of these would be potential commercial spinoffs.
> instead of private investors putting up capital to develop a commercial spaceflight system, we’re going to continue to spend NASA’s $20 billion/year plus. The difference between the old path and new one is that with the new path, we won’t get anything for the money.
I’m confused. My understanding is that SpaceX & company have put quite a bit of their own money into development of their own rockets and will end up owning them. Secondly, I’m not imaging commercial companies spending ALL of NASA’s $20 billion/year plus. I’m thinking that 15-20% of NASAs budget incentivizing commercial companies to develop propellant depots, lunar landers, etc. “Won’t get anything for the money”? Isn’t NASA going to get reduced cost deliveries to the ISS because of its incentivizing of commercial companies?
Comment by JohnHunt — July 11, 2010 @ 7:27 pm
Paul, excellent post! I applaud your antidisestablishmentarianism. We ought not throw the baby out with the bathwater.
If the world doesn’t come to an end in 2012, the stars may line up once again, and a person, an organization, and the times will come together to make historic achievement possible once again.
Keep the faith brother!
Trackback: @ bautforum.com
Paul Spudis (of lunar water fame) takes on the (in)famous Bolden’s interview for Al-Jazeera. He starts by noting that it has now been officially confirmed that NASA can’t go beyond LEO…
Comment by Warren Platts — July 11, 2010 @ 9:19 pm
JohnHunt,
fundamentally, exploration is probably not actually essential. It is mostly for pride or curiosity.
Exploration includes much more than that, as I have discussed at length in a previous post:
http://blogs.airspacemag.com/moon/2010/01/25/have-we-forgotten-what-exploration-means/
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 12, 2010 @ 5:10 am
Ed,
Do you have a better plan? Maybe, and I’d like to see your thoughts on how it should be done.
I’ve outlined what we should be doing on this blog repeatedly for the last year and a half. This presentation, written over 4 years ago, includes a straw man architecture that outlines the basics:
http://www.spudislunarresources.com/Papers/The%20Vision%20and%20the%20Mission.pdf
But more importantly, it emphasizes that if you don’t understand your mission, you’re just wasting time and resources.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 12, 2010 @ 5:15 am
red,
NASA’s new plan gives plenty of opportunity for reform within its HSF areas by continuing the ISS, doing heavy lift engine development and related work, continuing Orion in a CRV role, and running various exploration technology demonstration missions. We will get to see which ones work and which ones don’t work … and unlike megaprojects like Ares I/V, these projects will be small enough to shut down if they aren’t working.
Congratulations. You’ve just outlined the essence of the anti-Vision. I have no doubt that all of these “efforts” are scheduled for eventual cancellation.
I’m a little confused on one point, however — if the administration gets what it wants, Constellation is gone. How then is it a “megaproject” that can’t be shut down?
In that context, how could things be improved?
For a start, they could keep the Vision for Space Exploration, which was not about “Constellation” but a strategic direction and set of long-term objectives. If the new plan had such direction, it might be a serious proposal — it doesn’t and it isn’t.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 12, 2010 @ 5:38 am
We have gone from one extreme to another. Both are flawed both will lead to over-all stagnation for our NASA. There is some middle ground one with some flex, a goal and some defined steps or milestones or “prizes” with some degree of accountability to at least focus the effort in a general all on board the same bus direction. What have now is anyone guess leading to total KAOS.
Comment by Doug — July 12, 2010 @ 7:39 am
Doug,
We have gone from one extreme to another. Both are flawed both will lead to over-all stagnation for our NASA….What have now is anyone guess leading to total KAOS
And that suits some people just fine.
If you lose CONTROL, why wouldn’t you expect KAOS? :^)
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 12, 2010 @ 8:20 am
Paul D. Spudis said:
“I’ve outlined what we should be doing on this blog repeatedly for the last year and a half. This presentation, written over 4 years ago, includes a straw man architecture that outlines the basics:”
Excerpt from page 27 of your paper “The Vision and the Mission”:
{Need a mission first; cannot judge whether a flight or widget is relevant to your aims if you don’t have any.}
Mission: Go to the Moon to learn to live and work productively in space.
