AirSpaceMag.com

In contrast to the claims of the Augustine committee report, use of existing launch assets and infrastructure permit us to return to the Moon within the projected budget guidelines

The report of the Augustine committee analyzes America’s space program through a very narrow prism.  Much of their report argues that the existing program of record (more specifically, the Ares I and V launch system) is not affordable, a fact already apparent to most observers.  Thus, the committee advocates human missions to destinations without deep gravity wells, eliminating the need to develop a lander spacecraft.  The pertinent question about the original intent of the Vision for Space Exploration is not considered or addressed: Is a program to return to the Moon and create a permanent space faring infrastructure possible within the projected budgetary envelope?

So once again we have a space policy gap, a technical base mired in uncertainty and a citizenry that believes its once-heralded space agency has faltered – that NASA simply cannot send people on missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) because the government no longer has the interest or the money to support such efforts.

The administration’s budget proposal has directed NASA to concentrate on developing leap-ahead technology that will enable human exploration at some non-specific point in the future – “when we are ready” so as to excite and engage the public.  As the shutdown of the Space Shuttle quickly approaches, people are surprised to realize that seats must be purchased on a Russian Soyuz to reach the International Space Station that we’ve been building for twenty years.  And we must continue to do this until commercial space transportation (seeded with NASA money) develops hardware certified for human flight.  It is impossible to escape the sinking feeling that something just isn’t right about this state of affairs.

The cost estimates of the Augustine committee report made by the Aerospace Corporation perforce assumed certain developmental and operational scenarios, some of which could be seriously questioned.  One of the most interesting points about the Augustine costing exercise was that it focused almost entirely on launch vehicles and not deep space systems.  No scenario examined by the committee looked at the leveraging possibilities provided through the use of off-planet resources, apparently because they believed that the technology was too far out in concept and too far off into the future.  “When we are ready” apparently didn’t apply here.

In the committee’s view of the future, human missions beyond LEO will remain staged and launched from the bottom of Earth’s gravity well, along with all the required consumables for multi-week and multi-month duration missions of their Flexible Path exploration option.  For any significant effort, the enormous mass is launched using either existing expendable vehicles or a new, to-be-developed heavy lift rocket (for which their cost models estimate many billions of dollars).  Is it any wonder that the committee’s principal conclusion was that human spaceflight beyond LEO is “unaffordable?”

The cost estimates the Augustine committee relied upon are unrealistic, bloated and artificially high.  Although there is always uncertainty in estimating program costs, a system can be developed within the existing budgetary framework that gives us a heavy lift vehicle and human lunar return on reasonable timescales.  The key is to keep new developmental costs low by maximizing the use of existing assets.  A launch vehicle derived from the existing Shuttle system can be developed from existing pieces while retaining virtually unmodified the existing VAB and pad infrastructure at the Cape.  A single Shuttle side-mount can put 80 mT into LEO; two launches can mount a lunar mission.  As shown in the accompanying illustration, this launch vehicle solution fits within the projected budgetary envelope of NASA, the very same budget profile assumed by the Augustine costing exercise.

Digging into the details of the cost numbers of alternatives suggests that Augustine assumed both significant developmental costs associated with the new launch system, along with relying on inflated recurring costs (as has been pointed out previously by others).  But more significantly, they also assumed we would continue indefinitely the current paradigm of launching everything we need in space directly from the surface of the Earth.  Again, no consideration was given to using space-based consumables – specifically, LOX-LH₂ propellant made from lunar water – to improve access and reduce total costs for missions beyond LEO.  And yes, the committee was thoroughly briefed on the benefits of the Moon’s extensive and accessible water; they were apprised of the dynamically unfolding knowledge involving the enormous quantity of lunar water (both current knowledge and findings soon to appear in print) before, during and after their hearings.  They simply ignored its significant impact and consigned the discussion of space resources to a few paragraphs describing technology development.

An affordable return to the Moon is possible under the existing budgetary profile.  Such an affordable architecture based on Shuttle-derived assets was understood and in hand prior to the Exploration Systems Architecture Study.  But the better became the enemy of the good enough.  The needed incremental build up of cislunar spaceflight capabilities through the use of lunar resources was discarded and a system was designed based on the assumption that mega-sorties and Earth-staged missions to Mars were the future of human spaceflight beyond LEO.

To unlock our Earth-bound budgetary shackles, we must employ the keys at hand.  We must use existing flight assets to the maximum extent possible.  We must use robotic missions and teleoperations to emplace surface infrastructure on the Moon prior to human arrival.  We must begin water production from lunar resources as soon as possible using these robotic assets, with an eye toward integrating lunar propellant production into a reusable and extensible cislunar space transportation system.

To go forward, a determinate path to the Moon and beyond is required.  The Moon is where humans will learn how to arrive, survive and thrive in space.  To live and expand into the universe, we must take bold action to identify, access and harness those resources that are within easy reach.  In order for America to remain a leader in space technology development – charting the way for human space flight – we need an objective to design and cost out, not just a budget to spend.

