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The Once and Future Moon Blog, Written by Paul D. Spudis

March 11, 2010

Stuck in Transit – Unchaining Ourselves From the Rocket Equation

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The Moon is the key resource needed to open up the frontier of space

The Moon is the key resource needed to open up the frontier of space

Last fall, after much anticipation, the Augustine Committee presented us with their assessment of the future of space exploration.  Its basic conclusion was that at currently envisioned budgets, the Program of Record (a.k.a. ESAS, Project Constellation) would not get us back to the Moon before many decades had passed, if then.  This meme has been picked up by many in the space community to the point where is it now cliché to claim that we don’t have enough money to do anything in space.  Hence, the direction proposed in the new budget takes NASA out of the space transportation business entirely, freeing up their budget to focus on technology development, and contracting with commercial providers to create access to low Earth orbit (LEO) and the International Space Station (ISS).

How are costs estimated for space systems?  The costing exercise for the Augustine Committee was done by The Aerospace Corporation, a non-profit science and engineering company run for the U.S. Air Force.  Their costing procedures (described briefly on page 82 of the committee report) includes estimating the time and level of effort it takes to develop a system, informed by data from past projects.  The vast bulk of this costing effort deals with launch vehicles and systems.

Looking over cost estimates is a strange experience.  Almost anyone can immediately see inflated levels of costing for things they know about, but are uncertain for other items.  Bob Zubrin wrote a stinging rejection of the Aerospace Corporation’s costing just before the Augustine Committee released their report.  He noted in particular that the estimates included several years of increasing ground operations costs, even while nothing was being launched.  Of course, if you pull together a ground crew, you have to pay them to keep them around, even during slack times.  But his point is a good one; why should it cost more than Shuttle does now to support a launch system that requires an order of magnitude less preparation than the highly complex Shuttle Orbiter?

Using these estimates of the cost of the existing architecture, the Augustine Committee concluded that it was unaffordable.  What did they do then?  Rather than fix the problems with the ESAS architecture, they discarded the entire Vision for Space Exploration and came up with the so-called “Flexible Path” (FP).  Although cloaked in platitudes about how technology development will give us options to go to many destinations beyond LEO, the real motivation for this idea is revealed by the committee’s words on “public engagement” (e.g., “It (FP) would provide the public and other stakeholders with a series of interesting “firsts” to keep them engaged and supportive.” – Augustine report, p. 15).  Thus, the goal of FP is to create Apollo-like spectacles for public consumption, rather than creating steps toward increased space faring capability.

We can wait and hope for the proposed technology development program to provide us with magic beans, or we can begin that process now by returning to the Moon with robots and humans to learn how to harvest and use its material and energy resources.  Creating a sustainable system of space faring that can take us anywhere we want to go would be a real accomplishment.  By gaining this knowledge and expertise, mankind will be free to choose many space goals, thereby achieving “at will” space destination capability.

Jeff Greason, President and co-founder of XCOR Aerospace and a member of the Augustine Committee, recently spoke at the annual Goddard Memorial Symposium.  He asserted that for the near future, we have no path to move people beyond low Earth orbit because the options the Augustine Committee looked at cost more than the United States can afford or is willing to spend.  His principal message to Symposium attendees was to “deal with it.”

According to the Augustine Committee, “The cost of exploration is dominated by the costs of launch to low-Earth orbit and of in-space systems.”  This outlook is one reason why so much of the costing focus was on building Ares V, the super-heavy lift (188 mT) launcher designed for human Mars missions.  For such a mission with chemical propulsion (the only technology currently available) you need about one million pounds in LEO, of which more than 70% is propellant.  Going to Mars is expensive because you must lift all of that fuel out of the deep gravity well of Earth.  Even with the economies of scale provided by a super heavy lift rocket, it still costs tens of billions of dollars to mount such a mission.

Making propellant on the Moon completely changes these numbers, yet use of lunar resources is discussed in only a few brief paragraphs of the Augustine report.  We now know (as the committee did then) that water is present at the lunar poles in significant quantity and that its use to make rocket propellant can create a transportation system that could routinely access all of cislunar space.  This should be the objective of lunar return: to create a space “transcontinental railroad” through the use of lunar resources.  Once established, we can go to the planets with relative ease.

Is any of this possible under the existing budget?  Not if we dissipate our money with pointless and unfocused technology development.  Of the many advantages of the Moon, one of the biggest is that it is close enough that preliminary work can be done by robots on the lunar surface – controlled and remotely operated from Earth.  By emplacing robotic assets on the Moon before human arrival, we can begin to survey, process and store water for use well in advance of human arrival.  Sending robotic assets in advance of people allows us to start creating capability now, without a major increase in budget.  It simply requires a sense of clear objectives; we have the technology to work this problem now.

Simply put, our space objectives need to be – arrive, survive and thrive.  To do that, the goal must be stated, mapped out and achieved before setting out to the next destination.  A sustainable, expandable transportation system in space can be devised by using the resources we find in space.  We will learn how (and if) we can do this on our Moon.  Once we don’t have to haul everything with us from the Earth, costs become lower.  When you don’t have to use 90% of your travel budget just to get out of town, a lot more people can take the trip.  Before you know it, you have a space-based economy.

The nation has important strategic and economic interests in cislunar space and it is entirely appropriate for the federal government to develop a sustainable and extensible cislunar transportation system.  NASA needs to lead and point the way so that the private sector (not just aerospace companies) can invest in and develop the yet unknown technologies that will improve our lives here on Earth as we move out to explore and ultimately settle the new territory of space.

