December 16, 2009
Arguing about Human Space Exploration
Flexible Path -- Metro Map to Nowhere (Augustine Report)
Hot rumor has it that, like Christmas, the Obama Administration’s response to the Augustine Committee Report, Seeking a Human Space Program Worthy of a Great Nation, is imminent. Much excitement is discernible in the space blogosphere that a major change is at hand.
The Augustine Committee report concluded that NASA cannot execute the existing Program of Record (POR) of moving humans beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) to the Moon at existing or projected levels of funding. The report offered up “Flexible Path” (FP), an alternate beyond LEO mission architecture of sending humans to asteroids and other destinations.
Flexible Path is billed as a low-cost alternative to the POR. It avoids going to the Moon, a destination viewed by the Augustine Committee chairman as a repeat of Apollo (a defensible position, at least in terms of the current plans by NASA’s Exploration Systems Architecture Study). FP describes a trans-LEO architecture that uses fuel depots and visits Lagrangian-points, asteroids and the moons of Mars. By not building a “costly” lander spacecraft for descent into the gravity well of the Moon, NASA can “save” money. The Augustine Report envisions human trips (in terms of total mission duration and remote-from-Earth operations) to L-points and asteroids as intermediate steps to human missions to Mars, their chosen “ultimate destination” of human spaceflight.
Many space advocates see great advantages to FP. It relies on the idea of propellant depots, where fuel is cached at staging locations (e.g., Earth-Moon L-1; see below) and human vehicles are re-fueled in space for voyages beyond – trips destined for places at which no additional significant propulsive maneuvers are required. Thus, its targets are theoretical points in space or objects with very low surface gravity, such as near-Earth asteroids (rocky objects with orbits between Earth and Mars, not those in the asteroid belt, between Mars and Jupiter) or the small, asteroid-like moons of Mars. The latter are particularly interesting in that they could allow humans to control (teleoperate) robots on the surface of Mars with a near-instantaneous response, eliminating the tens-of-minutes time delay of radio communication with Earth. Such operations might permit true field geological exploration of the surface of Mars without the necessity of descending into the planet’s relatively deep gravity well.
The Lagrangian points (also called libration or L-points) are quasi-stable spots in space that are stationary with respect to two or more objects. For example, if you draw a line between Earth and Moon, it will revolve like the hand on a clock around the center of the Earth. If a satellite is put at a point on that line such that its period of revolution is identical with the Moon’s, it will appear to be stationary in space relative to both Earth and Moon, even though it is flying through space just as fast as the Moon. L-points are found in relation to any two bodies, including Earth-Moon, but also Earth-Sun. They have many advantages as observation points, where satellites or telescopes can point and stare at targets in space for long dwell times and as staging areas for trips to other destinations.
So what’s the problem with FP? At first glance, it appears to be an innovative way to move people beyond low Earth orbit at a relatively low cost. Advocates claim that human trips to destinations never visited by people are more exciting than repeating what we did 40 years ago and that by investing in things like depots, we get a flexible, extensible space infrastructure that will ultimately permit routine access to all destinations. Why complain about such a thing? Especially as many have advocated exactly such an approach for the return to the Moon, an approach sorely lacking in NASA’s existing plans.
To be blunt, the difficulty with Flexible Path lies in its motivations, assumptions and likely implementation. Development of FP by the Augustine Committee was driven largely by their determination that NASA’s chosen architecture for lunar return (ESAS) is unaffordable. Assuming that movement of people beyond LEO is desirable, FP offers an allegedly low cost path to accomplish such. But to what end? The Augustine report is a bit vague as to the objectives and goals of the various FP missions. Mentioned is the servicing of telescopes at the L-points; the problem is there are none, at least at the moment. The James Webb Space Telescope is not yet launched, nor is it designed for human servicing. The L-points are empty spots in space; there’s nothing there except what we put there. In that sense, as a destination for people, it is no different from low Earth orbit, except that being outside the Van Allen belts (which protect astronauts on the ISS and Shuttle,) the radiation hazard is much greater.
The Augustine Report indicates that human missions to asteroids—Near Earth Objects (NEO), could yield valuable information, including gathering strategic information for the possible mitigation of asteroid collision with the Earth. Yet such targets are potentially dangerous. Some NEO asteroids have very high rates of rotation (on the order of an hour or less) making close approach very hazardous, except near the poles. Many asteroids are loose piles of rubble and co-rotating pieces of debris in the near field of such bodies could pose a hazard to a human vehicle. The Orion spacecraft must be completely depressurized to allow astronauts to egress and explore an asteroid with EVA, so having all the crew in suits would be required. Exploratory capability would be very limited, on a scale similar to that of Apollo 11, the first lunar landing.
The several weeks-to-months duration of such mission will likely require the development of a “mission module,” with significant life-support, power, and environmental control. Thus, selecting this path over the lunar surface does not relieve the agency from the task of developing and qualifying a completely new spacecraft, so the alleged “savings” of not building a lander are gobbled up by expenditure on the mission module. Lockheed-Martin, contractor for the Orion spacecraft, has come up with a clever “kissing Crew Modules” concept whereby two Orion spacecraft are docked together, doubling the available interior space and consumables. However, this arrangement complicates the mission design. With two separate vehicles (requiring two dangerous re-entries), this configuration (with no airlock or docking module) has little exploratory flexibility. With such architectural difficulties and the “safety first,” risk-aversion-at-any-cost sensibility expressed in the report, a NEO mission is probably a non-starter, or more likely, it will morph into a multi-year “study.”
