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	<title>Comments on: Who Inspects the Navy&#8217;s Aircraft Carriers?</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/2013/02/who-inspects-the-navys-aircraft-carriers/</link>
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		<title>By: GACartier</title>
		<link>http://blogs.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/2013/02/who-inspects-the-navys-aircraft-carriers/comment-page-1/#comment-12606</link>
		<dc:creator>GACartier</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2013 13:43:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/?p=22514#comment-12606</guid>
		<description>Even the sugar container was fair game when I was on active duty.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Even the sugar container was fair game when I was on active duty.</p>
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		<title>By: Fuentes</title>
		<link>http://blogs.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/2013/02/who-inspects-the-navys-aircraft-carriers/comment-page-1/#comment-12593</link>
		<dc:creator>Fuentes</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2013 06:06:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/?p=22514#comment-12593</guid>
		<description>The main problem with the USAF&#039;s 66-1 and the Navy&#039;s 4790 or later versions is there is not a common sense or follow up to ensure the inspectors are qualified. As per the afore mentioned programs, the Navy aviation maint inspectors are supposed to be the cream of the crop. In real life they are the folks a work center can afford to lose. If you are in charge of a work center and are required to send a body to QC/QA, you are not going to lose your best leader or worker to QC/QA.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The main problem with the USAF&#8217;s 66-1 and the Navy&#8217;s 4790 or later versions is there is not a common sense or follow up to ensure the inspectors are qualified. As per the afore mentioned programs, the Navy aviation maint inspectors are supposed to be the cream of the crop. In real life they are the folks a work center can afford to lose. If you are in charge of a work center and are required to send a body to QC/QA, you are not going to lose your best leader or worker to QC/QA.</p>
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		<title>By: Vaughn Clevenger</title>
		<link>http://blogs.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/2013/02/who-inspects-the-navys-aircraft-carriers/comment-page-1/#comment-12571</link>
		<dc:creator>Vaughn Clevenger</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2013 18:19:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/?p=22514#comment-12571</guid>
		<description>The article makes it appear that in-depth inspections are only done on the 60 month or now 30 month cycle and doesn&#039;t come close to the level of inspections and tests that are done on a routine basis to ensure equipment safety, reliability and functionality.

While I can&#039;t speak for my &quot;black shoe&quot; brothers, as I was a Naval Aviator during the Vietnam era I can attest the the amount of inspection and test of equipment done at that time. 

The scheme is essentially:
     1. Per use or first use of the day or watch - a complete check of system functions using a checklist.
     2. During and after any repair, maintenance or reconfiguration, systems are rechecked and verified using a checklist; frequently (depending on the criticality of the work), confirmed by a second party using a checklist.
     3. Routine operational in-depth inspections or replacement of components of the systems based on time, cycles or usage; again done and inspected using checklists. 
     4. Depot level in-depth tear-down, inspection, replacement, reassembly, and testing done to the last nut and bolt; again all work done with checklists and inspected to checklists to ensure that it meets specifications for quality, reliability and function.

The point of all of this is that it is virtually impossible for a pilot to get airborne in a plane that is not safe, reliable and mission capable including knowledge of all parts or systems that require maintenance but are not mission critical or safety of flight related. Surely the same approach is used on our ships and the majority of faults found by the inspection teams are administrative or training related.

The reduction of the inspection cycle time, in this era of tight budgets, would indicate that the faults are trending upwards . . . are we really addressing the root causes on a fleet wide basis? How many of the faults found are translated into process and procedural changes applied to the entire fleet?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The article makes it appear that in-depth inspections are only done on the 60 month or now 30 month cycle and doesn&#8217;t come close to the level of inspections and tests that are done on a routine basis to ensure equipment safety, reliability and functionality.</p>
<p>While I can&#8217;t speak for my &#8220;black shoe&#8221; brothers, as I was a Naval Aviator during the Vietnam era I can attest the the amount of inspection and test of equipment done at that time. </p>
<p>The scheme is essentially:<br />
     1. Per use or first use of the day or watch &#8211; a complete check of system functions using a checklist.<br />
     2. During and after any repair, maintenance or reconfiguration, systems are rechecked and verified using a checklist; frequently (depending on the criticality of the work), confirmed by a second party using a checklist.<br />
     3. Routine operational in-depth inspections or replacement of components of the systems based on time, cycles or usage; again done and inspected using checklists.<br />
     4. Depot level in-depth tear-down, inspection, replacement, reassembly, and testing done to the last nut and bolt; again all work done with checklists and inspected to checklists to ensure that it meets specifications for quality, reliability and function.</p>
<p>The point of all of this is that it is virtually impossible for a pilot to get airborne in a plane that is not safe, reliable and mission capable including knowledge of all parts or systems that require maintenance but are not mission critical or safety of flight related. Surely the same approach is used on our ships and the majority of faults found by the inspection teams are administrative or training related.</p>
<p>The reduction of the inspection cycle time, in this era of tight budgets, would indicate that the faults are trending upwards . . . are we really addressing the root causes on a fleet wide basis? How many of the faults found are translated into process and procedural changes applied to the entire fleet?</p>
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