The Moon is a classroom, a test bed and a supply depot.  By using its resources, humanity can create the capability to live, work and travel in and beyond cislunar space.  As a nation, we cannot and must not pass on this enterprise.



Posted By: Paul D. Spudis — Lunar Resources,Space and Society,Space Politics,Space Transportation | Link | Comments (33)


33 Comments

  1. The cost of Constellation was horrendous. no doubt it was possible (in theory anyway) to restructure it to bring the costs down. But there was a second problem. Time.
    Even with unlimited budgets (according to Augustine) it would be impossible to bring Ares I on line in any reasonable time frame.
    Taken together these are fatal flaws.
    On the other hand Atlas V exists.
    Delta IV exists.
    Falcon 9 is on the launch pad now.
    There is no practical option but to go with the vehicles that exist to reduce the gap as much as possibl and restore HSF.
    And relying on EELVs is not a bad thing.
    Higher flight rates means lower costs.
    Lower costs in turn allow higher flight rates. A virtuous circle.
    Even more important than establishing lunar ISRU is getting the cost of access to LEO down.
    Getting that cost to LEO down enables everything else

    Comment by Frediiiie — March 12, 2010 @ 1:53 am


  2. Paul, this was so close to being a good article, it’s a shame you wrote it with such obvious anger and bias. The personal attacks were completely unnecessary. The misrepresentations did not help your argument.

    Orbital propellant transfer and storage, and in-situ resource utilization are both listed as technologies to be developed and demonstrated under the FY11 budget – they are flagship programs. Under the budget of previous years they were assigned no money at all. So it baffles me why you trying to imply the opposite.

    Robotic precursors to the Moon, both orbiting and lander/rovers, are funded under the FY11 budget. They have received little to no budget allocation under previous budgets. Again, I don’t understand why you seem to be implying the opposite.

    I think if you just stop being angry and actually look at what is going on, and get involved, you’ll see NASA is better off now than it was under Griffin.

    Comment by Trent Waddington — March 12, 2010 @ 4:39 am


  3. The personal attacks were completely unnecessary

    What personal attacks?

    Orbital propellant transfer and storage, and in-situ resource utilization are both listed as technologies to be developed and demonstrated under the FY11 budget – they are flagship programs….Robotic precursors to the Moon, both orbiting and lander/rovers, are funded under the FY11 budget

    Simply put, although the budget outlines these as items in the “technology development” lines, I do not believe that we’ll ever get anything from it. The history of the agency shows that they are very good at spending money on “technology development” but less proficient at producing any flight hardware from it.

    you’ll see NASA is better off now than it was under Griffin.

    Although I have had my differences with both Mike Griffin and his chosen architectural implementation of the VSE, at least he was aiming in the right direction. The “new path” aims nowhere.

    Comment by Paul D. Spudis — March 12, 2010 @ 6:12 am


  4. Paul, the personal attacks are obvious, I’m not going to play the game of pointing them out to you. If you’re going to advocate the use of technology like propellant depots and ISRU, I simply can’t understand why you would be opposed to a technology development program that focuses on that technology… The alternative is to focus on transport systems which don’t have that technology, which is what ESAS was all about… it really does just seem like cognitive dissonance.

    Comment by Trent Waddington — March 12, 2010 @ 6:28 am


  5. If NASA was doing something innovative, something different than has been done before by building the Constellation, I might see that as a valid investment into the future. About the only thing the Ares I was doing that was different from the past is to try and develop a man-rated solid fuel rocket capable of independently (instead of jointly with liquid-fueled rockets like the Shuttle program) achieving orbital velocities. From just about every rational study on the topic, that sounds almost an insane proposition anyway to even consider such a concept in the sense that abort options on a solid fuel rocket are embarrassingly few as once the rocket is lit off, it won’t stop (barring some incredibly expensive and wasteful from a payload standpoint fire suppression system). A liquid-fueled rocket at least can be turned off as an abort option.

    Constellation also was not focused on reducing the cost for access getting into space. At least the Space Shuttle was nominally oriented in that direction… at least in the 1970′s. What was the primary selling point for the Shuttle program during the Nixon administration was that it could provide a much lower cost per flight than using the Saturn I or similar vehicle. Everybody forgets now, but the Shuttle was considered the one super cheap way for getting into orbit. If it had gone through a couple dozen iteration in an engineering design cycle, it might have actually achieved that sort of reputation as well.

    One engineering mantra or philosophy is that any item can be produced cheaper, sooner, or more reliable. Unfortunately you must choose only two of those options for whatever you want to make or build. Apollo choose to build something sooner and more reliable, at tremendous expense. Constellation and many of the proposals based on the experience from the Apollo project were based on the same philosophy, with the retirement of the Shuttle looming all that harder on the time pressure to get something done now.

    SpaceX and some of the other newer spaceflight companies are trying an approach to build something cheaper and reliable. This is a very different philosophy and something that takes patience to get it to work correctly. I’ve seen critics complain about how long it is taking SpaceX to get the Falcon 9 to lanuch, thinking that this private company is trying to follow an Apollo crash program of trying to reach the market first and damn the costs of getting there. If the Falcon 9 doesn’t launch for another year…. so what? SpaceX already has a proven system with the Falcon 1, so they can at least be making some money and staying profitable.