The programmatic assumption behind FP is that lunar return is “boring” and trips to new destinations will somehow “excite” the public and sustain the NASA budget. The problem with this reasoning is that it’s not public excitement that is needed – it’s public support. People will support things that aren’t exciting, if there is some perceived value to it. A return to the Moon to develop and utilize its material and energy resources and create new space faring capability may not be “exciting” but it certainly is productive and useful. It allows us to build an extensible, maintainable, expandable, affordable transportation system, serving many purposes, thereby moving beyond the existing spaceflight paradigm: Design, Launch, Use, Discard (and Repeat.) The Committee’s assertion – that building a lander to get into and out of the Moon’s gravity well makes lunar return unaffordable – is ludicrous. It’s not the Altair lunar lander that’s eating NASA’s lunch; it’s the development of two entirely new (and arguably unnecessary) Ares launch vehicles.
Repeating what we did 40 years ago is not the reason for lunar return, although, I understand the confusion. Here was a great missed opportunity for the Committee – they could have pointed out that NASA flubbed the implementation of its lunar mission from the beginning, largely because the agency never really grasped the rationale behind going to the Moon, thereby leaving others unable to embrace or articulate the mission. Perhaps the Committee didn’t point this out because they didn’t understand it either. Or perhaps because so much money has already disappeared down the black hole of Ares development, it was deemed easier to frame the report in the familiar terms of hardware procurement rather than focus on the objectives of the mission.
The above dissection of U.S. space policy leads us to the question of how NASA would implement Flexible Path. The lesson to be drawn from NASA’s Exploration Systems Architecture Study – whose fiscally unsustainable architecture led to the creation of the Augustine Committee in the first place – is that the agency only knows one way of conducting business: the Apollo template. This business model calls for big rockets, big infrastructure, a large marching army, and big budgets. Who believes NASA would implement FP differently than how they’ve planned a return to the Moon? The Augustine Committee itself (largely made up of former NASA employees and agency contractors) claims that “heavy lift launch vehicles are essential for human trips beyond LEO,” a clear expression of the Apollo mindset, yet a statement that, objectively speaking, simply isn’t true.
In other words, changing the focus of our destination from the lunar surface to Flexible Path doesn’t solve anything. Building big rockets and throwing away 95% of the vehicle leaves no lasting infrastructure in space and prevents access to the material and energy resources of the Moon, negating the original intent and beauty of the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) – to learn how (or whether, if you prefer) to use those resources to build sustainable, extensible space faring infrastructure. The chorus of approval that you hear in the space press for FP is based largely on wishful thinking. Flexible Path, if implemented by NASA, will reflexively follow the existing panem et circenses paradigm, abandoning any hope of ultimately changing an outdated spaceflight business model.
A $3 billion vaccine won’t rid NASA of this disease. Only a renewed sense of purpose can save the patient.
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Paul,
FWIW, I’m not super-wedded to the flexible path approach, I was just using it to compare what you get with the money that way versus the PoR. That article was tossed together a bit quickly, and I probably could’ve taken one of the Moon First options and compared it just as easily, because after all, all of the non-PoR options the A-com reported on in their last report included robust advanced R&D funding and commercial crew funding. I’m a Moon nut myself, and have been so for all of my adult life. That said, part of why I’m somewhat more interested in the Flex-Path route is that I’m pretty sure NASA will botch a direct lunar return, and I actually want the Moon to have a chance.
I’m sure you’ve seen it too, but so many people are in such a darned rush, that whenever you propose something like depots that need to be done if we ever want to get the cost of lunar access affordable enough for real sustained activity, the answer always is “We can’t put a risk like that on the critical path!” And so we’re stuck with technologies like orbital propellant transfer that we could’ve demoed back in the late 60s or early 70s that we’re still afraid to do because every time “It’s unproven, we can’t risk the critical path on unproven technologies!” By taking the lunar return off the critical path, it might just allow NASA the flexibility to do stuff with the Moon that it couldn’t risk if it were the direct focus. Stuff like allowing a much larger commercial or international component be involved (who says the lander has to be NASA designed and operated?), developing stuff like propellant depots and ISRU that actually make this affordable enough that someday you can close a business case on lunar travel. Stuff like that.
So, while I’m a Moon nut, I think that the Flex-Path proponents do have a valid point that quickest route back to the Moon might not be the direct approach.
~Jon
Comment by Jonathan Goff — December 16, 2009 @ 10:38 am
BTW, having read the rest of your article, I do agree that the standard NASA approach to implementing FP is likely going to be a disappointment compared to its potential. NASA will just hear what it wanted to hear from your report–WooHoo! We get to build ourselves an HLV!–and ignore the inconvenient parts.
That said, how is a more Moon direct approach going to avoid the same fate? I mean, in the end, is a bloated, overly expensive, underperforming Moon program really that much better than what you think we’d get out of FP?