Basic principles:
Small, incremental building blocks
Cumulative – each step builds on previous one
Early accomplishment, early capabilities
Robotic presence first, then people
Pretty much what you describe here is what I said the new NASA plan does. The difference is that you’re talking about this in the context of it happening on the surface of the Moon, whereas the NASA plan is for many destinations.
And then you stated this in response to Ed Minchau:
But more importantly, it emphasizes that if you don’t understand your mission, you’re just wasting time and resources.
YOUR mission is to do stuff on the Moon. That has always been clear. NASA’s proposed budget (their “mission”) is to develop the basic technologies that NASA (or anyone) can use to go to the Moon, or anywhere else.
I noticed in your presentation that you only talked about what it would take when the “mission” was on the Moon. That reminded me of the cartoon of the guy doing a complicated math equation, and in the middle he writes “and then a miracle happens”. Your Moon “mission” is the same, in that it talks about all the wonderful technology and capabilities that you see being landed on the Moon (and later people), but somehow the ability to get them there, affordably, is completely ignored.
You just “assume” low cost, multiple path transportation systems just “appear” and work at such an efficient level that the U.S. Taxpayer can afford to pour all that money into your Moon “mission”. You’re skipping a step.
Your Moon “mission” proposal is a fine strawman, and someday I look forward to something like that happening, but if we don’t create a more efficient transportation system, you won’t be alive by the time the U.S. Taxpayer can afford to do what you propose.
Comment by Coastal Ron — July 12, 2010 @ 12:00 pm
What you’re describing here is Jerry Pournelle’s Iron Law of Bureaucracy: http://www.jerrypournelle.com/reports/jerryp/iron.html
A pity.
Comment by BD — July 12, 2010 @ 12:08 pm
You just “assume” low cost, multiple path transportation systems just “appear” and work at such an efficient level that the U.S. Taxpayer can afford to pour all that money into your Moon “mission”. You’re skipping a step.
The only thing I’m assuming is that NASA will continue to get the same budget, more or less, indefinitely. I base this assumption on the past 30 years of spending on space, which has hovered between 0.5 and 1% of the federal budget. I further assume that the objective stays fixed but that schedule is the free variable — if it costs too much to do it by x, we do it by y. But we do it. This was the basic funding/schedule assumption of the original VSE.
In contrast, your assumption seems to me much more problematic — you assume that pouring money into a bureaucratic black hole at NASA in the absence of any real mission or destination will result in: 1) cheap, routine commercial access to space and 2) all the technology we need to go to the planets. I submit that the history of the agency (e.g., Delta Clipper, X-38, NSLI) is counter-indicative to your assumption.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 12, 2010 @ 12:39 pm
Paul D. Spudis said:
“you assume that pouring money into a bureaucratic black hole at NASA in the absence of any real mission or destination will result in: 1) cheap, routine commercial access to space and 2) all the technology we need to go to the planets. I submit that the history of the agency (e.g., Delta Clipper, X-38, NSLI) is counter-indicative to your assumption.”
Your second statement is an interesting one, in that NASA was funding specific technologies, and not specific services. The goals of those programs were to see if something could be done, not how inexpensively they could be done. This is an important distinction.
I do agree with your overall premise that large programs can turn into “bureaucratic black holes”. Having worked at large defense contractors, and following the progress of many dead-end government programs, I know that the best of intentions can turn into money pits. Since good intentions don’t seem to be the solution, I see transforming “programs” into “commercial services” as a good model.
If the military needs to move a corp of troops across the world, they rely upon contracted commercial transport. The same with cargo they need moved to non-hotzone areas. NASA has traditionally felt they need to create and own their own transportation systems, and this was so with Constellation. What I advocate is that they only need to own the new & unique vehicles, and that once they are perfected, they should be handed off to commercial market as soon as practicable.