    I look at Armadillo Aerospace as an example of what really should be happening, and that company is definitely taking the slow but steady progress approach toward spaceflight, where fuel costs are a significant concern and budget item. In spite of being one of the original Ansari X-Prize participants, they still don’t necessarily have a genuine sub-orbital vehicle, but they are getting closer to that goal every day and are making a profit from some of the technologies they have already developed in trying to reach that goal.

    It still gets back to doing something new and innovative. Constellation was bad because the Ares I vehicle was essentially duplicating existing vehicles in terms of function if not design, and did so at an incredible premium over those other vehicles. While there was innovation with Constellation, it hat nothing to do with lowering the cost of getting into space, as that wasn’t even a design goal. The real purpose of Constellation was to act as an engineering/technology jobs program for the districts and states where the factories and design bureaus were located at. That has nothing to do with making it cheaper or easier to get into space.

    Comment by Robert Horning — March 12, 2010 @ 6:56 am


  6. Great article Paul. None of the EELVs (or Falcon 9) are remotely close to providing human transportation to the space station. And, I work for one of the companies that bid the EGLS (Exploration Ground Launch Services) contract for KSC that was recently cancelled. Launch operations costs were approximately 25% of the costs for the SSP. As Griffin has pointed out, the Augustine Commission used real estimates for Constellation and phony ones for the commercial alternatives. More important, both the Augustine Commission and the Administration are ignoring significant safety concerns.

    Comment by Rocketman — March 12, 2010 @ 7:45 am


  7. Paul, the personal attacks are obvious, I’m not going to play the game of pointing them out to you

    They are not obvious to me. You made this charge. Prove it.

    Comment by Paul D. Spudis — March 12, 2010 @ 8:04 am


  8. Robert,

    It still gets back to doing something new and innovative.

    It also involves understanding your mission and designing to accomplish it. The “new direction” has no mission, but spends on technology in general (or so they claim). Giving NASA money on New Space companies is merely trading one group of aerospace contractors for another.

    Comment by Paul D. Spudis — March 12, 2010 @ 8:07 am


  9. The “Exploration Technology and Demonstrations” program includes an in-orbit propellant transfer and storage technology demonstration, probably started in 2011. It looks like more of a demonstration than a technology development effort.

    That program also has ISRU work, including extracting water and oxygen from lunar ice. A lunar ISRU technology demonstrator/robotic precursor is also to be considered.

    The robotic precursor line most likely starts in 2011 with a lunar surface robot using telerobotics. Part of its job would be to validate the availability of resources for extraction. One of the potential subsequent missions is to land on the lunar surface and transform lunar materials to fuel.

    There are other potential robotic precursor destinations listed. I can’t say I object to those, although I’d prioritize the Moon for this sort of work. However, it looks like the Moon is fairly high in the robotic precursor queue already.

    The robotic precursor work also includes a new line of affordable “scouts”. Although the budget’s description of this line doesn’t call out any specific destinations, I have to think that the Moon is front and center there considering the private lunar surface competition.

    Comment by red — March 12, 2010 @ 8:08 am


  10. “None of the EELVs (or Falcon 9) are remotely close to providing human transportation to the space station.”
    —
    And neither would be the Ares I/Orion combo even if it was continued unabated.

    Comment by Rick Boozer — March 12, 2010 @ 8:12 am


  11. A great article. What gets me riled about all this is that the Augustine Commission stated, I believe, that unless Constellation receives an additional $3 billion a year for the next 5 years to meet the dateline as originally outlined in VSE, the plan was unworkable, as is. Don’t tell me that after squandering 100´s of billions of dollars on a “stimulus package”, “omnibus” bill, bank bailouts, Wall Streets bailouts, auto bailouts, giving billions to shady groups such as ACORN, that Obama did not feel it was necessary to give NASA an extra $15 billion to complete Constellation. Where is NASA’s bailout? And then he insults everybodies intelligence by stating that private industry will be used to transport personnel to ISS and into LEO by giving them $6 billion to kickstart a program. Who is he fooling? Even Burt Rutan says that Obama’s plan is stupid. And private industry might take 10 years, if not longer to devise a system that is viable, if they even ever get one off the ground. The Augustine Commission was a smoke screen right at the outset to cancel the entire project. Obama even stated in his 2008 campaign platform that he intended to “postpone” Constellation for 5 years to help pay for his education reforms. I don’t understand why there can’t be both. Private and government projects. Obama instead decides to scrap 5 years and $10 billion worth of research and development and fork everything over to the private sector, essentially starting from scratch. If this decision doesn’t prove that Obama is the new Walter Mondale, I don’t know what is. Hopefully, Congress will reverse Obama’s decision and if not, that a new US President with more common sense gets elected in 2012 and reverses the “new” policy.

    Comment by Paul Mense — March 12, 2010 @ 11:27 am


  12. Paul,

    the Augustine Commission stated, I believe, that unless Constellation receives an additional $3 billion a year for the next 5 years to meet the dateline as originally outlined in VSE, the plan was unworkable, as is.

    The committee did indeed claim this. But note carefully the qualifier: “the plan was unworkable, as is.” (emphasis added) That is a different statement than saying “the VSE cannot be implemented” under existing budgets, although the Augustine committeee jumped to that conclusion. The more I dig into the costing numbers, the more questionable the assumption that we cannot go anywhere beyond LEO becomes. Stay tuned for more on this soon.