~Jon
Comment by Jonathan Goff — December 16, 2009 @ 10:46 am
Wonderful post! But it’s far too logical and reasonable to be taken seriously…
Just kidding. Thank you for continuing to address “The Why”.
Comment by Itokawa — December 16, 2009 @ 11:07 am
Jon,
I am completely sympathetic to your programmatic concerns. And anyone who’s read my stuff knows the problems I have with the POR. We have an agency that will not think “outside of the box.” The few within it that try to change things for the better get slapped down very rapidly.
There is no guarantee that a “Moon first” program won’t turn into a dead end. It all depends on whether someone with decision authority (eventually) understands the real objective of lunar return: to learn how to use its resources to create new space faring capability. At least on the Moon, we have the inherent ability to experiment with doing that. At Earth-Sun L-1, we don’t.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — December 16, 2009 @ 11:14 am
I would agree with John that Lagrange points and NEOs should come before the moon, simply because they are easier. The radiation hazards at L1/L2 make them excellent places for testing radiation shielding. Using Orion for such experiments has the benefit of not needing to develop separate vehicles and of testing the actual hardware that will be used for exploration.
I’m less certain whether the moon or Phobos/Deimos should come first, I think both are reasonable. On balance I think the moon should come first.
About unproven technologies on the critical path: as Jon has heard me say hundreds of times
I would advocate using non-cryogenic lander propellants (either toxic or non-toxic) to avoid putting cryogenic propellant transfer on the critical path while at the same time devoting substantial resources to maturing them as soon as possible.
EELV Phase 1 + noncryogenic propellants can give us the moon and perhaps Phobos, Deimos and Ceres. Add SEP tugs and we’ll certainly have Phobos, Deimos and Ceres and perhaps the surface of Mars. All this is proven technology, although for the Martian surface and perhaps Ceres you would want surface nuclear power too.
And all this would give most of the benefits of propellant depots for commercial development of space.
Comment by Martijn Meijering — December 16, 2009 @ 11:47 am
It’s going to be difficult to plant a flag at the Lagrange points. It’s going to be just as heartbreaking to watch a future Spirit get stuck in the sand from Phobos as from Caltech.
And I’m pleased to hear someone echo the unmitigated concerns about GCRs (and secondary showers) as well as the clearly stated rationale in the Space Studies Board’s “Scientific Context for the Exploration of the Moon.”
I can understand the never-ending problem of carrying out long-term projects within the two-year horizon of the congressional election cycle, but the “flexible path” creates no real infrastructure anywhere but on Earth.
It appears that one day our astronauts will need to be functional in Hindi or Mandarin in order to get landing clearance to visit the relics of our own pioneering exploration.
Comment by Joel Raupe — December 16, 2009 @ 12:25 pm
The sad thing about all this is that we have existing launchers that could easily launch sophisticated probes to the surface of the Moon, to the various Lagrange points, to Phobos and elsewhere. It seems to me entirely feasible to consider developing lunar LOX ISRU using telerobotics, all controlled from Earth without any humans on the Moon. We could even prove out solar cell production on the Moon using telerobotics.
Ineed, if I could get brave, I could envision it being feasible to develop lunar LOX ISRU telerobotically and to establish an EML1 LOX depot telerobotically, all using existing launchers. Robotic vehicles would deliver LOX from the Moon to EML1 until the depot was stocked. That way, future landers would have access to descent and ascent LOX supplies.
But if we did that, then we wouldn’t need a huge launcher like Ares V when it eventually came to launching humans. Hmmm… that might be a problem.
Comment by Itokawa — December 16, 2009 @ 12:43 pm
Gee the A-panel siad we can’t do a the Constellation moon/Mars exploration due to being short on Funds. So they give us flex path…a journey going no-where as in Look but don’t touch. All those “experts” want us to believe Flex is the only answer. But then along comes ULA and shows how to do Costellation witin the current budget and have man back on the moon by 2018! ULA does it all no HLV needed, Fuel depots established, commercial flights, saves billions using existing Delta and Atlas boosters, moon base, rovers then on to Mars. DON”T LET THOSE SHORT SIGHTED EXPERTS PULL THE WOOL OVER YOUR EYES!!!! Check it out…this is the program that puts NASA back in game and encourages commercial involvemnt. LET THE PUBLIC KNOW THERE ARE OTHER OPTIONS!!!!!! MUCH BETTER OPTIONS!!!
http://www.ulalaunch.com/docs/publications/AffordableExplorationArchitecture2009.pdf
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/air_space/4330793.html
Comment by Doug Gard — December 16, 2009 @ 7:40 pm
Paul, I agree with you in a large part about Flexible Path. I also support development of lunar resources in order to facilitate long term space development. The ISS has created a paradigm shift in commercial human space development in LEO. NASA took the long expensive road to build the ISS because of the space shuttle program. The space station concept evolved over a decade before construction began. But nevertheless, that development has spurred a new round of commercial space development both on the suborbital level and LEO.
Ironically, NASA has abetted this movement by building an architecture which cannot possibly compete with commercial spaceflight in LEO. The Constellation program may not be perfect, but it includes two necessary components for space flight. A crew vehicle and a heavy lifter. By the time both are develop, there will be ample opportunity to refocus the Constellation onto lunar development and ISRU. Once the lunar base is establish, then a paradign shift in space travel beyond LEO can occur.