The Moon is the key resource needed to open up the frontier of space

Last fall, after much anticipation, the Augustine Committee presented us with their assessment of the future of space exploration.  Its basic conclusion was that at currently envisioned budgets, the Program of Record (a.k.a. ESAS, Project Constellation) would not get us back to the Moon before many decades had passed, if then.  This meme has been picked up by many in the space community to the point where is it now cliché to claim that we don’t have enough money to do anything in space.  Hence, the direction proposed in the new budget takes NASA out of the space transportation business entirely, freeing up their budget to focus on technology development, and contracting with commercial providers to create access to low Earth orbit (LEO) and the International Space Station (ISS).

How are costs estimated for space systems?  The costing exercise for the Augustine Committee was done by The Aerospace Corporation, a non-profit science and engineering company run for the U.S. Air Force.  Their costing procedures (described briefly on page 82 of the committee report) includes estimating the time and level of effort it takes to develop a system, informed by data from past projects.  The vast bulk of this costing effort deals with launch vehicles and systems.

Looking over cost estimates is a strange experience.  Almost anyone can immediately see inflated levels of costing for things they know about, but are uncertain for other items.  Bob Zubrin wrote a stinging rejection of the Aerospace Corporation’s costing just before the Augustine Committee released their report.  He noted in particular that the estimates included several years of increasing ground operations costs, even while nothing was being launched.  Of course, if you pull together a ground crew, you have to pay them to keep them around, even during slack times.  But his point is a good one; why should it cost more than Shuttle does now to support a launch system that requires an order of magnitude less preparation than the highly complex Shuttle Orbiter?

Using these estimates of the cost of the existing architecture, the Augustine Committee concluded that it was unaffordable.  What did they do then?  Rather than fix the problems with the ESAS architecture, they discarded the entire Vision for Space Exploration and came up with the so-called “Flexible Path” (FP).  Although cloaked in platitudes about how technology development will give us options to go to many destinations beyond LEO, the real motivation for this idea is revealed by the committee’s words on “public engagement” (e.g., “It (FP) would provide the public and other stakeholders with a series of interesting “firsts” to keep them engaged and supportive.” – Augustine report, p. 15).  Thus, the goal of FP is to create Apollo-like spectacles for public consumption, rather than creating steps toward increased space faring capability.

We can wait and hope for the proposed technology development program to provide us with magic beans, or we can begin that process now by returning to the Moon with robots and humans to learn how to harvest and use its material and energy resources.  Creating a sustainable system of space faring that can take us anywhere we want to go would be a real accomplishment.  By gaining this knowledge and expertise, mankind will be free to choose many space goals, thereby achieving “at will” space destination capability.

Jeff Greason, President and co-founder of XCOR Aerospace and a member of the Augustine Committee, recently spoke at the annual Goddard Memorial Symposium.  He asserted that for the near future, we have no path to move people beyond low Earth orbit because the options the Augustine Committee looked at cost more than the United States can afford or is willing to spend.  His principal message to Symposium attendees was to “deal with it.”

According to the Augustine Committee, “The cost of exploration is dominated by the costs of launch to low-Earth orbit and of in-space systems.”  This outlook is one reason why so much of the costing focus was on building Ares V, the super-heavy lift (188 mT) launcher designed for human Mars missions.  For such a mission with chemical propulsion (the only technology currently available) you need about one million pounds in LEO, of which more than 70% is propellant.  Going to Mars is expensive because you must lift all of that fuel out of the deep gravity well of Earth.  Even with the economies of scale provided by a super heavy lift rocket, it still costs tens of billions of dollars to mount such a mission.

Making propellant on the Moon completely changes these numbers, yet use of lunar resources is discussed in only a few brief paragraphs of the Augustine report.  We now know (as the committee did then) that water is present at the lunar poles in significant quantity and that its use to make rocket propellant can create a transportation system that could routinely access all of cislunar space.  This should be the objective of lunar return: to create a space “transcontinental railroad” through the use of lunar resources.  Once established, we can go to the planets with relative ease.

Is any of this possible under the existing budget?  Not if we dissipate our money with pointless and unfocused technology development.  Of the many advantages of the Moon, one of the biggest is that it is close enough that preliminary work can be done by robots on the lunar surface – controlled and remotely operated from Earth.  By emplacing robotic assets on the Moon before human arrival, we can begin to survey, process and store water for use well in advance of human arrival.  Sending robotic assets in advance of people allows us to start creating capability now, without a major increase in budget.  It simply requires a sense of clear objectives; we have the technology to work this problem now.

Simply put, our space objectives need to be – arrive, survive and thrive.  To do that, the goal must be stated, mapped out and achieved before setting out to the next destination.  A sustainable, expandable transportation system in space can be devised by using the resources we find in space.  We will learn how (and if) we can do this on our Moon.  Once we don’t have to haul everything with us from the Earth, costs become lower.  When you don’t have to use 90% of your travel budget just to get out of town, a lot more people can take the trip.  Before you know it, you have a space-based economy.