    Comment by Paul D. Spudis — March 12, 2010 @ 11:44 am


  13. Paul,

    I don’t know if you were in the audience on Wednesday, but I was and of course am very familiar with Jeff’s thinking and the Augustine report.

    In no way did Jeff or the report say that the VISION was unexecutable. They said that CONSTELLATION was unexecutable. They are different. In fact, Jeff repeatedly referred to the Aldridge Commission, on which you served, as supporting evidence for the technology plan and for commercialization.

    Jeff remains a strong advocate for the Vision and, as some of your commenters stated, ALL of the technologies you discussed above.

    You need to talk to Jeff or me before writing another piece like this.

    – Jim

    Comment by Jim Muncy — March 12, 2010 @ 1:34 pm


  14. Jim,

    Thank you for your offer to educate me on what’s in the Augustine report, but I can read. I am also aware that Constellation and the VSE are different, a point I have made repeatedly in these very pages.

    The Augustine report states “Human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline.” (Executive Summary, p. 17). But the committee largely ignored Constellation alterations and alternatives that are executable under the existing budget, including one using a Shuttle-derived HLV (side-mount) and a different one using commercial EELVs.

    The biggest problem I have with the new proposed NASA budget is that it discards the solid strategic direction of the VSE — lunar surface (to learn how to use its resources to create sustainable human presence), and then beyond (including Mars and other destinations). In contrast to your statements, the VSE has been discarded; the Augustine committee left in “lunar orbit,” but eliminated the lunar surface. Orbital lunar missions have no value because they cannot access and harvest resources. Instead, the “new path” proposes to spend billions on “technology development,” with no specific applications, missions or spacecraft envisioned. My point is that the history of this agency with such programs is not encouraging; NASA is now and always has been a mission-oriented entity. A few years of unfocused technology money down the drain and the entire program will become a ripe target for cancellation. In contrast, technology development in pursuit of a clear mission goal and set of objectives and activities will give you all the new technology you can handle.

    I know that many in the space community hated the Constellation architecture with a passion and are taking great pleasure dancing on its grave. I myself had issues with some of it. But the Vision is a good direction, one that made logical programmatic sense and contributed to national needs. It enables us to extend our reach in space incrementally and cumulatively. All I see coming out of this new path is a lot of widget-making and the exchange of one batch of aerospace contractors for a new and different batch.

    Thank you for your offer to check and approve my posts before publication in the future, but I’ll pass on taking you up on that, if you don’t mind.

    Comment by Paul D. Spudis — March 12, 2010 @ 2:20 pm


  15. re: Rocketman “None of the EELVs (or Falcon 9) are remotely close to providing human transportation to the space station.”
    -
    Atlas & Delta are real vehicles, whose reliability and costs are known. The path for upgrading them to be man-rated is fairly well understood, and ULA is probably the most qualified company around to depend on for launching valuable cargo. If we had gone with Atlas/Delta instead of Ares 1, crew would have been launching within a year of the shuttle ending.
    -
    Instead we have Ares 1, which has not lived up to any part of Simple, Safe, Soon. Choosing a new technology (SRB only) to launch crew to space was ballsy, and there have been too many design compromises for it to launch a crew of six to LEO – and we still don’t know if it will truly be safe at all points of flight.
    -
    NASA is not a manufacturing company, and they are not in the business of being a business. We need NASA to oversee our commercial space programs, and to create the new technologies that will decrease the cost of access to space, and to move us beyond earth orbit. Constellation was a deviation in their focus, and their inherent high operating costs were going to freeze out any private use of their launchers.
    -
    Without frequent launches, you can’t increase reliability and drive down cost. Atlas & Delta can do that, and Falcon 9 is on a path to do it too. No more eggs-in-one-basket. We need a true space industry.

    Comment by Coastal Ron — March 12, 2010 @ 2:25 pm


  16. >..why should it cost more than Shuttle does now to support a launch
    > system that requires an order of magnitude less preparation than the
    > highly complex Shuttle Orbiter?

    Why do you assume Ares/Orion was dramatically less complex or cheaper to launch prep then Shuttle? That’s certainly not what I saw in it – nor what GAO saw. Building a new Orion (which has about all the system complexity of the orbiter) for each flight, should reasonably cost more tehn tearing down and inspecting/servicing the orbiters.

    Also given you’d need most of the overhead (R&D costs, facilities, maintenance), for far fewer flights, you would expect far higher cost per flights with Orion then with shuttle. Which GAO also projected.

    Wings and a tail aren’t big cost drivers.

    >== Going to Mars is expensive because you must lift all of that fuel out of
    > the deep gravity well of Earth. Even with the economies of scale provided
    > by a super heavy lift rocket, it still costs tens of billions of dollars to mount
    > such a mission.
    >
    > Making propellant on the Moon completely changes these numbers, ….

    Not necessarily. After all you need a Earth to LEO launcher for anything you do in space, and most of the launch costs are fixed costs divided by the number of flights. So flying 20 times as often to fuel your Mars ship doesn’t dramatically increase your Earth launch costs. Since a Lunar to space tanker dev costs would rival a Earth to LEO launcher, and then you need to develop the ISRU fuel mining/refining systems and add in their operating cost, studies not infrequently find its cheaper to buy and launch bulk supplies from Earth, rather then use Lunar resources in space.