Comment by Gary Miles — December 16, 2009 @ 10:47 pm
One of the problems with the Constellation Program right from the start was NASA’s only half hearted commitment to a lunar base which made many people wonder if this was only an Apollo redux program.
But why build a permanent base on the Moon?
1. We’ll finally determine if living long term under a 1/6 gravity environment is deleterious to humans and other animals as far as health, reproduction, and growth. The results of this alone could have profound implications for space exploration and potential colonization.
2. We’ll finally discover if food can be efficiently grown under artificial conditions under a 1/6 gravity environment.
3. We’ll finally determine just how much and how effective regolith shielding is as protection against galactic and solar radiation and micrometeorites on the lunar surface.
4. Unmanned Earth operated solar powered rovers could travel all over the Moon collecting rocks and soil, returning their samples to the lunar base for return to Earth.
5. Unmanned Earth operated solar powered rovers could travel all over the Moon prospecting and collecting lunar meteorites for their platinum resources returning to the Moon base with their precious goods.
6. With emerging commercial manned space programs on the horizon, and potentially thousands of wealthy individuals on this planet willing to pay for a trip into space, a Moonbase could be a future destination for hundreds or perhaps thousands of wealthy space tourist and lunar lotto winners annually.
7. In the long run (perhaps just 20 or 30 years after we return to the Moon), a large lunar colony might be a perfect place for satellite manufacturing and launching since its much cheaper to launch satellites from the Moon into Earth orbit than from the Earth’s surface. The Moon would then dominate the satellite manufacturing and launch business and be at the core of a currently $100 billion a year satellite telecommunications industry.
8. The burial of cremated remains on the lunar surface might also be a lucrative venture perhaps generating billions of dollars annually. Perhaps a round trip of a loved one’s ashes sprinkled with lunar dust and returning to Earth in a beautiful lunar manufactured urn might also be a lucrative venture.
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — December 17, 2009 @ 2:04 am
Oh! I probably should have added that lunar base will finally determine if we can efficiently extract oxygen from the lunar regolith and mine the ice and hydrocarbons at the lunar poles.
Comment by Marcel F. Williams — December 17, 2009 @ 2:18 am
Even if manned missions to Lagrange points and NEOs precede manned missions to the moon, as I advocate, there is no reason why robotic precursor missions to the moon should wait. Manned NEO missions and perhaps Lagrange point missions should probably be preceded by robotic precursors, but robotic precursor missions to the moon could come first. It would probably be wise to do that just to keep some attention focused on the moon.
Sending a few remotely controlled roomba bots to sinter or melt landing pads would be great. Navigation beacons would also be a good idea. ISRU experiments and prospector missions are another possibility. Both would keep the link with later manned exploration clear.
Comment by Martijn Meijering — December 17, 2009 @ 4:25 pm
Even if manned missions to Lagrange points and NEOs precede manned missions to the moon, as I advocate, there is no reason why robotic precursor missions to the moon should wait.
Yes there is — there won’t be any money for anything else. The current ESAS architecture has gutted the lunar robotic program; how would a NASA “big rockets to nowhere” implementation of FP change that arrangement?
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — December 17, 2009 @ 5:43 pm
It wouldn’t. If all we get is big rockets to nowhere, we’re screwed, even if we do get a moon base. You want one, I get that and I want one too. But what I want even more is commercial development of space. If I had to choose between that and exploration I’d choose commercial development of space.
Of course, the only reason you’d have to choose between these two is if NASA insists it needs to build big rockets and if Congress and the Obama administration agree. If that happens, any hope of NASA helping with opening up space is gone for a generation. If we can’t have commercial synergy in the next couple of years then I’d rather choose killing off the Shuttle stack and having no moon base and even no exploration than doing exploration with an SDLV. That would at least leave open the possibility of commercial synergy a few years down the road.
You would perhaps rather settle for the moon base and I respect that. Of course, if they blow all the money on big rockets there will be nothing left for a moon base either.
Comment by Martijn Meijering — December 17, 2009 @ 8:39 pm
the only reason you’d have to choose between these two is if NASA insists it needs to build big rockets and if Congress and the Obama administration agree
And this is exactly the situation we’re in and that’s why I wrote this column. By the way, in the list above, you left out the “Augustine committee.” So they are all in agreement.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — December 18, 2009 @ 4:04 am
Good point about the Augustine committee. But isn’t the moon base lost anyway with an SDLV? A moon base with EELV might not even be affordable, let alone with SDLV. If SDLV is the choice as seems likely my only hope is that MSFC will screw up again between now and 2018 and the SDLV will be canceled for good. A five to ten year delay is better than a twenty five year delay. Of course, even if that happens it could still end up taking out the ISS.
If we want to see commercial development of space in our lifetimes all our hopes are now riding on SpaceX, whatever comes out of CCDev and suborbital efforts. SDLV is a travesty.