NASA (Griffin) ignored two perfectly safe and reliable commercial launchers (Delta & Atlas), and decided to spend $30-40B just for a crew launcher. If they had gone with Delta IV Heavy instead, they would have saved $Billions, and would have freed up $Billions that could have been going towards your proposed Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter or Lunar Outpost Landers.
Without a commercial & competitive transportation in place, we will never be able to afford a sustained presence beyond LEO. If NASA is not capable of managing large transportation programs, the only alternative is commercial. This should not be a big leap of confidence, since NASA & DOD already rely on Atlas & Delta for most of their satellite needs, and the commercial transportation model is how our country operates anyways.
NASA needs to get out of the transportation business, and the new budget starts that process. And with the money they save, you’ll be able to finally start your lunar program…
Comment by Coastal Ron — July 12, 2010 @ 2:12 pm
Please do include posting other space exploration programs apart from NASA, Keep Your blog updated with INDIA’s space exploration projects.. I appreciate the work done by you.
Check out my blog http://tarunvipparthi.wordpress.com/2009/09/28/mission-to-moon/
Comment by ramya — July 12, 2010 @ 4:02 pm
[...] if you just have to be angry at Administrator Bolden, read this. “The United States can’t do it”, eh? “Can’t” and “Would [...]
Pingback by Conflict Resolution…of a Sort. « The Space Geek — July 12, 2010 @ 4:03 pm
Paul,
Thank you for referring me to your previous post re: exploration. I am relatively new to your blog and so had not read that before.
—————
Let me suggest some practical definitions:
Explor(ation) – 1. to traverse or range over (a region, area, etc.) for the purpose of discovery (dictionary.com)
Prospecting – To further explore a resource to determine its value (my definition)
Develop(ment) – 1. to bring out the capabilities or possibilities of; bring to a more advanced or effective state (dictionary.com)
Sustainable Development – to develop resources and capabilities in a way where they will continue to be used even if the initial source of inputs is lost (my definition)
—————
> What is needed is the incremental, cumulative build-up of space faring infrastructure that is both extensible and maintainable, a growing system whose aim is to transport us anywhere we want to go, for whatever reasons we can imagine, with whatever capabilities we may need.
To me, what you are talking about is Sustainable Space Development. If you were to ask most people (whether in NASA or out) what “space exploration” was, they would probably not come up with the above description. But if you were to ask them what “sustainable space development” meant, they would probably come up with something close to your paragraph.
This is not an esoteric issue. The big problem with both Constellation and the New Path is that their goal is not Sustainable Development but mostly Glory. That’s clearly the case with the New Path but one could argue that Constellation would have built an architecture which could have enabled the develop of lunar resources on an industrial level. But they were discussing abandoning the base while money was being spent going to Mars.
BUT look at what is being accomplished with the COTS/CRS – SpaceX situation. When the NASA flights run out, they already have 9+Iridium flights manifested. And by 2014 there will probably be a lot more flights manifested. NASA puts in some initial inputs, technologies are developed, and companies start servicing a market which is sustainable.
All I am proposing is that the COTS/CRS approach be applied beyond LEO in order to develop a sustainable, commercial, cis-lunar economy. Saying that NASA needs to section out a part of its budget for commercial “development” incentives would be the way to achieve this. To achieve this we need to succeed in making the argument that “sustainable development” needs to be recognized as legitimate, discrete goal of the US space program.
Comment by JohnHunt — July 12, 2010 @ 8:13 pm
Mr. Spudis,
Another excellent article. Thank you. I really wish fans of Obama’s space plan would stop with the precursor mission myths. Where do the precursor missions lead us? And more importantly, when does the end point happen? All I’ve seen of the Obama plan is talk about a mission to an asteroid 15 years from now. A mission to Mars… that’s 40 or 50 years in the future. That’s a plan? We’re trading VSE for this? Without a specific timeframe to do anything, Obama’s space plan is a waste of time and resources (other than commercial support for ISS resupply). Space anything is not on Obama’s radar.