    Comment by Kelly Starks — March 12, 2010 @ 2:30 pm


  17. 1. > Comment by Paul D. Spudis — March 12, 2010 @ 6:12 am
    2. >
    >>Orbital propellant transfer and storage, and in-situ resource utilization
    >> are both listed as technologies to be developed and demonstrated under
    >> the FY11 budget – they are flagship programs….Robotic precursors to
    >> the Moon, both orbiting and lander/rovers, are funded under the FY11 budget
    >
    > Simply put, although the budget outlines these as items in the “technology
    > development” lines, I do not believe that we’ll ever get anything from it. The
    > history of the agency shows that they are very good at spending money on
    > “technology development” but less proficient at producing any flight hardware from it.

    Sad but true. One of the main reasons stated for the VSE program was Washington saw that unless there was a milestone that required NASA to do something with their cool new tech – they never advanced it past endless studies and research. …and now the new budget eliminates any delivery date, and just proposes endless studies.

    Comment by Kelly Starks — March 12, 2010 @ 2:31 pm


  18. Kelly,

    Why do you assume Ares/Orion was dramatically less complex or cheaper to launch prep then Shuttle?

    Because a lot of the fixed costs of the Shuttle system are spent in the OPF and the orbiter requires many man-hours of work for servicing, refurbishment and re-launch preparation. I am assuming that stacking big pieces in the VAB will cost less because it will take less time and personnel.

    studies not infrequently find its cheaper to buy and launch bulk supplies from Earth, rather then use Lunar resources in space.

    Yeah, I know that you can make a study to show anything you want. I base my comments on Gordon Woodcock’s work, who has done the most thorough study of this that I am aware of. He concluded that for a chemical-rocket Mars mission, making the propellant on the Moon saved considerable money, even after building that lunar infrastructure. To which I add that the real benefit of lunar propellant production is the creation of routine access to all of cislunar space, where all of our space assets reside. My claim is that this completely changes the paradigm of spaceflight, from one-off, use-and-discard satellites, to maintainable and extensible distributed systems.

    Comment by Paul D. Spudis — March 12, 2010 @ 2:39 pm


  19. 1. > If NASA was doing something innovative, something different than has
    2. > been done before by building the Constellation, I might see that as a valid
    3. > investment into the future. ==
    4. >
    5. > Constellation also was not focused on reducing the cost for access getting into
    6. > space. At least the Space Shuttle was nominally oriented in that direction… at
    7. > least in the 1970’s. ==
    8. >
    9. > One engineering mantra or philosophy is that any item can be produced cheaper,
    10. > sooner, or more reliable. Unfortunately you must choose only two of those
    11. > options for whatever you want to make or build. Apollo choose to build something
    12. > sooner and more reliable, at tremendous expense. Constellation and many of the
    13. > proposals based on the experience from the Apollo project were based on the same
    14. > philosophy, ==
    15. >
    > Comment by Robert Horning — March 12, 2010 @ 6:56 am

    Yes, Constellation was (in inflation adjusted dollars) FAR more expensive then Apollo, was to take twice as long to develop, and no be better in any significant way.

    A good example is contrasting this with the DC-X of the mid ‘90’s, which was projected to cost 3 years and $5 billion to develop into a production craft, and with orbital refueling could have taken gone to the lunar surface and back. A dramatic advance in technology and capacity at a reasonable cost. In contrast Orion / Aries-1 alone were to take 10-15 years and over $50 billion dollars to develop. Even comparing it to the $37 billion shuttle program makes the Constellation program a staggeringly high cost, slow to develop, crude system. Hardly something that would be a showpeace for the US or NASA.

    Comment by Kelly Starks — March 12, 2010 @ 2:46 pm


  20. > Comment by Paul D. Spudis — March 12, 2010 @ 2:39 pm

    >> Kelly,
    >> Why do you assume Ares/Orion was dramatically less complex or
    >> cheaper to launch prep then Shuttle?
    > Because a lot of the fixed costs of the Shuttle system are spent in the OPF and
    > the orbiter requires many man-hours of work for servicing, refurbishment and
    > re-launch preparation. ===

    And funding a OPF to service and relaunch a orbiter is going to cost less then funding a factory to build a new Orion for each flight?

    >== I am assuming that stacking big pieces in the VAB will cost less because it will
    > take less time and personnel.

    I don’t see stacking a STS and stacking a Ares/Orion say would be THAT much different, especially enough to cover the sunk costs and per flight costs per Ares/Orion flight. (Ares-V + cargo would obviously be at least as big a stacking issue as a STS.)

    >> studies not infrequently find its cheaper to buy and launch bulk
    >> supplies from Earth, rather then use Lunar resources in space.
    >
    > Yeah, I know that you can make a study to show anything you want. I base
    > my comments on Gordon Woodcock’s work, ===

    So does that mean Gordon used more valid assumptions and logic – or you just picked the study that gave you the answers you wanted?

    ;)

    >== I add that the real benefit of lunar propellant production is the creation of
    > routine access to all of cislunar space, where all of our space assets reside. My
    > claim is that this completely changes the paradigm of spaceflight, from one-off,
    > use-and-discard satellites, to maintainable and extensible distributed systems.==

    I’d debate that. If you don’t have cheap routine Earth to LEO transport, a lunar fuel supply won’t help you (and likely isn’t buildable anyway). If you have cheap routine access to LEO – LEO fuel really isn’t helpful.