Comment by Martijn Meijering — December 18, 2009 @ 9:28 am
There are SDLVs and SDLVs — we could make a Shuttle side-mount using the existing SRB, ET and left-over SSME (there are enough to make between 15 and 19 SDLVs) for minimal investment. Each could put ~60 mT into LEO and that capability is enough to emplace a lunar outpost and associated equipment. Before human arrival, we could start resource prospecting and experiment with processes using EELV launched robotics and teleoperated machines; these assets would be left in place on the Moon for future use by humans.
I simply don’t buy the NASA/Augustine line that there’s not enough money to do this. They need to craft an architecture that permits them to make incremental progress under existing budgets. If they’re the smartest people and the finest engineering organization in the world, that shouldn’t be an insurmountable obstacle.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — December 18, 2009 @ 10:17 am
I simply don’t buy the NASA/Augustine line that there’s not enough money to do this.
Are you assuming the ISS is scuttled in 2020 or perhaps earlier? The Augustine committee assumes you can have two out of the following three: SDLV, exploration, ISS. And xploration would exclude a moon base. I’m having a hard time believing you could have Shuttle-C + ISS + moon base.
I would consider abandoning LEO an even bigger disaster, as what some NASA insiders call yielding LEO to commercial players translates to making off with the loot to safely beyond LEO and making sure there is nothing left in LEO.
If they’re the smartest people and the finest engineering organization in the world, that shouldn’t be an insurmountable obstacle.
Surely you don’t believe that is true?
Comment by Martijn Meijering — December 18, 2009 @ 2:45 pm
The Augustine committee assumes you can have two out of the following three: SDLV, exploration, ISS
I know they do. And they are wrong.
The one aspect everyone forgets is that schedule is the real free variable. We do all these things and we take as long as we need to do them. Build the program with small, incremental, but cumulative steps. We get there eventually. But we make constant, steady progress, even when budgets are tight.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — December 18, 2009 @ 3:28 pm
Build the program with small, incremental, but cumulative steps.
Amen to that. I’d say that that is in fact one of the potential strengths of the Flexible Path, even though you are right in pointing out NASA would likely find a way to mess that up.
But doesn’t the high fixed cost of the Shuttle stack throw a spanner in the works here? Sure, you can develop the SDLV slowly, but if there isn’t the money to both use it for exploration and maintain the ISS you’d have to sacrifice one capability for another. That’s not incremental progress, although it is incremental change.
You have argued that the Flexible Path as implemented by NASA is unlikely to yield the spacefaring capabilities that people who want to see commercial development of space would hope for. You are probably right about that, or at least it is unlikely to yield much.
A moon base (if that is possible budget wise) is a perfectly honourable alternative goal to commercial development of space. It is a goal spacefaring enthusiasts might find less exciting, but it is certainly better than nothing. That part of your argument I find convincing.
But I don’t think it’s true that there would be no further pain for advocates of a spacefaring civilisation. Losing ISS (or another permanent presence in LEO) would be a high price to pay. Not having the opportunity to delay exploration in the hope that a later administration might be willing to go down the commercial route with depots and such is another non-zero opportunity cost. ISS and Lagrange point infrastructure are arguably of greater benefit to commercial development of space than a lunar base. In my opinion switching from NASA-style Flexible Path to a lunar base would be a step backward from the point of view of commercial development of space. In other words, although your argument has some merit, it likely won’t and in my opinion shouldn’t sway advocates of a spacefaring civilisation to switch their allegiance to a lunar base. Perfectly honourable position to take, but a different set of priorities.
BTW this little discussion we’re having shows that it is actually possible for reasonable people who have different priorities (exploration vs commercial development of space) to have a civil, honourable and honest discussion without resorting to lies and distortions as happens so often on online forums.
Comment by Martijn Meijering — December 18, 2009 @ 4:16 pm
But doesn’t the high fixed cost of the Shuttle stack throw a spanner in the works here?
The high costs of the Shuttle “stack” are mostly associated with the people costs of refurbishing the Orbiter after each flight, not by stacking launch components in the VAB. Shuttle-side mount won’t have those costs.
But I don’t think it’s true that there would be no further pain for advocates of a spacefaring civilisation.
I didn’t say there wouldn’t be any “pain.” I’ve been in the business over 30 years and it’s been one continuous pain. But I happen to think it’s important enough to endure it.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — December 18, 2009 @ 5:53 pm
Paul,
A program built on developing human spaceflight through incremental steps withing existing NASA budget would seem logical and ideal. For one, NASA’s budget has not even been increased to match the inflation rate over the last four decades. Any kind of program, no matter how incremental, would have to be cut back over time due to the inflation rate unless NASA budget is given parity.
Two, as you are keenly aware, NASA is subject to the changes in political winds whenever a new White House administration takes over. From Nixon, to Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II, NASA’s policy has changed drastically. The sustained construction of the ISS is probably the most longterm project NASA has endeavored to build and even then it evolved from the Space Station Freedom to International Space Station. So how do you propose to insulate NASA from Presidential politics in order to guide a longterm strategic vision?
Three, historically, human development rarely occurs incrementally. In fact, technological development tend to spur rapid changes in the market and human society. Who for instance could have predicted the impact of the Internet and the changes that it has created in information technology? Cellular communications? Even microwave technology in food preparation. The guiding factor seems to be creating or establishing new markets either through technological innovation or geographical distribution.