Bolden should be ashamed of himself. Obama and him are getting good at saying “we can’t.”
Comment by Jim R. — July 12, 2010 @ 10:04 pm
John,
To achieve this we need to succeed in making the argument that “sustainable development” needs to be recognized as legitimate, discrete goal of the US space program.
I’m with you on the statement of goals. My point in writing the other blog piece was that what you call “development” has been historically a part of the concept of “exploration.” The idea that exploration is instead a series of PR stunts, akin to a modern gladiatorial contest, is relatively new and apparently subscribed to by many who know no history.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 13, 2010 @ 4:59 am
President Nixon decided to decommission America’s heavy lift rocket, the Saturn V, and the US has been stuck at LEO ever since. But now it looks like the Congress is going to mandate that a heavy lift vehicle and Crew Exploratory Vehicle be built– immediately.
Once NASA has a heavy lift vehicle again, then a new American space age will begin. And everything we do at LEO and beyond LEO will be a lot easier and cheaper.
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — July 13, 2010 @ 5:45 am
John Hunt,
I think you have grasped the dilemna NASA is facing. That is to say, i think the Administration and Bolden/Garver equate Exploration with “glory” and “science”, but not the historical definition that Paul mentions. My read is that the intent of the VSE was to subscribe to the historical definition of “exploration”, although in execution, the decisionmakers at NASA lost sight of that intent, and we were left with a suboptimal implementation of the VSE. While we may, can, and will argue about the proper phasing of commercial launch capability, that misses the major point on the VSE. We (NASA) like to build and play with rockets, but we haven’t yet grasped the enabling significance of the importance of the intent of the VSE. The Moon is the best initial destination because it allows us the best chance to learn whether or not, and if so, how to use in-situ resources to enable cheaper long duration stays off-planet (in pursuit of the goal to learn how to live off-planet), and in so doing, create wealth for the country instead of expending it. Can this ISRU thing really be viable? We don’t really know for sure until we try. However, if we don’t try, then we certainly will not succeed.
That is why many of us are upset at the new “direction”; there is no underlying meaning or unifying rationale for human space flight. “Science” can be achieved very effectively and a lot less expensively with robotic missions. And how much is it worth for “the Glory of it”? If we aren’t focused on the basic tenet to learn how to live off-planet, then why should be spend the large amount of resources it takes to simply put a fresh set of footprints on Mars or an Asteroid, notwithstanding the fact that one can’t “step on” and asteroid?
Comment by Tony L — July 13, 2010 @ 7:03 pm
I wrote about this very subject myself today, and it was a pleasure to read your take on it Paul.
All the best ;-P, bowlegged148.
Comment by Lauren — July 16, 2010 @ 12:40 pm
Major agree!!
Excellent article!
The idea that a NASA administrator would say the US can’t and shouldn’t go beyond LEO by itself is nonsensical to insulting to the country as a whole. We certainly can afford to do it alone (frankly one lesson of ISS is that international programs cost are far higher the national programs – and no one saves money), and the idie we shouldn’t do it alone – like its presumptuous of us to step out ahead of others REALLY grates!
As to you’re management points. Hey its a civil service organization. Managers are paid by the size of their staffs not their results – so they try hard to bloat their staffs. Is someone surprised? This is the post office in space!
NASA has shown itself to be behind the times in the fields, and actively working to move their technology back to a higher cost, fewer flights, Griffin model.
I desperately wish NASA was directed to do CATS, or commercials were contracted with a large scale flight contract that would justify a new RLV and drive down costs – but no ones talking about any of that..
Comment by Kelly Starks — July 16, 2010 @ 1:47 pm
One comment in particular really hit home with me on your blog this week:
Ed Minchau: This is a symptom of bureaucracy. It is also exactly backwards from the way things operate in any successful small business. How discouraging it must be for the truly bright lights to see the reward system operate this way at NASA.