    Comment by Kelly Starks — March 12, 2010 @ 2:57 pm


  21. If you have cheap routine access to LEO – LEO fuel really isn’t helpful.

    Yes, except many satellites are not in LEO, but in higher orbits that take fuel to reach. The community has been fixated on “cheap access to LEO” for years, but it’s already “cheap enough” in the sense that we launch viable commercial assets now. What does not exist is a way to reach and service those higher orbit assets (MEO, HEO, and GEO) that have both commercial and national security satellites.

    If you want “cheap access to LEO” we already know how to do that: outsource it to India and Russia.

    Comment by Paul D. Spudis — March 12, 2010 @ 3:10 pm


  22. Re: Paul D. Spudis “If you want “cheap access to LEO” we already know how to do that: outsource it to India and Russia.”
    -
    Russia isn’t so cheap anymore – $45M a seat soon? But for arguments sake, let’s say that any U.S. launcher was going to be 10-20% more/seat than Russia. The multiplier effect of keeping those dollars here in the U.S. makes the overall cost far cheaper to do here. The funds flow thru our economy, and we build a stronger and robust space transportation system. I don’t mind using the services and capabilities of other countries, but we need to keep a strong commercial presence here too.
    -
    NASA is not a manufacturing and operations entity, and has no incentives to lower the cost of access to space. Put them in charge of overseeing the emerging commercial crew launch programs (more than two), and give them back the charter to develop the next generation of technologies that we will need to leave LEO.
    -
    Regarding chemical fuel spacecraft to Mars, I don’t think anyone can estimate the cost of operating a fueling station on the Moon, so any cost savings over alternatives is fictitious. Chemical fuel may be the best choice for Earth-Moon, but we need to start using more efficient propulsion to get us beyond.
    -
    I look forward to mining the moon someday, but I also see a strong commercial launch program as key to doing that. Without competition, we are not going to be able to afford to start any industry in space, and we the taxpayer cannot afford to shoulder the entire space program.

    Comment by Coastal Ron — March 12, 2010 @ 6:31 pm


  23. “Thus, the goal of FP is to create Apollo-like spectacles for public consumption, rather than creating steps toward increased space faring capability.”

    Exactly!

    The Augustine Commission also distorted the development and operational cost for alternative architectures. Unlike for the Ares 1/V architecture, for the Sidemount/DIRECT alternatives, they required an extension of the shuttle program for an additional 5 years ($15 billion) plus they extended the ISS for an additional 5 years ($10 billion). So they added $25 billion in extra cost to the Sidemount/DIRECT alternatives to make it seem like these were nearly as expensive as the Ares I/V architecture. They also claimed that the operational cost of the Sidemount/DIRECT alternatives would be higher because they require three launches. Well, they only require three launches if you ban NASA from LEO and force them to use private commercial space craft. Only two launches would be required for the Sidemount/DIRECT architecture for a trip to the Moon– with over 80 to 90 tonnes transported into lunar orbit for a manned two launch scenario.

    But there are all kinds of easy ways to reduce the developmental and operational cost of a lunar architecture. The simplest way, IMO, would be to use the Altair LH2/LOX descent stage as both an ascent and descent stage.

    It would still have the same 17 tonne cargo capacity as an unmanned vehicle but as a manned ascent/descent vehicle it could operate as a people shuttle with about 1.5 tonnes for the pressurized transport module on top of the Altair and another 1.5 tonnes for passengers, pressure suits, and a few hundred kilograms of extra payload.

    Of course, an Altair people shuttle could land several tonnes of payload with its passengers if an Altair cargo vehicle was used to previously place a solar or nuclear powered LOX manufacturing unit on the lunar surface. Then an Altair people shuttle would only have to carry the extra LH2 for future ascent down to the lunar surface. This could allow an Altair people shuttle to carry at least 10 tonnes of payload down to the lunar surface per mission.

    Of course, a lunar LOX factory also means that we would only have to ship nine times less mass (LH2) to the lunar surface to produce water for a lunar base. A LOX factory on the Moon just makes too much sense to me! Plus I instinctively love when humans try to live off the land!

    Marcel F. Williams

    Comment by Marcel F. Williams — March 13, 2010 @ 4:24 pm


  24. It seems that there is a difference of opinion as to what is important in the space discussion. Some feel that the ultimate goal is to send humans to Mars, but to what end? Many don’t penetrate deeper than that, and so focus on simply putting boots down on the ground and planting flags and “exploring”. Bolden himself refers to this when he says that it’s ok that other nations go to the Moon, since the first 12 sets of footprints are already there and they are American (ie, what’s left there to do?). There are others who say that the important thing is to learn how to live, expand our sphere, create wealth, and eventually thrive off-planet. It seems like this latter thinking has more intrinsic appeal for those of us interested in space. Some of those advocates point to the resources of the Moon as the means to really dramatically reduce launch cost because you launch less “stuff”. This also has some intrinsic value, as it makes sense that eventually, if we are going to evolve off-planet, sooner or later we must be able to use local resources (or wait for science fiction physics breakthroughs), so why not tackle that issue now and build that industry from infancy.