So getting to the Moon and staying there to develop its resources to create new markets could expand human society beyond LEO. Once these markets are established then development of better means of space travel can proceed more rapidly. Whether any of us like it or not, the decision on the architecture was made almost 5 years ago by Congress at the behest of Michael Griffin. What is relevant is the Augustine panel report stated that the Constellation program is executable and can succeed in getting to the Moon. If Obama changes this course now, what is to stop the next President changing Obama’s decision 4 or 8 years from now? It is like a perpetual game of ping pong where nobody is winning and we are all losing. Staying the course and tweaking the Constellation program to succeed in getting to the Moon and establishing a permanent lunar base (fingers crossed) is a worthwhile goal. Once the lunar base is there, that is when your paradigm change will occur.
Comment by Gary Miles — December 19, 2009 @ 12:21 am
What is relevant is the Augustine panel report stated that the Constellation program is executable and can succeed in getting to the Moon. If Obama changes this course now, what is to stop the next President changing Obama’s decision 4 or 8 years from now?
Gary,
The Augustine report is wrong. The current architecture is not executable for the simple reason that there is not enough money to do it. The Vision did not direct NASA to create an unaffordable architecture and then whine about not having the money for it.
As far as changes in strategic direction go, I am arguing against that — I want NASA to carry out the direction it was given on January 14, 2004. They are the ones who changed the mission, from one using lunar resources to establish a sustainable and useful human presence in space to a rocket-building entitlement program. They were given clear programmatic direction and chose not to do what they were told. So exactly where is the problem with program execution?
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — December 19, 2009 @ 4:59 am
Paul,
Sustainable government programs are a rarity given the changes in political discourse in the federal government over time. Social Security and Medicare have survived this long due to their immense popularity with a solid political base to protect them. Human spaceflight has no such political base. Commercial markets are what provides sustainability to transportation systems. So establishing a market on the Moon is what will sustain space travel beyond LEO.
You have pointed out that the Flexible Path option has no identifiable markets on which to develop and generate revenue to sustain the development of human space travel. Moreover, under NASA, the same government contractors that have been providing services for NASA for the last 40 years, namely Boeing, Lockheed Martin, ATK, Northrop Grumman will remain the same players for development Flexible Path option. The dates these companies have provided for operational launchers and spacecraft are no more reliable than the dates given by NASA.
Given the unlikelihood of NASA implementing an incremental, sustainable program, which strategy would you choose to support. The Moon First with either Constellation program or possibly Ares V Lite variant where there remains the possibility of establishing a market for real commercial expansion? Or Flexible Path which leads to nowhere and depends on developing technology that does not exist yet with no to little hope of establishing new markets beyond LEO?
Comment by Gary Miles — December 19, 2009 @ 3:38 pm
Sustainable government programs are a rarity given the changes in political discourse in the federal government over time
On the contrary, my impression is that no government spending program or agency ever goes away, unless by a specific act of Congress. We had a tea-tasting board funded by the federal government for over 200 years. The only question is whether money will be spent wisely or not.
which strategy would you choose to support. The Moon First with either Constellation program or possibly Ares V Lite …. Or Flexible Path…?
Your choice is a false one. Neither will lead to the kind of long term space faring capability that we need. Either NASA will change the way it conducts business in space or it will go nowhere. It’s as simple as that.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — December 20, 2009 @ 4:33 am
I am a little surprised and disappointed that the Augustine commission didn’t promote the idea of a Lunar space elevator, which (unlike a terrestrial space elevator) could be built with existing fiber. There is highly unlikely to be anything already at the Lagrange points, but a lunar space elevator would start at L1, and would seem to be a good use of human presence and heavy lift capacity.
The Pearson report on a Lunar Space Elevator http://www.niac.usra.edu/files/studies/final_report/1032Pearson.pdf gives some background here, but I think is ambitious for initial goals, with elevator masses in the kiloton range. I would argue for an initial elevator that was just capable of bringing 1 kg of mass up from the Lunar surface. This would both provide a new lunar sample, presumably from the pre-Imbrian Sinus Medii mare at the sub-Earth point, and would enble us to gain experience with the workings of an actual elevator. I think that the cost to do this would be comparable, and the benefit far greater, than developing another LEM.
Comment by Marshall Eubanks — December 20, 2009 @ 6:01 pm
[...] http://blogs.airspacemag.com/moon/2009/12/16/arguing-about-human-space-exploration/ [...]
Pingback by Transactional, Transitional, and Transformational Change « Leading Space — December 20, 2009 @ 10:08 pm
As Paul mentions, one of the reasons we are in the mess we are in when it comes to human space flight beyond LEO is because of the way NASA chose to implement the strategic plan it was given in January 2004. Here are a few excerpts from President’s Bush’s speech: “Beginning no later than 2008, we will send a series of robotic missions to the lunar surface to research and prepare for future human exploration. . . Also, the Moon is home to abundant resources. Its soil contains raw materials that might be harvested and processed into rocket fuel or breathable air. . . We can use our time on the Moon to develop and test new approaches and technologies and systems that will allow us to function in other, more challenging environments.” POP QUIZ: How many robotic missions does NASA have in work for the lunar surface? (Answer: ZERO). How has NASA included the use of lunar resources in their current architecture? (Answer: a few small demonstrations only). NASA obviously chose to ignore this whole thought pattern in the strategic plan that was given to them.