You and others are seeing this from the outside. Some of us who have been in the midst of the disenchanting NASA bureaucracy have been facing this very personally from the inside for years.
Shuttle got off to a good and even handed start.
ISS has been a dismal place to work because of the proliferation of meaningless and unproductive meetings led by managers who never had any experience in the productive segments of the program since the management shake up in 1993. That is now 17 years.
But the worst was Constellation starting with people at the top who had never been a part of that productive segment; it started off on a bad foot and never recovered. It was openly visible to all concerned; program and project managers who had never managed anything in their careers. Design and development managers who had never designed or developed anything. And these same people, some called them NASA’s “best and brightest”, would tell those of us with experience, “what makes you think you can do the job”.
Some of the people at the top of Constellation still today need to be kept from the leadership positions in whatever form the new program takes.
Comment by G-Man — July 16, 2010 @ 7:39 pm
Paul- You and I have have a fundamental disagreement about what the Obama administration is doing. NASA has spun it’s wheel for 20-25 years. They have funded a series of seemingly sound program ideas going back to Bush I, and yet we are still stuck in LEO. I think by getting money to smaller, leaner organizations that want to step beyond that self imposed exile, we have a opportunity to get past LEO and back back to the moon and go to Near Earth Objects of interest. I think that NASA has become a rat hole that we need to stop flushing money into. I think the idea of funding American businesses to do our bidding is brilliant.
A few years ago, I had thought that the notion of foreign programs going back to the moon would be enough to overcome organizational apathy, but that has not been the case. I think we are about to see China, India, our private companies(and perhaps Russia) do what NASA has been unable to do- leave our gravity well, and journey outward.
I hope to finally see this in my lifetime (I’m almost 60), but it’s likely too late for me to participate in.
Comment by Steverman — July 19, 2010 @ 10:26 am
Steverman,
I think that NASA has become a rat hole that we need to stop flushing money into.
You are aware, of course, that the President’s proposal actually increases the NASA budget? I guess “flushing money into the rat hole” is fine, as long as you know which hole to pour it in.
I think the idea of funding American businesses to do our bidding is brilliant.
Yeah, brilliant. We’ve been doing that for the last two hundred years or so — it’s called “government contracting.” The anti-Vision just trades one bunch of contractors for another.
Brilliant, all right.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 19, 2010 @ 5:16 pm
The “United States can’t do it” comment sure didn’t go ‘unnoticed’ by me or my co-workers, that’s for sure. And you nailed it on the head about the management fads — that goes for many contractor entities as well. I get called a “sucker” and “space junkie” when I try to find some molecule of optimism about the solutions put forth by NASA adminsitrators or Congress… then I get treated to tirades about how we were better off when we competed with other nations instead of collaborated. Debatable, but a sad sign of human nature. “Fixable” appears to be relative, because even with budget increases, the money is spread more thinly across far more endeavours when compared to the glory days of moon landings. NASA’s budget now encompasses space exploration, planetary science, oceans & climate research, astrophysics, heliophysics, green aviation, aeronautical engineering and education support. Too many cooks spoil the… tell me if you’ve heard this one.
Comment by Pillownaut — July 20, 2010 @ 10:35 pm
Paul,
I always get nervous when people talk of “visions”. Did so with VSE. The meat of what you’re really getting at is in doing exploration. Which is what I harped on at NASA in the 70′s – that we needed focus on missions that were doable with mostly off the shelf hardware. Said missions created the environment to fund more hardware. Otherwise “visions” remain that. So I believe you are naive in thinking that they matter at all to your goal.
VSE created an environment for another NASA “bubble” … and yes we’ve seen quite a few of them. They create an excuse to seem to do something, either via the arsenal system or another. Do you really think that in decades it has changed at all? You could read the writing on the wall at the beginning on this one, as also the one that preceded it. “Stray but a little and it will fail to the ruin of all”.