    Following that line, now the question is, what role does NASA play in this “vision”? If it does have the primary role, then it should be defined and coded into its “mission”. This was mostly the thinking with the VSE, but now there is nothing apparent in NASA’s strategic mission. Further food for thought, there are those that say that the government is too costly and shouldn’t be establishing this new infrastructure, and that it should be in the realm of the private sector. I don’t think that anyone argues in principle that eventually the private sector would evolve, but the pertinent question should be, what is the government role now? Let’s engage about that, since it is the driver (or should be) for most everything in the human space flight arena that NASA does. There is a lot of talk about Ares, Orion, EELV’s, Direct, but all these launch vehicles are simply means. Frankly, the cost for launch is going to be high for the foreseeable future due to the fact that the physics is hard. Think about it; let’s say that the cost of launching a kg can be reduced by even 25%. It is still a lot of money, and that cost will always stifle the drive to space. Look at the EELV progression from its start to now. Both Delta 4 and Atlas 5 are commercial endeavors that are still almost exclusively paid for by the government payloads they fly. Without the government, their business collapses. Why should it be any different with human payloads?

    OK, so what if we use ISRU to lower the cost. Does ISRU help get it lower? If one propagates the concept past the initial development and learning cost, eventually there will be the long term payoff that reduces the cost below 25%, because you bring less and less with you. Hence, why not start that now and codify that scope in NASA’s mission? But the point is to SET THE MISSION INTO NASA’S SCOPE and let it drive the decisions that NASA makes. Otherwise, you will get choices by NASA managers like sending the Project M Robonaut to the Moon on a robotic lander for a few hours of handwaving to the camera and not much other benefit for the cost of $500M – $700M. I believe that this was precisely the point that Paul was making.

    Comment by flash — March 13, 2010 @ 5:52 pm


  25. “The Moon is a classroom, a test bed and a supply depot. By using its resources, humanity can create the capability to live, work and travel in and beyond cislunar space. As a nation, we cannot and must not pass on this enterprise.”

    YES!!!!! The moon’s resources will define the “free markets” and drive the technology needed to develop those markets from LEO to cislunar and beyond. A commercial based VSE is still the right path. Flex has it backwards, its stalls the USA access to those resources for decades. Meanwhile China enjoys access and claim to the moons resources.

    Comment by Doug Gard — March 14, 2010 @ 1:15 am


  26. Paul
    You and I have crossed verbal swords over the use of lunar hydrogen before and I won’t riposte on that substantive point in your article; except to say that we seem to have a nice collection of nest eggs…
    If I may, I would like to add three aspects to the Flex Path vs Moon First debate.
    1/ The hoary chestnut of ownership. Whilst a FlexPath tele-robotic survey and ISRU experiment program will cause little international upset; a full blown VSE Armstrong Base exploiting these resources unilaterally would have been, shall we say, provocative. The current Administration is clearly of a multi-lateralist mind. Especially so when it comes to space. The potential for a lunar base, ISRU and all that you would like, will only be enabled WHEN the the time is right. And it’s not right at this moment. So rather than wait for the “New Space Order” the interim proposal lays down the technological foundations to ensure that America has a lead in such future activities.
    2/ Space Faring resources. Whilst the Moon has abundant resources they are nevertheless at the bottom of a Well. With a Lunar catapult, tethers or even a Moon stalk… the future for the Moon as an Industrial resource is assured: IN THE LONG TERM. But, in the long term, there are many ‘cheaper’ and more valuable targets out there: providing we have the deep space infrastructure to go and get them. The Flex Path recognises that the Asteroids are the ultimate key to the future incorporation of the Solar System into Humanity’s economic sphere. It is long term thinking but a correct conclusion IMHO. Again the new direction proposed lays down the technological foundations to ensure that America has a lead in such future activities. Whilst an Armstrong Base would be useful – as a tourist destination – with advances in tele-robotics and automation: Lunar Industries will need little, if any, human intervention. Compare this with a mobile ISS (International Space Ship) evolving over time into a deep space vessel with long term ‘ISRU’ (closed loop life support), radiation shielding, nuclear power and a halfway decent set of engines. The could call it “The Aldrin Cycler!”
    3/ panem et circenses Or: “No buck rogers, no bucks!”
    “Thus, the goal of FP is to create Apollo-like spectacles for public consumption, rather than creating steps toward increased space faring capability.”
    This is where the Aldrin Cycler beats an Armstrong Base hands down. If the POR had come to fruition in the distant future and had survived the ennui: “but we did this back in the ’60′s dude” and had started to place real hardware on the surface, the public experience (apart from us space cadets) would have been ISS redux. I.e. a select group of civil servants performing routine micro-managed maintenance tasks. I would contend that your taxpayers would not have stood for it! Indeed I would imagine that after a couple of initial landings the architecture would have been abandoned as unaffordable. In contrast to building a monolithic architecture capable of doing one thing (very expensively) we have, in the Flex Path a sequence of demonstrations of increasing capability whilst developing those self same capabilities!
    As to the fine print of the Augustine Report. This was a figleaf to protect professional reputations that ought not to have been protected. But “History will out!” as they say!
    David G. Lermit

    Comment by brobof — March 14, 2010 @ 8:07 am


  27. @Trent Waddington

    You are seeing things that are not there. Paul Spudis made no ‘personal attacks’ on either Jeff Greason or any member of the Augustine committee. There not one shred of character assassination in his post.

    Thanks for the article Paul.

    Comment by Gary Miles — March 14, 2010 @ 3:52 pm


  28. A Moon base will change everything. Once its established, the privateers and the settlers will quickly follow since reusable orbital transfer vehicles and lunar lander’s are a lot cheaper to develop and maintain that Earth to orbit vehicles.