NASA also dropped the ball in adequately describing the strategic plan to the public. A few more excerpts from President Bush’s speech: “The Moon is a logical step toward further progress and achievement. . . Returning to the Moon is an important step for our space program. Establishing an extended human presence on the Moon could vastly reduce the cost of further space exploration, making possible ever more ambitious missions. . . With the experience and knowledge gained on the Moon, we will then be ready to take the next steps of space exploration; human missions to Mars and to worlds beyond.” So, what does Mike Griffin do? He calls the program “Apollo on steroids”, and from then on whenever the press reported on human exploration beyond LEO it was always “NASA’s Moon Program”. And when the Ares-1X launched, headlines read “NASA launches new Moon rocket”. The Ares-1 can only make it to LEO, of course. The moon was only supposed to be the first step, not the entire plan.
Finally, we are also where we are because of politics. Every time the United States get a new President, NASA gets a new direction. Congress too has its pet projects that it directs NASA to execute, many times at the expense of existing projects. There’s no doubt that President Obama’s Administration is very ‘political’, and by definition anything associated with former President Bush is BAD. So here is a couple of excerpts from Arthur C. Clarke in 1951: “The first lunar explorers will probably be mainly interested in the mineral resources of their new world, and upon these its future will very largely depend. . . The human race is remarkably fortunate in having so near at hand a full-sized world with which to experiment: before we aim at the planets, we will have had a chance of perfecting our astronautical techniques on our own satellite . . . the conquest of the Moon will be necessary and inevitable prelude to remoter and still more ambitious projects.” Sound familiar? President Bush was only re-telling the story of a methodical, incremental, and practical approach to expanding human presence into the solar system, that has been told now for over 50 years. It’s not ‘Bush’s plan’.
Trying to be an optimist, I’m hoping that reason will ultimately win the day, and we do embark on the expansion of humans into the solar system, using the Moon as the gateway that it truly is.
John G.
Comment by John G. — December 21, 2009 @ 12:24 pm
Paul,
A more careful reading of the Committee’s “Flexible Path” option will show it *includes* Lunar return capability; but by *first* developing the deep-space capability (i.e., a restartable space transport stage), it lowers the technical difficulty of a lander to the point where a commercial procurement could make one; thus following that course would likely yield a lunar delivery capability at far lower cost/flight and cost/lb to lunar surface than a “get there now!” Lunar architecture.
Speaking for myself I’m well aware of the promise of Lunar ISRU and the advantage of incremental development. I could find no path for incremental development by NASA without incremental destinations, because the organization is so “destination driven”. I think in terms of the capabilities needed, personally. Lunar development needs depots at LEO and a cislunar staging point, a reusable transfer stage between them, and a reusable lander with ISRU propellant, as long as you’re using chemical propellants. The Flexible Path alternative has NASA developing the bulk of those things.
I question whether you *want* NASA as the organization developing Lunar surface infrastructure for cost-effective resource development. That is not playing to their strengths. If they develop enough transportation infrastructure to get you most of the way there, it’s a help.
Comment by Jeff Greason — December 22, 2009 @ 12:02 am
Hi Jeff,
Thanks for reading my post and for your comments. The problem with FP’s inclusion of the “capability” for lunar surface return is that it is optional and in NASA-speak, that means that you don’t get it.
I could find no path for incremental development by NASA without incremental destinations, because the organization is so “destination driven”. I think in terms of the capabilities needed, personally.
So do I. And we need a path that creates capabilities incrementally — the key is to emplace and use robotic assets first to demonstrate and begin to make what we need on the Moon. NASA claims that they want to build, launch and fly hardware. Let them do so by pre-emplacing ISRU equipment on the Moon and practice extracting resources through remote teleoperation. We can survey, prospect, and conduct demonstrations first. Then small payloads can extract and store product before human arrival. There is no destination short of the Moon where this can be done.
I do not buy the committee argument that this is unaffordable; in the spring of 2004, Code M (now SOMD) had a tiger team examine an affordable architecture built around robotic outpost emplacement and a side-mount SDLV made from leftover STS pieces, which could put 60 mT into LEO. It had a lunar outpost in place and operating by 2016.
I question whether you *want* NASA as the organization developing Lunar surface infrastructure for cost-effective resource development.
You’re right — their job is NOT to develop the surface infrastructure but to determine how difficult lunar ISRU is, where the choke points are, and how to mitigate any unforeseen difficulties. In other words, they do engineering R&D, not infrastructure creation.
That is not playing to their strengths. If they develop enough transportation infrastructure to get you most of the way there, it’s a help.
Given what’s transpired in the last 5 years, how is developing Earth-Moon transport playing to their “strengths”? The whole reason your committee was called into existence was because of the perception (accurate or not) that the agency had blown the task of transportation development.