The bigger the project, the shorter the life of the bubble.
I’m sorry, but one can’t afford to not take things excruciatingly seriously here. I think you are your own worst enemy here, in wanting a perfect path that can’t happen. To get what you want, you need a more direct path to a singular goal – which isn’t VSE by rigorous definition.
You can get what you want … writ small … as a national post ISS / Shuttle program. But for the vastness of VSE, you need a pre 2008 USA … and you can’t get that.
Crying for the moon isn’t useful or effective.
Comment by no one of consequence — July 21, 2010 @ 8:47 pm
No one,
we needed focus on missions that were doable with mostly off the shelf hardware.
Every step in lunar return can be executed with existing OTS hardware. The only people advocating “unobtainium” are those who believe in the “magic beans” of spaceflight, like VASIMR and “cheap access to LEO.”
I think you are your own worst enemy here, in wanting a perfect path that can’t happen.
Show me where I have advocated a “perfect path.” All I’m saying is that by going to the Moon, we have the ability to create new space faring capability.
Crying for the moon isn’t useful or effective.
I’m not “crying” for anything — I am advocating a strategic path forward. Of course, I assume that my readers are intelligent and want something positive accomplished as well. If that doesn’t describe you and you find the content here irrelevant or offensive, you are welcome to seek enlightenment elsewhere.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — July 22, 2010 @ 2:00 am
Paul,
I am glad you agree OTS can get you back to the moon – that has always been the case. The point is in doing so, not, in the case of VSE’s reliance on CxP, building a monument that ‘perfectly’ goes there as in ‘the enemy of good enough is more better’. I hope I don’t have to spell this out in detail for you.
I’d like the space/time to spell it out in detail for you – I believe I can. But if I take the time to detail it in an enormous comment, and you choose to quibble with its minor points, well what’s the use in that – you’re already locked into a mindset I couldn’t change.
So I’ll just say that the perfect path is one where we leave the immediately developed plan for ‘more better’ … as was done several times as you know … most recently OSP for CxP … as opposed to accelerating out of ‘spiral’. And before you condemn for the theory of backing a given agenda, let me go on to say with others prior (including FLO) same thing.
“Crying for the moon” is a metaphor – reiterating again the point is dedication to mission – such that one isn’t dragged off on developmental ‘goose chases’ of one sort or another.
I criticize your strategic path specifically as being impractical for this (and past) time. In how it deals with your aggravation of NASA management fads, I’d like you to consider that you may be creating such fads in the manner by which you attempt to go forward. Like one arm pushing against the other, employing NASA “isometrics” isn’t successful. Please remember that George Mueller felt that NASA didn’t have enough of the management you disdain here in Apollo … so might that be a tip off to what the issue might be?
Nahh – who want’s to hear that. Nothing to learn from those past fools – right? It’s just those that agree with you vs. those on the ‘other side’, zero sum game.
Comment by no one of consequence — July 22, 2010 @ 12:22 pm
Paul wrote:
“Regarding the comment by Administrator Bolden that ‘We’re not going to go anywhere beyond low Earth orbit as a single entity’, I see that as a reflection of what has happened…”
I rather interpreted this comment as a type of self-fulfilling prophecy. I suggest reading the comment again with the phrase “we’re not going to go anywhere” taken as an active directive rather than as a passive observation. Of late, as my anecdotal observation goes, the Americans are being outvoted by the Americants. In a way, Mr. Bolden’s and Mr. Obama’s comments seem to lean towards acknowledging this.
I agree with Paul’s general approval of the VSE. In principle, I think that what I’ve been calling the BSE (Budget for Space Exploration), FY2011, the Flexible Path, whatever; can have a positive interpretation and outcome. However, VSE failed, largely for political reasons, and I think the new proposal suffers from the same propensity for probable political failure.