    Robots are the best way to exploit the asteroids– not humans. Just send a light sail out and grab a 10 to 100 tonne NEO asteroid a bring it back to a Lagrange point. Then you can produce all the oxygen and hydrogen that you want for your fuel depots. An aluminumized kite is far simpler technology than any nuclear rocket.

    http://alglobus.net/NASAwork/papers/AsterAnts/paper.html

    Comment by Marcel F. Williams — March 14, 2010 @ 5:38 pm


  29. [...] [...]

    Pingback by Moon Versus Mars! - Page 5 - Bad Astronomy and Universe Today Forum — March 17, 2010 @ 7:14 pm


  30. All space exploration is not worth much, if ultimately, space is like the center of the earth- not very accessible.

    It could be conceivable by some that astronomy is all that is needed in terms of space exploration; the argument “robots are cheaper” sometimes veers in this direction.

    It’s widely understood that what is needed regarding exploration and exploitation is Cheaper Access to Space.

    Our current situation is similar to desiring the internet and only having a few billion dollar computers.

    Until rather recently many people accepted the dogma that because space is so expensive only the government can do it.
    This idea still colors much of the current approach to space exploration, though this concept seems to be fading and probably within a few decades be such an odd idea that will be hard to grasp by the next generation.

    Obama, whether he is actually aware of it or not, is currently putting the finishing nails in the coffin of socialism- though like all vampires, one should have no doubt that in the future, this vampire can re-emerge. The idea that “because space is so expensive, only the government can do it” is concept of the workable socialist paradigm.

    I believe it’s axiomatic that socialism is incapable of “Opening the Space Frontier”. I also think that some socialist “know” this or at least “feel” this.
    Btw, the only real “value” of socialism is stagnation- other than this possibly useful “product” it is mostly parasitical- it depends upon “change” and/or innovation from outside it’s social system.

    Opening up the space frontier will certainly involve change- it will be as some Chinese guy said “interesting times”. Opening up the space frontier will radically alter this world.
    And if you abhor the “fast pace of modern times”, you going to wish for the calmer periods of the 20th century.

    Lunar water is all about Cheaper Access to Space. Lunar water isn’t primarily about having water to drink or wash things, rather it’s about having the ability to make cheap rocket fuel in space.
    Cheap rocket fuel is relative to current costs.
    Today rocket fuel on earth costs a few dollars a kg, and in low earth orbit, it currently can’t be bought, but if it could be, rocket fuel would be in the range of few thousand dollar per kg. In High earth orbit or lunar orbit, the rocket fuel would be about twice the cost as it would be in LEO. And on the lunar surface rocket fuel would be about 4 to 5 times as much in LEO.
    So example of cheap lunar rocket fuel on the lunar surface would be in the range of hundreds dollar per kg- or about 1/10th the current costs.
    But the most significant aspect of lower price rocket fuel on the lunar surface is not the rocket fuel on the lunar surface, but being able to bring the lunar rocket fuel to lunar orbit.
    In other words if it was a matter of choosing between having 1/2 the price of rocket fuel in lunar orbit [and/or high earth orbit] or having rocket fuel at 1/10th it’s current price on the Lunar surface, having rocket fuel at half the current price in orbit is more significant than having 1/10th the price on lunar surface.
    Of course, it’s not actually a choice of one or the other, but rather having the price be 1/10th the price on lunar surface enables the price to be 1/2 the current price in lunar orbit.

    Comment by gbaikie — March 17, 2010 @ 11:01 pm


  31. Can anyone comment about the cost effectiveness of rocket fuel from water ice at the lunar poles to LEO compared to rocket fuel from water ice from an NEO? Getting to the lunar surface would require new craft to drop into and out of the lunar gravity well whereas there is no significant gravity well when landing on a NEO. However the Moon is always close by whereas the few NEOs containing water ice orbit around the Sun.

    Also, if the strategy were to move an entire NEO to a Lagrange point (using sails), then does going from LEO to an L point and back significantly affect the economics?

    Comment by JohnHunt — March 26, 2010 @ 1:58 pm


  32. John,

    Can anyone comment about the cost effectiveness of rocket fuel from water ice at the lunar poles to LEO compared to rocket fuel from water ice from an NEO?

    Well, as it’s my blog, let me be the first to comment on it.

    Each destination has specific advantages. For the Moon, it is close, accessible and we know what’s there and what form it’s in. Lunar water is present as ice, which is relatively easy to harvest and process (as opposed to chemically bound water). The NEOs have low surface gravity.

    For disadvantages, the Moon has a 2.2 km/s escape velocity, which is an energy penalty for launching product into space. For NEOs, we don’t know what form their water is in or how much a given asteroid contains, but for asteroids close to the Sun, it is very likely to be chemically bound water, meaning that significant energy is required to to break those bonds during processing. Also, we cannot remotely teleoperate processing robots at NEO’s because of the (minutes-long) time-lag in communication; we could do so on the Moon (3 light-second time delay.)

    In short, each location both offers features and has issues. I prefer going to the Moon first to learn how to extract and use resources because it is the destination that offers the possibility of resource utilization with the least amount of unknowns. After we demonstrate that we can do ISRU on the Moon, it becomes much easier to do so on other objects.

    Comment by Paul D. Spudis — March 26, 2010 @ 2:14 pm


  33. [...] of science and politics, both are ill served, much to the determent of humanity.  For now, we remain wedded to the template of launch, use, and discard – a modus suitable to an occasional, expensive and limited presence in space but one wholly [...]

    Pingback by The Path of Exploration | The Once and Future Moon — December 14, 2011 @ 3:55 am


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