Having no particular destination in mind (FP) is much worse; it intensifies and buttresses NASA’s tendency to excel in pointless “busy work” and Powerpoint engineering rather than cutting metal and conducting flight test. The real problem is the agency’s “Apollo” mindset, in which big rockets and big money are the sine qua non of space exploration. They need a major change in their business model, not a re-direct away from the Moon.
The Vision was about changing the paradigm, of finding out whether we could use space resources to change the rules of space faring. It was not a “ticket out of LEO for humans” or a “human Mars mission” or a “rocket building entitlement.” It was NASA’s last chance to do something significant and game-changing. Instead, they dusted off and trotted out “Apollo on steroids.” I do not want to appear cynical, but it makes one question whether they are capable of significant change.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — December 22, 2009 @ 5:13 am
Paul,
I can tell that the passion is flowing… keep it going! Those of us within NASA who believe it is the “Why” question (Why should NASA do the things that it does in its Human Space program?) that is the most critical aspect of the debate will do our part to honor the bigger vision context and advocate to those within who don’t fully understand it. We do what we do so that we learn how to live off-planet as we progress to become unbounded from Earth. By the way, i was also disappointed that the Augustine folks did not adequately address the “why” question.
Comment by TonyL — December 23, 2009 @ 11:29 am
Hi Tony,
Thanks for reading and commenting. The Augustine committee actually did say that human expansion into space was the “long-term goal” for human spaceflight.
They then proceeded to lay out a plan using the Apollo-template of big rockets and PR stunts that is the very antithesis of sustainable human presence.
So, like most committee reports, it’s a mixture of the good and the bad — the sublime and the ridiculous.
Comment by Paul D. Spudis — December 23, 2009 @ 12:37 pm
If Nasa is not protecting us from asteroids and comets, Nasa is waste of money. The survival of human civilization being a compelling thought? Protect us instead of doing ivory tower make work projects.
And if Earth does get impaled by some rock or nuke itself, it might be nice to have some colonies on nearby planets. The survival of human civilization being a compelling thought?
You dont have to worry about the gravity well if you are not coming back. Send people on one way trips. If I were terminally ill I would go and work myself to death setting up house. I might even go healthy and try to eke out long term survival on a hidious algea diet. Many people would.
Mars has aerodynamic braking so it takes less fuel to land there. No point in a sample return mission from Mars, better to send people up there and see if there is some bug that kills them rather than bringing a bug here.
We will have to dig underground or pile up dirt to survive radiation. Might as well send the robots to get started. Is that taboo terraforming? might ruin the sacred science musuem up there? Terraforming! now thats a goal? The survival of human civilization being a compelling thought?
Comment by Francis X. Gentile — January 9, 2010 @ 3:44 am
[...] In an interesting post at Vision Restoration, “Ray” tackles the desultory Flexible Path (FP) architecture of the Augustine committee, which calls for human missions to low gravity destinations and delays missions to the lunar and martian surface. The problems he finds with FP are similar to points that I’ve discussed in a previous post. [...]
Pingback by Beyond LEO – Flexible Path Revisited | The Once and Future Moon — January 23, 2010 @ 6:13 am
[...] along with all the required consumables for multi-week and multi-month duration missions of their Flexible Path exploration option. For any significant effort, the enormous mass is launched using either [...]
Pingback by Value for Cost: The Determinate Path | The Once and Future Moon — March 24, 2010 @ 8:37 am
[...] see different motives for this new direction and are particularly concerned that the new “flexible path (FP)” doesn’t have any specified destination or [...]
Pingback by To do the heavy lifting | The Once and Future Moon — April 14, 2010 @ 3:00 pm
[...] new direction quite closely. Both the IAA report and the administration’s budget propose a “flexible path” approach for human journeys beyond low Earth orbit. Both plans outline a variety of possible [...]
Pingback by Malice, Mischief and Misconceptions | The Once and Future Moon — June 26, 2010 @ 7:03 pm
[...] new direction quite closely. Both the IAA report and the administration’s budget propose a “flexible path” approach for human journeys beyond low Earth orbit. Both plans outline a variety of possible [...]
Pingback by Malice, Mischief and Misconceptions « Aerospace Blog — June 27, 2010 @ 8:02 pm
[...] take issue with several points in the Augustine report and have commented on them at length in several previous posts of this blog. But now that the dust has settled and we have a “new direction” [...]
Pingback by Can we afford to return to the Moon? | The Once and Future Moon — December 21, 2010 @ 10:01 am
[...] dubbed “the mission to nowhere,” NASA and the administration appear undeterred about keeping Flexible Path as their guiding direction. It is clear from this interview and some previous remarks that [...]
Pingback by Who’s short-sighted? | The Once and Future Moon — May 4, 2011 @ 3:57 pm
[...] replaced lunar return? That’s a bit more muddled, but vague notions were advanced that human missions “beyond low Earth orbit” could be undertaken only if NASA was freed from [...]
Pingback by The Latest Destination for Human Spaceflight | The Once and Future Moon — December 1, 2011 @ 5:50 am
[...] not a new path or direction to follow. Mirages of human missions to asteroids and following a “flexible path” will produce pointless viewgraph engineering – and no missions getting off the ground. At [...]
Pingback by The Flight of the Dragon | The Once and Future Moon — May 15, 2012 @ 3:22 pm