For example, FY2011 suggests cancelling one HLV program, and substituting another HLV program, and doesn’t address the management problem of large program accomplishment. Haven’t we Been There and Done That? In a way, FY2011 is a failure of capitalism; when the actual product is less important than corporate profit. In another way, it’s a failure of socialism, when the process of keeping the worker bees busy assumes more importance than the products needed to fulfill the program. FY2011 doesn’t really offer a mechanism for success, which would be a real game-changer.
Not only that, but the infighting among the HSF enthusiasts, partly encouraged by FY2011 it seems, has not convinced the American populace that HSF is a worthwhile endeavor, especially in light of the historically large other problems facing our country these days.
Our country, as a whole, does not really believe that HSF serves a valuable human purpose, and Congress seems to pick up on that.
Moving on, these are a couple of specific examples missing from FY2011:
As far as robotic precursor missions, what is the actual nature and disposition of that lunar water ice? And where are my AutoCAD r14 contour maps of the likely craters? And how about a simple demo ISRU water cracking mission?
The Moon is not the only object of attention either. My personal focus is on the near term goal of the Moon, because of the proximity argument. I have no fundamental problem with Paul’s lunar proposal from several years back. It is a very useful talking point. But Mars bears serious attention too; some of the latest information was not available in 2004, which calls for a revision of Paul’s ideas, but by no means calls for any dismissal. That time is virtually the only unknown variable in his presentation seems quite sound to me.
Dr. McKay is studying the possibility of perchlorate based life on Mars. There is also a methane cycle on Mars which does not conform to current understandings of abiotic processes; it should be studied carefully by an orbiting observatory. It seems that the question of life on Mars can be determined by robotic missions, carefully conceived and executed. Should life be discovered, it seems clear to me that the martian ecosystem should
studied, but also that there should be no human presence on the surface until that understanding should be more sound.
In my mind, the discovery of martian life might properly encourage the development of a lunar outpost and manufacturing abilities, in order to begin reaching out to the solar system in a more permanent fashion, with Mars as that next step. But it is by no means the only requirement for the development of the lunar outpost and ability.
Ultimately, I think that the HLV should be a passenger vehicle, and also carry high value, low mass cargo. Using it to deliver propellant and other unmanned lunar infrastructure would be a good way to demonstrate reliability and cost reduction. The martian mothership, whenever it is built, would be built on the surface of the Moon, and launched from there. If the people of our country do not wish this to happen, they will not ensure that Congress embark on a sustained effort such as this, which gets back to agreeing on how we should proceed.
Perhaps it really is the job of the entrepreneur to open up this new frontier. At the same time, I think that the recent Senate language shows that some sort of political compromise is emerging.
Comment by John Fornaro — July 22, 2010 @ 1:23 pm
Hello Paul,
I enjoyed your “Once and Future Moon” book. There are not many popular books on the moon in local libraries. I hope you update it one day.
You clearly dislike the Presidents’ Fy2011 budget, but how do you feel about the Senate proposal? A HLV and a BEO Orion, but also adopts the asteroid goal. It also slashes the budgets affecting life support, ISRU and the lunar lander/rover with ISRU component planned for 2015. At least this would have given you an additional chapter.
Although the Presidents’ budget had a weak vision wrt to the moon it did have a number of moon related budget items to be delivered within the President’s term. My own hope was that several of these items could have been bundled into something more meaningful. If some more space technology prize money could have found its way to another commercial lunar lander prize then we would have all the components for a robotic lunar colony. Compared to VSE with a permanent manned lunar base, at least this scores 2 out of 3.
Right now I do not see any political force genuinely fighting for the moon. The senate seems to want an HLV, mission secondary. The house seems to want Constellation, reality secondary. (Constellation minus Altair of course.)
Comment by KelvinZero — July 24, 2010 @ 12:26 pm
[...] have written previously about the management fads that periodically sweep through the agency – the alphabet soup of TQM to Earned Value to [...]
Pingback by Vision statements for non-Visionaries | The Once and Future Moon — February 23, 2011 @ 2:56 pm