The nation has important strategic and economic interests in cislunar space and it is entirely appropriate for the federal government to develop a sustainable and extensible cislunar transportation system.  NASA needs to lead and point the way so that the private sector (not just aerospace companies) can invest in and develop the yet unknown technologies that will improve our lives here on Earth as we move out to explore and ultimately settle the new territory of space.

The Moon is a classroom, a test bed and a supply depot.  By using its resources, humanity can create the capability to live, work and travel in and beyond cislunar space.  As a nation, we cannot and must not pass on this enterprise.

Radar mosaic of the floor of the north polar crater Peary, showing many craters with elevated CPR inside, but not outside, their rims. This material is probably water ice.

Last year, India’s Chandrayaan-1 lunar orbiter spent eight months mapping the surface of the Moon.  I had the honor of being the Principal Investigator of an experiment on that mission, the Mini-SAR imaging radar.  The purpose of this experiment is to map and characterize the deposits within permanently dark areas of the poles.  These dark areas are extremely cold and it has been hypothesized that volatile material, including water ice, may be present in quantity here.  Our radar team has just finished the first round of analysis of data returned by the Mini-SAR for the north pole and results will soon be published in the technical journal, Geophysical Research Letters.

Mini-SAR is a lightweight, low power imaging radar.  It uses the polarization properties of reflected radio waves to characterize the lunar surface composition and physical state.  Mini-SAR transmits pulses of left-circularly polarized radar.  Typically, reflection from planetary surfaces reverses the transmitted polarization, so that Mini-SAR radar echoes from the Moon are right circularly polarized.  The ratio of received power in the same sense transmitted (left circular) to the opposite sense (right circular) is called the circular polarization ratio (CPR).  Most of the Moon has low CPR (about 0.3), meaning that a reversal of polarization is the norm, but some specific areas have high CPR (greater than 1.0).  These include very rough, rocky surfaces (such as a young, fresh crater) and ice, which is transparent to radio energy.  In this latter case, the radar penetrates the ice and is scattered and reflected multiple times by inclusions and flaws in the ice, resulting in the reflection of many same sense polarization echoes, leading to higher CPR values than normal.  High values of CPR are not uniquely diagnostic of either surface roughness or ice; we must take into account the geological setting of the high CPR signal to interpret its cause.

Many craters near the poles of the Moon have interiors that are in permanent shadow from the Sun.  These areas are very cold and water ice is stable permanently there.  Fresh craters show high degrees of surface roughness (high CPR) both inside and outside the crater rim, caused by sharp rocks and block fields that are distributed over the entire crater area.  However, Mini-SAR found craters near the north pole that have high CPR values inside, but not outside their rims.  This relation suggests that the high CPR is not caused by roughness, but by some material that is restricted within the interiors of these craters.  It is not geologically reasonable to expect rough, fresh surfaces to be present inside a crater rim but absent outside of it.  The craters that show this enhancement are all permanently cold and dark, where ice is stable.  We thus interpret this high CPR to mean that water ice is present in these craters.

Over forty small (2-15 km diameter) craters near the north pole of the Moon are found to contain this elevated CPR material.  The total mount of ice present at the pole depends on how thick it is; to see this elevated CPR effect, the ice must have a thickness on the order of tens of wavelengths of the radar used.  Our radar wavelength is 12.6 cm, therefore we think that the ice must be at least two meters thick and relatively pure.  At such a thickness, more than 600 million metric tones of water ice are present in this area.  Such an amount is comparable to the quantity estimated from the 1998 Lunar Prospector (LP) mission’s neutron spectrometer data (several hundred million metric tones).  The LP neutron spectrometer only sees to depths of about one-half meter, while we penetrate at least a couple of meters, so the neutron data would underestimate the total quantity of water ice present.

The emerging picture from many experiments on several different lunar missions indicates that the creation, migration, deposition and retention of vast amounts of water are occurring on the Moon.  Such an astounding result was totally unexpected by most lunar scientists, including myself.  The emerging picture is consistent with earlier studies from the 1994 Clementine mission and subsequent Lunar Prospector as well as the more recent reports of the presence of water-bearing minerals at high latitudes (Moon Mineralogy Mapper), the detection of water vapor in the LCROSS impact plume (a few percent water content at its target site), and a variety of new supporting measurements, such as the discovery of unexpectedly cold polar temperatures by the DIVINER experiment on NASA’s Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (as cold as 25 degrees above absolute zero, colder than the estimated surface temperature of Pluto).  The Moon experiences complex geological processes that were wholly unexpected before the recent results.

The quantity of water present at the lunar poles is significant; at the north pole alone, the 600 million metric tons of water there – turned into rocket fuel – is enough to launch the equivalent of one Space Shuttle (735 mT of propellant) per day for over 2000 years.  The discoveries we are now making show that the Moon is an even more interesting and attractive scientific and operational destination than we had previously thought.  The Moon is the key to sustainable human presence in space.  Its resources enable us to create a reusable, sustainable transportation system, one that can routinely access not only the Moon, but all points of cislunar space.  Once established, such a system can be used to go forward into the Solar System.